

Da Nang and the Que Son Valley

*The 7th Marines—26th Marines: Protecting the Northern Flank
Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Battleground—Results*

The 7th Marines

North of the 5th Marines' TAOR and west of that of the 1st Marines, the 7th Marines defended a large area of responsibility stretching from Elephant Valley in the northwest to the Thuong Duc Valley in the southwest, west of Da Nang. Although dominated by Charlie Ridge, a hill mass that projected from the Annamite Mountains and constituted a much-used enemy base area, the regimental area included a variety of terrain. To the north, the rolling, brush-covered foothills, interspersed with few hamlets and patches of woods, predominated, while to the south were the steep-sided, jungle-covered walls of Thuong Duc Valley and the broad, rice-paddied flood plain of the Song Vu Gia and Song Yen. Besides Routes 4 and 540, few roads crisscrossed the TAOR. The same could not be said for enemy infiltration routes. The regiment's area of operations, elongated as it was, sat astride all known routes from the western mountains into the Da Nang Vital Area.

With the end of operations in the mountains to the west, Colonel Robert L. Nichols' 1st and 3d Battalions returned to the regiment's TAOR at the beginning of June, where they rejoined the 2d Battalion, which had maintained a screen in the piedmont throughout Operation Oklahoma Hills. Based at Dai La Pass, Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Lugger's 2d Battalion, reinforced from time to time by two additional companies of the regiment, continued its mission of providing security for the Da Nang Vital Area by aggressively patrolling and ambushing throughout its TAOR, while strengthening and improving the Da Nang Barrier.

III MAF envisioned the barrier, or as it was later known, the Da Nang Anti-infiltration System (DAIS), as the first line of defense for the city, its vital military installations, and surrounding populated areas. In June 1968, the 1st Marine Division, at the direction of III MAF, began construction of a physical barrier along the outer edges of the rocket belt, a 12,000-meter semicircle centered on the Da Nang airfield whose radius was the maximum range of the enemy's 122mm and 140mm rockets. The project, as initially conceived, was

to consist of a 500-meter-wide cleared belt of land containing two parallel barbed wire fences, concertina wire entanglements, 23 observation towers, and minefields which would halt or at least delay enemy infiltrators. Although work continued throughout the remainder of 1968, by the beginning of 1969, the barrier remained uncompleted.

Under a revised plan prepared by General Simpson in March 1969, the final sections would be completed, and five Marine rifle companies and a supporting artillery group of two 105mm howitzer batteries, the entire force under the direct operational control of the 1st Division, would be assigned to guard the barrier. According to General Simpson's proposal, the system, when completed, would require no more than 1,800 Marines to keep the enemy out of the rocket belt, freeing nearly 5,000 Marines for offensive operations elsewhere.

By the beginning of June, Marine, ARVN, and Korean engineers had cleared the land, and had finished laying barbed wire, minefields, and over 100 line sensors, but little else. Divided responsibility, poor site planning, and the lack of manpower, materiel, and a well-coordinated fire support plan continued to prevent completion of the system. The installation of the elaborate array of sensors and indirect observation devices had not been accomplished, nor had the forces to monitor them or guard the barrier been assembled. Older portions of the barrier now were deteriorating. Brush, in places 18 feet high, covered portions of the cleared strip, and numerous cuts had been made by farmers bound for their rice fields through the unguarded wire. "Unless radical improvements are made," General Simpson stressed, "the Da Nang Barrier will prove to be ineffectual in countering enemy infiltration into the Da Nang Vital Area."¹ It was this concern which prompted the assignment of elements of Lieutenant Colonel Lugger's battalion to the barrier. Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel James O. Allison's 3d Battalion, designated the regiment's mobile strike battalion, initially was assigned to the barrier following Operation Oklahoma Hills, and tasked with repairing the wire and installing a string of sensors from the Song Tuy Loan to the Song Yen, before moving on to

a number of short, swift strikes into Dodge City, Bo Ban-Duong Lam villages, and Sherwood Forest-An Tan Ridge areas later in the month.

While work on the barrier consumed a portion of the efforts of the 2d and 3d Battalions, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Dowd's 1st Battalion, following its return to the lowlands, concentrated on operations along Route 4 and the Song Vu Gia from Hill 37 near Dai Loc, west to Thuong Duc, in order to reestablish a presence along the road and to block major river fords. These efforts bore fruit on the night of the 19th, when a Company D platoon ambush spotted an equal number of Viet Cong crossing the Song Vu Gia, 10 kilometers west-northwest of Liberty Bridge. The ambush, waiting until the enemy reached midstream, employed organic weapons and artillery fire, killing 20 of the infiltrators. Three nights later, three kilometers downstream, another ambush was sprung, catching eight more Viet Cong and capturing over 1,000 pounds of tea. On 30 June, Allison's 3d Battalion relieved Dowd's Marines in place, as the 1st Battalion, reinforced by one company of the 3d, joined elements of the 5th Marines in the northern Arizona for Operation Forsyth Grove.

Following the three-day Arizona operation, Lieutenant Colonel Dowd's Marines moved back across the Song Vu Gia, relieved the 3d Battalion, and immediately began extensive patrols along the western sections of Route 4. By the end of the first week of July, the 1st Marines, working to the east, completed upgrading the route from Hoi An to the railroad berm, and Dowd's battalion had secured the road and its bridges from Dai Loc to Thuong Duc. On the 10th, the Marines officially opened Route 4 and the first civilian convoy in four years made its way across Dodge City to Dai Loc and then up the Thuong Duc Valley, accomplishing a major goal of the 1st Division's Operation Pipestone Canyon.

Dowd's Marines continued to maintain security for Route 4 until 17 July, when the battalion, relieved by Allison's Marines, again crossed the Song Vu Gia into the Arizona, this time freeing 5th Marines units for operations in the Que Son Mountains. "We landed across the Vu Gia River," reported First Lieutenant Raymond A. Hord, Commanding Officer, Company C, and then "deployed four companies abreast of one another and had a coordinated sweep to the south; two companies through the My Binh region, about 4,000 meters to the east."² Once established on the high ground, 3,000 meters into the Arizona, each company sent out squad-size patrols and night am-



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Col Gildo S. Codispoti, right, assumes the helm of the 7th Marines from Col Robert L. Nichols at change of command ceremonies held at Hill 55 on 9 July.

bushes which encountered numerous enemy reconnaissance and small foraging and ammunition-carrying parties. On occasion the companies combined for sweeps and cordons of specific areas. In one instance, while Companies B and D provided deep security, Company C advanced into the Nam An (5) village complex to conduct a cordon and achieved unexpected results. Lieutenant Hord noted:

We moved very late at night, had a good night move during which the forward elements of my company moved very quietly, and we had a good sound plan in setting up on the objective once we got to it. The second platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant [Anthony H.] Yusi, moved into the right side of the objective, tied in at 12 o'clock, using north as our direction of advance, set his people down very quietly and waited for the first platoon to move in with him. The first platoon, led by [Second] Lieutenant [Ronald W.] Costello, effected the move nicely, did tie in at 12 o'clock and this led for the CP group, led by myself, and the battalion CP group with [Lieutenant] Colonel Dowd and his staff to move right in behind us. We moved into the center of the village that was encompassed by the two platoons to our north and the third platoon tied in to our rear, so we had a very sound cordon in a matter of minutes. And much to the surprise of five NVA ammo humpers sleeping, we woke them up while they were in their bunker and in a matter of about 15 minutes had five POWs.³

This constant, although low-keyed, patrol and sweep activity continued throughout the remainder of July and into the first 10 days of August.

Beginning late on the 11th, conditions worsened. That evening, every major unit throughout the 1st Marine Division area of operations was hit by either mortar or rocket fire, accompanied in most instances by a predawn enemy sapper attack. The heaviest fighting occurred in the Arizona, where Lieutenant Colonel Dowd's battalion initiated a three-day battle, reminiscent of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines encounter in June with a large enemy force, later identified as composed of the *8th and 9th Battalions, 90th NVA Regiment* and *1st Battalion, 368B Artillery (Rocket) Regiment*, which again was attempting to move through the area under cover of the intense series of indirect fire attacks.

At 0415 on the 12th, a Company D listening post and a Company B squad ambush engaged two enemy soldiers sighted midway between their positions, whereupon 15 to 20 enemy directed small arms fire against the two Marine security elements, who then withdrew once reinforced. As the security elements returned to their positions, each of Dowd's companies simultaneously came under heavy, but sporadic, enemy fire, which continued throughout the night. Activation of preplanned artillery concentrations about the friendly positions staved off a major enemy attempt to mass against a single company target. At first light, with air strikes and artillery fire placed on suspected routes of escape, Dowd's Marines swept the site of the predawn firefights. In the vicinity of the initial action, sweeping units found 58 NVA killed, 2 wounded, who were taken prisoner, and 16 AK47 rifles, 3 light machine guns, 3 grenade launchers, and a large assortment of ordnance.

In an effort to relocate the enemy force, Lieutenant Hord's company began sweeping to the northeast shortly after sunrise. At 0830, Hord's Marines regained contact. The enemy was by then deployed in bunkers within a tree line near the villages of Phu An (1) and (2), some six kilometers northwest of An Hoa Combat Base. Consolidating his position for a subsequent assault, Lieutenant Hord directed a coordinated air and artillery attack against the enemy's fortified positions. By 1330, Lieutenant Colonel Dowd committed Company D to cover Hord's right flank, and both companies then prepared to assault. Despite the results of the heavy air and artillery concentration, which made movement through the thick tree line difficult,

the enemy mustered enough strength to oppose the Marine assault. Lieutenant Hord observed:

In essence we had four platoons on line with awesome firepower going into this objective. We got the people up and we moved forward and got inside the tree lines, through the first initial trench networks. In the first trench line we found several NVA bodies, well-equipped NVA, quite young, well-equipped with web gear, grenades, AK47s, helmets, and B40 rocket launchers. In one bunker complex, as we moved through there, we had to assault one with two machine guns which had excellent grazing fire over our positions, and it is very hard to describe the efforts and the courage that each individual Marine displayed in the company as we moved forward assaulting these positions: throwing grenades, shooting LAWs, trying to envelop, getting pinned-down, getting up and moving again. This was just head-on-type stuff, grenade throwing, and almost hand-to-hand combat. On each occasion, as soon as we would secure 10 meters of ground we would come under attack again from the next network of trenches. The NVA were very well dug in and they were waiting for us.⁴

At 1430, Company A, maneuvering toward the battle area, caught a portion of the enemy force, either attempting to outflank the two Marine companies or to flee. By late afternoon, the main assault had broken through the tree line and routed the defenders. Air and artillery peppered the remnants as they fled to the north and northwest. All fighting ceased shortly before sunset, and the 1st Battalion established night defensive positions. Enemy losses for the daylong battle were 145 killed and 50 individual and automatic weapons captured.

Ordered to reinforce Dowd's Marines, Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines moved by helicopter, and Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines advanced overland by foot on the afternoon of the 12th. Neither was committed immediately, but instead held in blocking positions as a reserve. Beginning at dawn on the 13th, and preceded by an air and artillery preparation, Company I joined 1st Battalion Marines in a four-company-front, northeasterly attack through the Finger Lake region of the Arizona. At midday, the attacking force engaged an estimated 100-man NVA unit in a skirmish which lasted some seven hours. Like the previous days' battles, the fighting was again at close quarters, with Marines inflicting 73 casualties, while sustaining 5 killed and 33 wounded. Included among the dead was Lieutenant Colonel Dowd, subsequently awarded the Navy Cross, who was felled by a burst of enemy automatic weapons fire as he and a portion of his command group endeavored to maneuver toward the site of the day's heaviest fighting. Thirty-nine-year-

old Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Clark assumed command of the battalion the following day.

On the 14th, the enemy again attacked. Just after midnight, a remnant of the scattered NVA force attempted to breach the battalion command group's night defensive position, overlooking the Song Vu Gia, near the village of My Hoa (3). Employing the full spectrum of organic and supporting arms, Clark's Marines beat back the attempt, breaking what was to be the enemy's final and somewhat feeble bid to gain a victory at any cost in the Arizona during August. A sweep of the perimeter at dawn revealed 13 bodies and 10 weapons. In three days, the reinforced 1st Battalion had inflicted over 220 casualties, severely disabling the *90th NVA Regiment* and forcing it again to withdraw in order to regroup.

Within hours of the last engagement in the Arizona, the 7th Marines, under World War II and Korean combat veteran, Colonel Gildo S. Codispoli, who had

A Marine shoulders an M79 grenade launcher and fires into a treeline suspected of harboring several Viet Cong guerrillas during the heavy Arizona fighting.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371757



taken over the regiment in July, received final orders from III MAF and the division to stand down in preparation for a move south into the Que Son Valley, also known as the Nui Loc Son basin. Recent Marine multi-battalion and special landing force operations had denied the enemy use of his traditional infiltration routes through the An Hoa basin, as well as access to Dodge City and Go Noi Island, forcing him to shift a larger portion of his operations into the Que Son Mountains and Valley, where elements of the Army's Americal Division likewise had disrupted his movement. This southward expansion of the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility was the next step in the continuing battle to deny the enemy access to the populated and rice-rich coastal lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. In addition to allowing Vietnamese regular and territorial forces a greater role in the defense of the Da Nang Vital Area, this shift not only brought the whole of Quang Nam Province, but also key terrain features, previously divided between the two divisions, under control of the 1st Marine Division.

The move of the 7th Marines 54 kilometers to the southeast was fraught with problems from the beginning. This was not to be a short tactical move, but a permanent one. In addition to men and equipment based at the regiment's seven cantonments scattered throughout the soon-to-be-vacated area of operations, all property assigned to the regiment would also be moved, necessitating use of the division's entire rolling stock. First to go would be the 2d Battalion. By the morning of the 15th, Lieutenant Colonel Luger's Marines and their equipment were loaded on board 120 trucks at Dai La Pass and ready to head down Highway 1. "This was," according to Major Peter S. Beck, regimental S-4, "the greatest single mistake we could have made, since it became readily apparent that it was absolutely impossible to control 120 vehicles in one convoy on a narrow dirt road, many sections of which were only passable one way at a time."⁵

What occurred later in the day on the 15th could only be termed a fiasco. As Luger's Marines moved south, without the aid of control vehicles or military police stationed at obvious choke points, unbeknownst, a 35-truck, 9th Engineer convoy, loaded with wide-angle-bladed Eimco tractors, was moving north from Chu Lai. They met at the one place on Route 1 that could have precipitated the worst bottleneck possible: a one-way, one-vehicle-at-a-time, pontoon bridge. Riding in front of the 120-truck convoy was Major Beck, and as he later reported:



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Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines patrol a Vietnamese village near Landing Zone Baldy, while the rest of the regiment pushes westward into the Que Son Valley.

Needless to say, the tractor-trailers going north completely blocked the road so that the southbound convoy could not cross and could not pass if they could cross. And the northbound convoy, which was the tractor-trailers with the bulldozers, completely blocked their portion of the road. Consequently, we had a four-and-one-half-hour bottleneck at this bridge, which ate up most of the day, and additionally, at one point in the road, concentrated in excess of 150 pieces of large rolling stock plus all the equipment that they were carrying and troops . . . We finally managed to un-snarl the bottleneck, by allowing the northbound convoy, with the wide-load angle blades, to pass first because there was no way possible for the southbound convoy to pass. In doing this we had to back up the 120 trucks off the right shoulder of the road, so that the truck convoy going north could pass. This was an unbelievable task, since Marines who can't move in either direction become very frustrated and all of a sudden we had 1,000 traffic control personnel; everybody thinking they knew exactly what they were doing.⁸

The Marines finally resolved the problem and the convoy continued; however, it was so late in the day when it arrived at LZ Baldy that it could not proceed to its final destination, LZ Ross, 16 kilometers inland.

Again, this presented an unacceptable tactical situation: 120 trucks and a large proportion of Lugger's Marines sitting on Baldy's landing strip—a lucrative mortar target. The battalion convoy was in fact mortared on the night of the 15th, but fortunately only one Marine was wounded. The following morning, the convoy traveled the 16 kilometers along Route 535 to LZ Ross without incident.

With one battalion's move completed, the movement procedures and schedule of the remaining two had to be revised due to the problems encountered on the 15th. In discussions which followed the move, division and regimental planners decided that instead of trucks, CH-53 helicopters would be used to move troops, while equipment would be carried by 30-truck convoys spaced over a period of days, instead of a single, 120-truck convoy. In addition, military police would be assigned to each bridge, choke point, and curve, and "roadmaster" jeeps would patrol Highway 1, regulating the flow of traffic. Beginning on the 17th,

men and equipment of the 3d, and then the 1st Battalion, moved without incident to LZ Baldy, and by 23 August, the regiment had settled into its new area of operations, which encompassed a large portion of the Que Son Valley.⁷

Lying south of the rugged, jungle-covered Que Son Mountains, the fertile Que Son Valley spread north-eastward from its head at Hiep Duc into the coastal plain between Hoi An and Tam Ky. Running through its center, in an easterly and then northeasterly direction, was the Song Ly Ly which marked the boundary between Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, and also the new areas of responsibility of the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions.

As a major enemy thoroughfare, the region had experienced much warfare. In the Que Son Mountains, ridgelines, ravines, and caves hid enemy base camps and harboring sites, all within easy striking distance of the populated coast. The valley, with its many Viet Cong-controlled hamlets, was a major source of food and manpower. From the war's earliest stages, Communist main force elements roamed the area, and as a result, it was the site of one of the Marines' first large-scale operations in 1965. The Marines returned in 1966 and again in 1967, but as North Vietnamese pressure along the DMZ pulled the Marines northward, the Army took over responsibility. On 20 August 1969, the Army officially handed back the defense of the northern portion of the Nui Loc Son Basin, as the 7th Marines moved into the Que Son Valley.

From the Army, the 7th Marines inherited two combat bases, both located on Route 535, a narrow dirt road which ran westward from Route 1 to the district headquarters at Que Son. There the road divided, with Route 535 continuing southward into the Americal TAOR, while the northern fork, Route 536, climbed over the Que Son Mountains, through Antenna Valley, and then into the An Hoa basin. LZ Baldy, formerly the command post of the Army's 196th Infantry Brigade and now site of the 7th Marines' Headquarters, was the easternmost of the two bases, located at the intersection of Route 535 and Route 1, about 30 kilometers south of Da Nang. Sixteen kilometers west, near Que Son District Headquarters, was Fire Support Base Ross, which commanded the Que Son Valley.

Within days of the arrival of the 7th Marines, heavy fighting erupted in the rolling foothills around Hiep Duc, some 32 kilometers west of Tam Ky, at the head of the Que Son Valley. Triggered by elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade endeavoring to reach a downed

helicopter, the Army's 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry locked horns with elements of the *1st VC Regiment* and *3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division*, both of which were attempting to destroy the government's model pacification effort at Hiep Duc. By 20 August, the 31st Infantry had killed over 300 enemy troops, and was still heavily engaged. The following day, the Army battalion requested the 7th Marines provide "any size unit" to relieve the pressure by sweeping a finger of the Que Son Mountains to the east of their position. At 1400, in over-100-degree heat, two of Lieutenant Colonel Lugger's companies, F and G, in addition to the battalion's Alpha command group, left FSB Ross and advanced down Route 535 towards the hill mass, thought to contain an NVA battalion and regimental command post.⁸

Early on the morning of the 22d, Company F moved up Hill 441, north of the village of Phu Binh (3), and then back down where it joined Company G in a sweep of the hill's southern slope. As the companies moved westward, the only difficulty encountered was the heat, which caused numerous nonbattle casualties, requiring several emergency evacuations. Later in the day, again at the request of the 31st Infantry, Lugger's two companies moved off the slopes of Hill 441, and by the morning of the 23d, had set up a 1,500-meter blocking position, stretching across the valley floor. The following day, Companies F and G were to begin moving slowly forward in an effort to relieve enemy pressure on the Army battalion, pushing eastward from Hiep Duc. In the interim, forward and flank patrols were sent out. On the left, Company F made no contact as it reconnoitered the area to the front of its position, but on the opposite flank, as Lieutenant Colonel Lugger reported, Company G encountered stiff resistance:

The hill mass located to my immediate right front was a very heavily covered small hill . . . I ordered Golf Company to send a reconnaissance force forward to determine what was on that hill, and they sent a reinforced squad. The squad moved up the slope, and was about one-third of the way up when it came under intensive sniper fire. The enemy, firing from very well-concealed and very heavy sniper positions, inflicted wounds on two men and then, with his normal tactics, he covered the bodies with fire so that anyone who attempted to go forward to assist or to aid or to retrieve the bodies would himself come under very intensive fire. Before the day was out, we had about three bodies that we could not retrieve.⁹

At 1700, Company H moved by air to reinforce Company G and the two units attempted to recover the dead Marines, but failed. On the 24th, after air and

artillery had stripped away the heavy foliage and destroyed the enemy's positions, the two companies made another attempt during which they retrieved the three bodies.

All three companies of Lugger's battalion moved out on the morning of the 25th, but ran headlong into elements of the two enemy regiments. On the right, Companies G and H encountered the same heavy resistance they had on the 23d, and spent most of the day attempting to both move forward and recover their casualties. On the left, elements of Company F came under intensive mortar, RPG, and automatic weapons fire, as did Lugger's command group in the center. With the enemy less than 50 meters away, noted Lieutenant Colonel Lugger, "every man in the CP had to fire his weapon in order to protect himself." Lugger requested air strikes—napalm within 50 meters, 250-pound bombs within 200 meters, and 500-pound bombs "as close as we dare get them"—breaking the attack on the battalion command post. By late afternoon, with Companies G and H still heavily engaged on the right, and the forward elements of Company F unable to move on the left, Lugger requested reinforcements. At dusk, Company E helilifted into the area, and in what was a daring rescue, Huey gunships, supported by AH-1G Cobras, extracted the battered remnants of Company F, returning them to the command post while evacuating the casualties.¹⁰

That night, as the Marines of Companies E and F huddled around the battalion command post, the enemy attacked with a heavy mortar barrage which killed four and wounded 26. It appeared that all efforts to spread the Marines out and dig them in was to no avail, and as Colonel Lugger remarked:

It was a very grim lesson that was learned. Unit leaders at every level must pay more attention; especially after an intensive fight there is a tendency for people to let down because they feel they have given their all. This is not the time to let down. You must even intensify your efforts in order to spread people out and dig people in, especially when the enemy seems to have had some advantage over you. These enemy forces will press the advantage.¹¹


Later that evening, the battalion received another mission. Once all casualties were retrieved and evacuated, Lugger's Marines were to push forward 2,000 meters, link up with the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and act as rallying point for its scattered companies.

At first light on the morning of the 26th, as Companies G and H secured the high ground on the right, Companies E and F moved forward and immediately came under heavy small arms and mortar fire. By afternoon, both companies had advanced only 600 meters, and once again had come under heavy enemy fire. Digging in, the companies requested air and artillery support, but it had little effect. Under constant orders to push forward, no matter the cost,

A machine gun crew from Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines opens up on a fleeing enemy force during several days of fierce fighting east of Hiep Duc at the end of August.

Marine Corps Historical Collection





mand of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Hopkins, with Colonel Codispoti's approval, issued revised orders for the battalion to "move forward to certain selected objectives . . . and recover all casualties lying in front of their positions." Second Battalion Marines accomplished the mission as ordered, noted Hopkins, "albeit reluctantly in at least two instances."¹²

Following its arrival in the Que Son Valley on the 17th, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant

Colonel Ray G. Kummerow, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Allison on the 16th, was assigned by Colonel Codispoti the tasks of securing LZ Baldy and the 9th Engineer rock crusher to the west, and patrolling Barrier Island to the east. On the 26th, following several days of sweeping the island and encountering nothing but enemy snipers, Kummerow's Marines helilifted to LZ West, atop Nui Liet Kiem, overlooking the upper Que Son Valley, and ordered to relieve the 2d Battalion, heavily engaged below. After coordinating with Lieutenant Colonel Luger by radio on the relief, the battalion moved off the hill, guided by an Army reconnaissance unit. Lieutenant Colonel Kummerow described the relief:

The going was very slow, with numerous halts and very little progress. It turned out that the Army had never been off the hill on foot before, and had become helplessly lost. I instructed my point of the mile-long battalion column to use a compass heading to the rendezvous point. Approaching dusk, we finally emerged on the stream bed where I expected to pick up 2/7 guides and found to my surprise 2/7 on the march, heading back to FSB Ross. I deployed the point company to establish security for a bivouac area just short of the 2/7 furthest point of advance and closed in the battalion as darkness fell.

The next morning, following a passage through the 2d Battalion's lines, Kummerow's Marines headed west toward a planned linkup with the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry.¹³

Straddling a small stream with two rifle companies abreast followed by the remaining two in trace, the 3d Battalion began sweeping the valley floor. Almost immediately, Company L, on the right flank, became engaged and eventually unable to maneuver, all the while suffering heavy casualties from an entrenched enemy automatic weapons position. Kummerow ordered Company K to pass through Company L's lines and continue the attack. Surmounting a series of rice paddy dikes, the Marines of Company K, in a number of violent assaults, overran the NVA platoon, killing 13 and capturing two 12.7mm heavy and one 7.62mm light machine guns.

There were numerous displays of personal valor as Company K furiously pushed against the base of the Que Son Mountains into which the NVA had withdrawn. Among them was that of Lance Corporal Jose Francisco Jimenez, who, while shouting encouragement to his fellow Marines, plunged forward, attacking a group of enemy troops and silencing one heavy machine gun. Moving forward toward yet another position, he became the object of concentrated enemy

fire and was mortally wounded. Second Lieutenant Richard L. Jaehne, meanwhile, ordered his platoon to attack. When one of his squads was halted by heavy fire, the young Marine officer inched his way through a rice paddy toward the enemy position. After lobbing hand grenades, Jaehne ran forward firing his .45-caliber pistol, killing those of the enemy who had survived the grenade explosions. Although subsequently wounded, the lieutenant continued to lead his men during the engagement.

In another action, Private First Class Dennis D. Davis raced across 10 meters of open ground, leaped atop an enclosed, fortified bunker, and tossed a grenade into a rear aperture. Although seriously wounded by an enemy grenade which landed nearby as he released his own, Davis crawled to the front of the bunker and pushed another grenade through a firing port. He entered following the explosion and seized an enemy machine gun which he then used to fire on another nearby position. Seeing a fallen Marine about 20 meters away, Davis dashed from the bunker and dragged the man to a covered position only to discover that he was dead. Picking up the Marine's rifle he charged another fortification, but was cut down by enemy fire before he could reach it. For their heroic actions, Lance Corporal Jimenez received a posthumous Medal of Honor, while Private First Class Davis and Second Lieutenant Jaehne were awarded Navy Crosses, the former posthumously.¹⁵

By nightfall on the 27th, Kummerow's Marines had linked up with elements of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry in preparation for the push into the Que Son Mountains. Before moving out the following morning, the Marines, in a customary search of areas adjacent to their night defensive positions, came upon a grisly scene. Apparently during their hasty retreat the night before, the NVA had executed a number of civilian prisoners—two males, one female, three young children, and a baby. All were lying side by side, shot once in the head. Continuing the search, 3d Battalion Marines moved into the high ground later in the day and discovered numerous large bunkers with connecting tunnels, all capable of holding in excess of 10 enemy troops. Most were protected by rock outcroppings or nestled among huge boulders, making them imperious to artillery and air strikes.

On the 29th, Colonel Codispoti ordered Companies K, L, and M, together with the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines into blocking positions in preparation for a multi-battalion assault to trap the two fleeing NVA regi-



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Nestled among the boulders which dotted the Que Son Mountains, the 7th Marines discover an enemy hide-out. These temporary way stations could accommodate one or more North Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong troops, who would then move into the valley below.

ments. As 3d Battalion Marines moved deeper into the mountains and Marines of the 2d Battalion deployed west from FSB Ross, Lieutenant Colonel Clark's 1st Battalion, in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, assaulted landing zones along the mountains' main ridgeline. During the next three days, the four battalions searched the ridgelines and ravines leading into the valley, finding caves, bunkers, and tunnels, but few enemy troops. The remnants of the two NVA regiments, it was later surmised, had scattered to the west, instead of northward, after being beaten near Hiep Duc.

September found the 1st and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines still in pursuit of the two enemy regiments, and the 2d Battalion patrolling the regiment's western TAOR, centered on the district headquarters at Que Son. In the mountains to the northwest of FSB Ross, ARVN troops and Marines of the 1st Battalion continued search operations begun the previous month, but encountered few enemy troops. To the northeast

of the western fire support base, Kummerow's Marines, following their withdrawal from Hiep Duc, conducted sweep operations up the Nghi Ha Valley, and like the 1st Battalion, participated in no significant engagements. As the month progressed, the regiment gradually shifted its operations to the northeast as Clark's Marines, still in pursuit, established blocking positions along the draws leading into Phu Loc Valley on the northern slope of the Que Sons, and 3d Battalion Marines conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations through the mountains toward the blocks.

On 16 September, Clark's Marines withdrew from the Que Son Mountains and reassumed responsibility for the regiment's eastern TAOR, centered on LZ Baldy, where they concentrated on rice denial operations and security assistance in support of Vietnamese elections held in the 28th. Behind, remained Marines of the 3d Battalion, who, as Lieutenant Colonel Kummerow was later to recount, found fighting the environment more difficult than fighting the enemy:

[It] was a "billy goat" type scramble from peak to peak, trying to maintain communications and cover of supporting arms We failed to find the main force and facilities of the [NVA] Regiment, however, which was hunkered in along the base of the mountains in caves and tunnels protected by rock outcroppings and huge boulders against which our artillery and air strikes were harmless We were surprised at the casualties sustained from malaria and other diseases after a month of continuous fighting in that environment. The battalion dwindled to half field strength. India Company lost all its officers save the company commander, . . . who requested relief because of fatigue.¹⁶

At the end of the month, Kummerow's Marines pulled out of the mountains and moved back to FSB Ross, under the command of Major Samuel J. Marfia, who temporarily replaced the wounded Kummerow. At Ross, the battalion began the task of refurbishing the fire support base's defenses and patrolling the approaches to the town of Que Son.¹⁷ As an added security mission, companies periodically rotated to FSB Ryder, atop Hill 579, from which Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines conducted "pinpoint accurate fire missions, . . . shooting at anything that moved in the valley below."¹⁸

While Kummerow's Marines maintained watch over the regiment's western TAOR for the next month, 1st and 2d Battalion Marines took on the tasks of ferreting out the enemy and his supplies, first in Antenna Valley, between An Hoa and Hiep Duc, and then in Pagoda Valley, northeast of LZ Baldy. During the month, the regiment employed over 2,000 patrols, ambushes, and company sweeps which not only blocked enemy lines of communications and destroyed base areas, but significantly disrupted the enemy's rice-gathering activities. In the Pagoda Valley alone, Clark's Marines, reinforced by elements of the 1st ARVN Armored Brigade, captured over 17 tons of rice, 75 percent of the regiment's monthly total, which they subsequently distributed among the local civilian population. During November, as the regiment employed more than 2,400 patrols, ambushes, and company sweeps, encounters increased. Lieutenant Colonel Clark's 1st Battalion experienced the sharpest fighting in the mountains overlooking Antenna Valley, a rugged, heavily vegetated area which severely limited both visibility and maneuver. Assisting Clark's Marines in locating enemy troops and their main lines of communications was the Integrated Observation Device (IOD), introduced throughout the division in late October. Sited at FSB Ryder, this highly sophisticated, line-of-sight device used a laser range-finder in conjunction with high-powered binoculars and a night

observation device to locate and pinpoint enemy movement during both daylight and darkness at ranges up to 30,000 meters. The primary asset of the IOD was its range and azimuth accuracy, which, when coupled with the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (an aid for solving firing problems), produced a 70 percent probability of first-round-on-target hits by supporting artillery. The device at FSB Ryder accounted for at least 83 NVA killed during an eight-day trial period, primarily along trail networks in the Antenna Valley.*

Scouring the mountains until relieved by the 3d Battalion in mid-December, Clark's Marines pursued elements of an NVA regiment, subsequently identified as the *36th*, discovering several significant ordnance and logistical complexes. While the *36th NVA Regiment* was not encountered in strength, Marines of the 1st Battalion did chance upon several large groups of the regiment's troops. On 12 November, as Company D moved toward the summit of Hill 953, northeast of Ryder, it encountered about 40 entrenched enemy troops, supported by automatic weapons. In an action that was to gain him the Medal of Honor, Private First Class Ralph E. Dias, on his own initiative, assaulted one of the machine gun emplacements. Although severely wounded by heavy enemy fire, he continued to crawl for 15 meters toward a large boulder from which he threw grenades at the enemy gun position. Unsuccessful in destroying the gun, Private Dias left his cover, moved into the open to hurl more grenades, and was shot once again—this time fatally. His last grenade, however, destroyed the machine gun position and its crew.¹⁹

The nearly two-month-long sojourn in the Que Son Mountains proved to be extremely lucrative for Clark's Marines. In searching almost every cave and ravine, they captured over 200 individual weapons, as well as 40,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,000 grenades, twelve 122mm rockets, and huge stockpiles of food, field equipment, and assorted ammunition. On 9 December, 1st Battalion Marines withdrew from the Que Sons, moved to FSB Ross, and assumed control of the regiment's western area of operations from the 3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Kummerow, following his return to command. The 3d Battalion then returned to the Que Sons.

By year's end, the 7th Marines had tramped over virtually every square meter of ground from Barrier Island on the coast to Antenna Valley, near the western

*For additional detail on the use of the IOD, see Chapter 14.

edge of the Nui Loc Son Basin. In four months of hard fighting, the regiment, as Lieutenant Colonel Kummerow was later to report, had turned the area around militarily:

Up to the time the 7th Marines had moved into [lower] Quang Nam Province in August 1969, there had been little, if any, patrolling done by the Army (US and ARVN) outside of the Fire Support Bases and cantonments. The enemy had used the terrain from the Barrier Island to Elephant Valley [sic], lowlands and mountains, without interference . . . [But] we had succeeded in stabilizing the region militarily. Elections went off without a hitch in the province and attacks against heavily populated An Hoa failed to materialize.²⁰

Although badly beaten and forced to suffer severe losses in both men and materiel, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were not defeated, as the 7th Marines would discover in 1970.

26th Marines: Protecting the Northern Flank

Protection of Da Nang's northern flank required the constant efforts of Marine infantrymen, and in June 1969, the 26th Marines continued to shoulder the task.

Among the weapons captured by the 7th Marines in the Que Son Mountains was a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun, here being presented by MajGen Ormond R. Simpson, left, and Col Gildo S. Codispoti to MajGen William G. Thrash, right, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and BGen Ralph H. Spanjer, Assistant Wing Commander, center right, in appreciation of the timely and accurate air support provided the regiment.

Marine Corps Historical Collection





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In addition to weapons, food, and ammunition captured in the Que Sons, a cache of bicycles, here displayed by members of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was uncovered.

launching occasional company-size reconnaissance-in-force operations along known infiltration routes in Elephant Valley. On the 12th, the 3d Battalion, which had come ashore the day before, relieved Edmondson's Marines of the responsibility for the regimental TAOR. The 2d Battalion was then redesignated Battalion Landing Team 2/26 and assigned to Special Landing Force Bravo.

Throughout the remainder of June and into July, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Snelling's 3d Battalion, reinforced for a period by one medium tank platoon, one amphibian tractor (Ontos) platoon, and attached engineer, truck, reconnaissance, and artillery units, continued to provide security through patrols and ambushes for the area's vital installations. In addition, the battalion conducted cordon and search operations with local Popular Forces and actions designed to deny the enemy use of Elephant Valley as an avenue of approach into the Da Nang area. Although enemy activity, characterized by sniper and harassing fire, remained fairly constant, there were a number of sharp exchanges. In June, for example, Company M caught and severely mauled a group of 50 enemy troops cross-

ing the Song Cu De with automatic weapons fire, supplemented by artillery and Air Force C-47 "Spooky" missions. Again in July, Company M patrols and ambushes in the Elephant Valley, west of Route 1, snared another 25 enemy rice carriers, and captured large quantities of field equipment and food. The 3d Battalion's aggressive cordon and searches, patrols, and ambushes were so successful that by August, enemy infiltrators and rice gatherers made obvious attempts to avoid encountering Snelling's Marines.

In August, with the southward expansion of the 1st Marine Division's TAOR and the 7th Marines' move into the Que Son Valley, the 26th Marines assumed a portion of the latter regiment's area of operations. On the 10th, after periods of training on Okinawa and in the Philippines, and participation in Landing Force Operation Brave Armada in Quang Ngai Province, near Chu Lai, Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Battalion Landing Team 2/26 again moved ashore and into positions vacated by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, west of Da Nang. By 15 August, the BLT completed the relief and split its rifle companies into heavy platoons and squads, sent out on day patrols and night

ambushes in an area of operations stretching from Hill 41 in the south to Hill 22 in the northwest. In addition to defending static positions and blocking avenues of approach into the Da Nang Vital Area, Colonel Heywood tasked Edmondson's Marines with maintaining and responding to intrusions along the regiment's portion of the Da Nang Barrier. Armed with readouts from the balanced pressure system sensors, night observation devices, and large spotlights, 2d Battalion Marines and their supporting artillery responded with both direct and indirect fire to any break in the barrier.

Throughout the remainder of August and most of September, encounters with enemy forces in the expanded 26th Marines TAOR was light and sporadic, with the exception of an attack by 15 sappers on the command post of Company F at Hill 10. The continued employment of a Marine rifle company and a Regional Force platoon from 1/25 Regional Force Company in the high ground west of Hai Van Pass, kept enemy fire in the area at a minimum. To the south, the 2d Battalion, in addition to monitoring and assisting in the continued construction of the barrier, participated with ARVN forces in securing the Hoa Vang and Hieu Duc Districts' rice harvest, not only denying the enemy a source of food, but blocking infiltration routes into the two districts.

In mid-September, another battalion "flip-flop" took place. On the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel James C. Goodin's Battalion Landing Team 1/26 disembarked by helicopter and landing craft from the *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2) and began the relief of the 2d Battalion, which in turn embarked on board the *New Orleans* (LPH 11). Ten days later, Battalion Landing Team 2/26 made a practice amphibious landing within the regiment's TAOR. On the morning of the 30th, one reinforced rifle company landed by LVTs over Nam O Beach, while three reinforced rifle platoons helilifted into a landing zone near the rock crusher at Dai La Pass, and three waves of combat support elements made turnaway landings in assault craft. The exercise terminated at midday and all elements returned to Amphibious Ready Group Bravo's shipping.

During the first two weeks of October, despite swollen streams and flooded lowlands due to the monsoon rains, the 1st and 3d Battalions continued patrol and ambush operations throughout the regiment's TAOR. On the 19th, the 26th Marines reassumed command of BLT 2/26, now under Lieutenant Colonel William C. Drumright, who relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Edmondson on 9 September. The 2d Battalion relieved elements of the 3d Battalion and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in the subsequent northward expansion of the regiment's area of operations. The following day, the 3d Battalion passed responsibility for securing Route 1 in the Hai Van Pass and the Lieu Chieu Esso Depot to the 2d Battalion. At the same time, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade transferred administrative control of the 26th Marines to the 1st Marine Division. The division redesignated and deactivated the regimental and battalion landing teams, except for planning purposes. With the assumption of responsibility for Observation Post Reno, in the foothills west of Da Nang, Observation Post Eagle Eye, overlooking the Song Cu De, and security for the Da Nang Barrier construction effort by the 3d Battalion on the 23d, the division completed the internal realignment of forces and boundaries. At the conclusion of the realignment, the new area of operations of the 26th Marines encompassed some 711 square miles.²¹

As was the case with the preceding five months, enemy activity during the final two months of the year continued to be light and sporadic throughout the 26th Marines' TAOR. The enemy continued to devote the bulk of his efforts toward gathering food and supplies, but the regiment's aggressive patrol and ambush operations again severely restricted these endeavors. In an effort to locate, interdict, and destroy enemy lines of communication and base camps, Heywood's Marines carried out several company-size search and clear operations in the western and southern portions of the regiment's area of operations. Landing by helicopter, elements of the 1st Battalion began a three week operation in Happy Valley and Sherwood Forest areas on 3 December. Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Goodin's battalion found several tunnels and bunkers, but enemy activity, on the whole, was nonexistent. The regiment carried out similar operations in Rumor Valley, south of Dai La Pass; Leech Valley, along the Song Lo Dong; and in the foothills below Dong Den, all with the same disappointing results.

December, while not a lucrative month in terms of enemy troops destroyed or supplies captured, did witness the introduction of a number of innovations. Under the leadership of Colonel James E. Harrell, who relieved Colonel Heywood on the 12th, elements of the regiment began planning for participation in the division's Infantry Company Intensified Pacification Program and Kingfisher patrol operations, slated to



Marine Corps Historical Collection

On a mountaintop northwest of Da Nang, Col James E. Harrell, center, Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines, discusses the movement of Company L with its Commanding Officer, 1stLt John K. Robb, right, and LtCol William A. Simpson, Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, who had replaced LtCol Edward W. Snelling in September.

begin in January 1970.* In addition, the 11th Marines installed an Integrated Observation Device on Hill 270, enabling the regiment to have a continuous observed fire capability within Happy Valley, Worth Ridge, and Charlie Ridge—all areas crisscrossed by well-known enemy infiltration routes. By integrating the new equipment with changes in tactics, the 26th Marines found itself better equipped to carry out the mission of defending Da Nang's northern flank in the coming year.

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Battleground

On 1 June, command of the Americal Division passed from Major General Charles M. Gettys to Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey. In reviewing the accomplishments of the division during his tenure and its future prospects, General Gettys noted:

Although the enemy continues to present a significant threat in this area, because of aggressive Americal opera-

tions he has been unable to achieve a single military or political objective. His future looks no brighter. As GVN forces continue to grow stronger and to dominate the coastal plain, Americal will turn its attention further to the west, targeted against his staging areas and command and control installations, the objective of completing his destruction in the southern I Corps Tactical Zone.²²

During the previous five months, emphasis was placed on maintaining a flexible offensive posture poised to counter enemy threats anywhere within the division's TAOI. The principal enemy targets, however, continued to be the heavily populated provincial capitals of Quang Ngai and Tam Ky. As a result, a majority of the significant battles fought were in response to the enemy threats against these two cities and were preemptive in nature, engaging the enemy well west of the cities, leaving him to resort only to stand-off attacks by fire. In addition to these preemptive coastal operations, the division also placed emphasis on operations into the mountainous hinterland of southern I Corps to locate and destroy previously immune enemy

*For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 11.

units and base camps. These operations, during the latter half of 1969, would be intensified in order to provide a screen behind which South Vietnamese forces could consolidate and expand their control of the strategically important populated coastal lowlands.²³

As General Ramsey took command, Americal Division forces were engaged in five major operations throughout the two provinces of southern I Corps. To the north, Operation Frederick Hill continued as elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade and 5th ARVN Regiment conducted combat operations designed to secure population centers along the coastal plain and to destroy enemy concentrations, base camps, and infiltration routes in the Que Son Mountains to the west. Within the center sector of the combined Americal-2d ARVN Division area of operations, elements of the

198th Infantry Brigade and 6th ARVN Regiment continued to protect major allied lines of communication and to locate and destroy enemy forces attempting to attack the city of Quang Ngai and the Chu Lai Base complex in Operation Geneva Park. In the mountains west of Tam Ky, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, under the operational control of the Americal Division since 16 May, continued Lamar Plain, designed to destroy elements of the 2nd NVA Division in Base Area 117. To the south, the 11th Infantry Brigade and 4th ARVN Regiment, in Operation Iron Mountain, secured population centers south of Quang Ngai City and continued to destroy other elements of the 2d NVA Division operating in the mountains to the west. And, on the Batangan Peninsula, Marine Combined Action teams in conjunction with elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment and U.S. 46th Infantry

Feeling that the Marines under his command had accomplished much in providing a secure environment for the inhabitants of Quang Nam Province, MajGen Simpson, right, relinquished command of the division to MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler on 15 December.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A372305



continued population security, guerrilla interdiction, and nation-building efforts in this long-time enemy stronghold in Operation Russell Beach.

Enemy activity during June and July was light and sporadic throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, consisting of sapper and indirect attacks by fire against Americal Division installations. Within the Frederick Hill operational zone, the division continued to place emphasis on preemptive operations designed to deny enemy forces the use of base areas, infiltration routes, and supply caches. Barrier Island was the scene of four such major preemptive operations in an effort to neutralize the area thereby increasing security for South Vietnamese pacification programs. South, within the Iron Mountain operation zone, the division conducted a series of combat sweeps and reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Song Tra Cau Valley and surrounding mountains in order to blunt a possible enemy attack upon Duc Pho. On 20 July, the Americal initiated Operation Nantucket Beach in an area north of the Batangan Peninsula in conjunction with Marine Special Landing Force operation Brave Armada to increase population security in the area, northeast of Quang Ngai City. The following day, Operation Russell Beach came to an end.

With the termination of Operation Lamar Plain in mid-August, enemy activity throughout the division's operational area rose dramatically. During 18-29 August, elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade, 5th ARVN Regiment, and 7th Marines engaged elements of two NVA regiments near LZ West, southeast of Hiep Duc. In fierce fighting the combined allied force drove the enemy from the area, inflicting over 540 casualties. Two weeks later, elements of the battered enemy force returned and attempted to launch an attack on Hiep Duc, but were again driven back by the 2d Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment.

As the monsoon season began during the latter half of September, both allied and enemy activity declined. Continuous heavy rains during the remaining three months of the year limited combat operations in the Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Iron Mountain, and Nantucket Beach operational zones by curtailing the effectiveness of visual reconnaissance causing delay or cancellation of close air support missions and limiting both air and ground mobility. Nevertheless, Americal forces continued to concentrate on combat operations, however limited, to increase the level of security for pacification efforts near the major population centers of southern I Corps Tactical Zone.

Results

Measuring the results of six months of large- and small-unit action within the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility was not an easy task. By the end of 1969, the division could point to many indications that it was inflicting more casualties on the enemy than it was taking. Casualty figures for the six-month period shed some light: 5,503 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese killed against 419 Marines killed, and 4,623 wounded. To these figures one would have to add those of the ARVN and Korean forces. The Marines could also point to the large quantity of weapons, the tons of rice and other foodstuffs, and countless rounds of assorted ammunition captured. And they could add the number of base camps, installations, and enemy fighting positions destroyed.²⁴

Statistics tell only half the story. The other half is PFC David A. Wosmek drops a round into a mortar tube held by LCpl Jose L. Rodriguez during an attack in progress by Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines upon an enemy base camp north of Da Nang.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



told by how well allied forces did in restoring South Vietnam to an era of peace in which the people were allowed to resume their normal pursuits. Using this measure, Major General Ormond R. Simpson thought his 1st Marine Division had done well indeed:

We achieved limited success by that measure in the Da Nang defensive area . . . the percentage of people that were voting in elections and the very high percentage of children that were in school. I counted that as a successful type of thing. At one time I had available the hectares or the acre-

age, as we used to have to do it, because that was the only thing we knew, or square kilometers of ground that was made safe enough for people to return to farming and to fishing and that sort of thing. It would be a rough guess, but I would suppose that area that I was responsible for during the year I was in Vietnam, the 1st Marine Division Reinforced must have doubled the area. Now, that doesn't mean anything . . . but it was a significant amount of acreage in which people were able to return and start in a very rudimentary fashion to rebuild their villages, to go ahead with rice farming, and the other kind of crops that they did Those are the kind of things that you measure success in.²⁵

PART V
SUPPORTING THE TROOPS

CHAPTER 13

Marine Air Operations

*1st MAW Organization and Deployment—Single Management: Relations with the Seventh Air Force
Upgrading of Aviation Assets—I Corps Fixed-Wing Support—The Interdiction Campaign—Air Control
Helicopter Operations—Improving Helicopter Support—Air Defense—Accomplishments and Costs*

1st MAW Organization and Deployment

In January 1969, MACV had at its disposal approximately 2,000 United States fixed-wing aircraft and 3,700 helicopters, in addition to the support of Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers scattered from Guam to Thailand and naval aircraft on carriers stationed in the South China Sea. Of these aircraft, 258 fixed-wing and 270 helicopters were under the control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW).¹

The fixed-wing aircraft of the 1st MAW were concentrated at two bases in I Corps Tactical Zone. At Da Nang, where the wing headquarters, support, and air control groups were located, Colonel Robert D. Slay's Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11 included four jet squadrons: Marine All Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW)) 242; Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons (VMFAs) 334 and 542; and Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1. Two other fixed-wing aircraft groups operated from Chu Lai. Under Colonel Rex A. Deasy, MAG-12 consisted of Marine Attack Squadrons (VMAs) 221, 223, and 311, and VMA(AW)-533. MAG-13, commanded by Colonel Norman W. Gourley, included VMFAs -115, -314, and -323. Three of the four attack squadrons were equipped with McDonnell-Douglas A-4E Skyhawk bombers and the fourth with the older A-4C Skyhawks; the all-weather attack squadrons used Grumman A-6A Intruders. Three fighter attack squadrons flew the McDonnell Douglas F-4B Phantom II, while a fourth was equipped with the improved F-4J Phantom. The primary task of the attack and fighter squadrons was to provide close air support for ground combat units; a secondary mission was interdiction. The reconnaissance squadron flew a mixed complement of RF-4Bs, Phantom IIs modified for aerial reconnaissance and photography; EA-6A Prowlers carrying electronic warfare devices; and the electronic versions of the McDonnell-Douglas F-3D Skyknight, known as EF-10s.

Three aircraft groups controlled the wing's helicopters, divided among three airfields at the beginning

of 1969. Based at Marble Mountain Air Facility was Colonel Warren L. MacQuarrie's MAG-16 with six squadrons: one light helicopter squadron, HML-167, with Bell UH-1Es; three medium squadrons, HMMs-164, -165, and -364, the first two equipped with Boeing CH-46A Sea Knights, and HMM-364 with Boeing's improved Sea Knight, the CH-46D; and one heavy squadron, HMH-463, with Sikorsky CH-53A Sea Stallions. Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2, in addition to Bell UH-1Es, was equipped with fixed-wing North American OV-10A Broncos. MAG-36, commanded by Colonel Bruce J. Matheson, was at Phu Bai Airfield with four helicopter squadrons: the heavy squadron, HMH-452, with CH-53As; the light, HML-367, flying UH-1Es; and two medium squadrons, HMM-265 equipped with CH-46Ds, and HMM-363, using Sikorsky UH-34D Seahorses. Flying in support of the 3d Marine Division was Colonel Walter Sienko's Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) 39, created and based at Quang Tri in April 1968. Colonel Sienko's command included two medium helicopter squadrons, HMM-262, equipped with CH-46As, and HMM-161 using CH-46Ds, and VMO-6, which flew UH-1E helicopters, OV-10As, and Cessna O-1 and O-1G observation aircraft.

Not assigned to the operating squadrons, but attached to the 1st MAW, were a number of other aircraft. Headquarters and maintenance squadrons (H&MSs) employed seven aging Douglas C-117Ds on a variety of transport missions. Three of the headquarters and maintenance squadrons also operated 11 TA-4Fs, two-seat trainer versions of the A-4 Skyhawk, and three Grumman TF-9J Cougars, for reconnaissance and forward air control missions. H&MS-17 used four Grumman US-2Bs for aerial monitoring of sensors, and employed two Grumman C-1A Traders in reconnaissance flights. A detachment of Lockheed KC-130F Hercules refueler-transporters from Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron (VMGR) 152, based on Okinawa, flew refueling, transport, and illumination missions from Da Nang Airbase.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422115
As Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during the first half of the year, MajGen Charles J. Quilter devoted much effort to facilitating the wing's adjustment to single management and the support of two Marine divisions, and at times two Army divisions.

In addition to Marine aviation units, aircraft of the U.S. Air Force's 366th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 41st Wing, 1st Vietnamese Air Force Air Division also were based in I Corps, as was the organic helicopter support for the 101st Airborne and Americal Divisions.² These units were not under Marine control.

Three groups supported the personnel and aircraft attached to the wing. Headquartered at Da Nang was Colonel Thomas H. Nichols, Jr.'s Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG) 1 which provided administrative and logistical support. Furnishing maintenance were the squadrons of Colonel Richard S. Rash's Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) 12, also located at Da Nang. Marine Wing Control Group (MWCG) 18, under the command of Colonel Edward S. Fris, provided air control and antiaircraft support.

Major General Charles J. Quilter commanded the 1st MAW at the beginning of 1969. Quilter, a highly decorated veteran of World War II and Korea, took over the wing soon after MACV's imposition of single management of fixed-wing aircraft and the movement of large contingents of Army forces into I Corps. Dur-


ing his tenure as wing commander and III MAF deputy commander for air, Quilter devoted much of his time to facilitating the wing's adjustment to single management and to the increased demands for air support by the two United States Marine and two Army divisions, South Vietnamese units, and the Korean Marine Brigade.

Among the highlights of Quilter's tenure was the activation of an auxiliary wing headquarters in northern I Corps in an effort to improve coordination and response. Headed by Assistant Wing Commander Brigadier General Ralph H. "Smoke" Spanjer, who possessed delegated command authority over all wing aviation and base resources north of Hue, the new headquarters, which replaced the less formal liaison staff headed by Assistant Wing Commander Brigadier General Homer S. Hill, was collocated with Headquarters, 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha Combat Base. The new organization, in addition to ensuring ground commanders more responsive air support and permitting more effective use of air assets, particularly helicopters, reduced the span of control necessary to command the air units and airfields responsive to wing headquarters.

In July 1969, Major General William G. "Gay" Thrash relieved General Quilter in command of the 1st MAW. A native Georgian, Thrash served with distinction during World War II and Korea where, while serving with MAG-12, he received the Silver Star for gallantry in action before being shot down, captured, and held prisoner for two years. General Thrash, during the remaining months of 1969, labored to improve the working relationship between the wing and the two Marine divisions, which gradually had deteriorated during the first year of single management.³ By late December, his efforts appeared to be succeeding, as Marine Major General George S. Bowman, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, III MAF, informed Major General Keith B. McCutcheon, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air at Headquarters Marine Corps:

Here in III MAF we have a very fine relationship between our Ground and Air . . . Gay spends a great deal of time to make it so. He is bending every effort to use more of the Air capability in support of the Ground effort. And I mean this from a planning point of view, and not just having it available should someone call up. Every adverse comment is thoroughly examined, and in almost every case, there wasn't a problem when all the details were exposed. We still have a ways to go.⁴

In addition to strengthening the air-ground relationship, General Thrash also supervised the initial



redeployment of 1st MAW air and support units. As a portion of the 25,000-man United States force reduction announced by President Nixon in June 1969, the four 1st MAW units selected for departure represented a cross section of Marine aviation in I Corps. Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 66 left Vietnam for Okinawa on 14 July, followed in August by Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334, which moved to Iwakuni, Japan; Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165, which deployed to Futema, Okinawa; and the 1st Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion, which joined its sister battalion, the 2d, at Twentynine Palms, California. Both the traffic control unit and two aircraft squadrons joined MAG-15, the air component of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. As a result of the Keystone Eagle redeployment, the wing lost approximately 1,300 personnel and 29 aircraft.

The movement of Marine air units designated as part of the second troop withdrawal, Keystone Cardinal, took place in early October. Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533 departed Chu Lai on the 5th, enroute to Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan for assignment to MAG-15. Later in the month, Marine Observation Squadron 6 and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 left Vietnam for Okinawa. The transfer of wing units imposed by Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal culminated during November in the creation of a wing headquarters (rear) in Japan. With the establishment of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), for command and control of Marine combat units in the Western Pacific not committed to Vietnam, FMFPac activated the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) on 7 November as the senior I MEF aviation component. Under 1st MAW (Rear), which was not associated in any way organizationally with the 1st MAW, Vietnam, were MAG-15, which retained operational control of fixed-wing units; MAG-36, which assumed control of all helicopter, OV-10A, and KC-130 aircraft; and selected headquarters, maintenance, and air control elements.⁵

A second consequence of the late 1969 troop redeployment was the consolidation of remaining 1st MAW aviation resources in I Corps. With the departure of the 3d Marine Division, helicopter needs north of Hai Van Pass were reduced significantly. Beginning in October, those helicopter squadrons not involved in the withdrawal began moving to Marble Mountain Air Facility in order to adequately support the 1st Division. By early December, all but three squadrons, HMM-161, HMM-262, and HML-367, which were to remain at

Phu Bai, had moved south. The Army then assumed operational responsibility for the Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and Hue-Phu Bai airfields although certain wing equipment remained at Quang Tri and Marine helicopter squadrons continued to operate from the Phu Bai airfield until the end of the year.

Single Management:

Relations with the Seventh Air Force

Since March 1968, in their capacity as Deputy Commander USMACV for Air Operations, the Commanding Generals, Seventh Air Force, General William W. Mommyer, and his successor, General George S. Brown, exercised "fragging and operational direction" of all 1st MAW fixed-wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft.* Prior to that time, the 1st MAW assigned its own aircraft to particular missions and then reported to the Seventh Air Force the number of available fixed-wing sorties not needed to support Marine operations. The Seventh Air Force could then use the extra sorties for its own purposes. Under the new arrangement, the wing reported all preplanned, fixed-wing sorties for Air Force approval and assignment.⁶ This new system, outlined in a letter from General William C. Westmoreland to the Commanding General, III MAF, on 7 March 1968, was termed "single management," and justified on the basis of providing adequate air support for the Army divisions reinforcing the Marines in I Corps during the siege of Khe Sanh and *Tet* Offensive, in addition to improving the efficiency of United States tactical airpower as a whole.

The decision to place Marine aircraft under Air Force control required a fundamental change in the Marine Corps' basic principles of combat organization. III MAF was designed and equipped as a combat entity, in conformity with the Marine air-ground principle of exploiting, under a single tactical command, the capabilities of infantry maneuver, helicopter mobility, and the immediate control and coordination of organic attack aircraft and artillery. By means of an uncomplicated and responsive system of air and ground control, the Marine infantry commander was able to weave artillery and air support quickly and effectively into his pattern of ground maneuver, in addition to coordinating naval gun fire support and the movement of supporting helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft within the battle zone.

*The daily orders assigning an aircraft to a particular mission are known as fragmentary orders, hence the slang verb "frag" as applied to air operations.



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Sheltered within a steel-reinforced concrete revetment, a versatile McDonnell Douglas F-4B Phantom II awaits assignment to a close air support or interdiction mission.

Most Marine commanders believed that while both systems employed similar organizational terminology, there existed a fundamental difference between the two. The single management system was primarily a producer effort, while the one it supplanted was oriented toward the consumer. This consumer orientation was essential to the Marine Corps system and underlaid the complete responsiveness of Marine air to the desires of the supported ground commander.

Preplanned requests for air support under the Marine system involved only three processing steps and 18 hours from the submission of the initial request to receipt of air support. In contrast, the single management system imposed intervening layers of processing between I Corps units and the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) in Saigon. Six steps were now required to process requests from the 1st Marine Division and seven for the 3d Marine Division. Under the Air Force system, request times varied from a minimum of 36 hours advanced notice for radar-controlled aircraft to over 50 hours for preplanned visually controlled aircraft attacks.

Requests for immediate air support under the Marine system likewise involved three processing steps: the originating battalion or regiment; the direct air support center (DASC), collocated with the division; and III MAF Tactical Air Control Center. The TACC then scrambled waiting aircraft. The single manage-

ment system relied upon diverting aircraft already assigned to other missions. This often resulted not only in the requestor being deprived of support, but the questionable ability of the diverted aircraft to perform the mission properly. Where the Marine system focused on the division, the single management system focused on the corps.

Despite Westmoreland's assurances that Marine aircraft would support Marine ground units, "consistent with the tactical situation," Marines viewed single management as yet another bid by the Air Force for operational control of Marine fixed-wing aircraft, and an expanded role in the tactical support of Marine ground forces.⁷ The issue resurrected bitter memories of what the Marine Corps considered inadequate and inefficient air support of Marine ground forces during the Korean War, under the single management system directed by the Fifth Air Force.

The III MAF commander, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., with the full support of the Commandant, waged a relentless campaign during the remainder of 1968 to overturn Westmoreland's directive. For his part, the Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., took the issue to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declaring, as he later stated, that it was unnecessary for two reasons:

The Marine Corps did not battle roles and missions, did not use roles and missions as an argument in battling sin-

gle management, but battled it rather on two other issues. First, that it was unnecessary. There was already a good system in effect that supported Marines and supported the Army . . . And secondly, that it destroyed the immediate responsiveness of Marine close air support to the Marine infantry and that's a fact. Under the Marine techniques, the Marine infantry commander can state at night what he wants for tomorrow morning and get it in the way of close air support. Under single management, he had to state 72 hours ahead of time what he wanted, see, 72 hours hence. Well, at that point he didn't know. Well, of course that's the Army-Air Force system you know, the air is programed three or four days in advance in their system. They don't have any concept of immediately responsive exigency-type air support for the infantry, and it was on those two grounds that the Marine Corps battled single management.⁸

The controversy resulted in a split among the Joint Chiefs; the Army and Navy Service Chiefs supported the Marine position, while the Air Force and Chairman supported single management. The issue went to the Secretary of Defense, who turned it over to Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze for resolution. A compromise, according to General Chapman, who took the question to the President, eventually was reached:

[General Earle] Wheeler [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] made a special trip to Vietnam to talk it out with MACV with the end result that single management was rearranged in a fashion that permitted the Marines to get their immediately responsive close air support as they needed it, and the surplus to go to the Army—just the way it had been before, but with a different name.⁹

Although grudgingly accepting single management, Marine Corps leaders continued to insist that the system destroyed the concept of the Marine air-ground team and at the same time violated existing inter-Service agreements on the conduct of joint operations. Emotions ran high on both sides.¹⁰ Both General Quilter and his successor, General Thrash, however, by working informally with the Seventh Air Force, attempted to modify the system and recover as much control of Marine fixed-wing aircraft as was possible. This pragmatic approach eventually succeeded and by the end of 1969, the 1st MAW had regained much of the ability to assign its strike and reconnaissance aircraft to missions in support of Marine ground operations, and exercise a degree of supervision over the sorties surrendered to the Air Force. The wing, however, was stymied in its efforts to compel the Air Force into supporting the two Army divisions in I Corps to a greater extent than it had in the past.¹¹

"On a strictly working day-to-day basis," General Quilter noted, "we hardly . . . knew of single manage-

ment, because we got everything we wanted. We could negotiate, and the stuff we proposed was invariably bought."¹² Others, however, continued to view the system as a failure despite the increasing amount of flexibility gained by Marine Corps prodding. Among them was Brigadier General Homer S. Hill, Assistant Wing Commander, who stated:

There is some indication that there is beginning to be a degree of respectability and acceptability for single management. And I want to go on record right now as saying, that if this is true, it is a sad, sad day for the Marine Corps, because single management is no better than it was the first day it was implemented. It is no damn good for the Marine Corps, and for Marine aviation. And if we are getting lulled into a sense of false security, it is about time we wake up. And there is some indication from people we have talked to that say, well hell that is not bad, it is working isn't it? Well sure it is working. It is working because the Marine Corps had provoked so many changes to the original single management concept that it pretty well parallels the old Marine Corps system. We have managed to prod some flexibility out of this thing, but the disease is still there. It has got to be cured.

It is not working all right. If you are following the close air support statistics every morning, . . . you will see what the hell is happening. You talk to the 3d Marine Division and you will find it is not all right, because they are nowhere near getting the amount of close air support that they requested every day, and they are not getting what they used to get. And every morning on the board you will see 50, 60, 70 Marine close air support sorties going to the Americal, or you will see 40 or 50 close air support sorties going to the 101st. So there are some people that are smelling like a rose in this business, because these Army units not only have their organic ARAs [Aerial Rocket Artillery], gunships, as well as their Huey gunships, but now they are getting the world's finest close air support, in considerable proportions. So, we don't like this thing from two standpoints. One, is that we don't have control of our organic air, and it is affecting the support to our Marine divisions, and likewise their capability to fight this war. And secondly, the Army never had it so good.¹³

Although opinions on single management still varied widely, Marines had, by the end of 1969, come to terms with the system and had modified it enough in practice to keep the air-ground team substantially intact. These arrangements, growing in part out of the tactical situation and from the conciliatory attitude of both Marine and Air Force commanders on the scene, especially that of Air Force General George S. Brown, had yet to be formalized in a MACV directive or an Inter-Service agreement for joint operations. The only official description of the system remained General Westmoreland's letter of March 1968 to General

Cushman, although MACV attempted to incorporate the basic principles of single management into a December 1968 revision of Directive 95-4, which prescribed the rules of air operations throughout Southeast Asia. MACV abandoned the attempt after III MAF, in a sharply worded response, refused to concur in the draft. Throughout 1969, Marines remained steadfast in their opposition to any attempt to formalize single management. This stance would change in 1970, as Marines, in order to protect their position in Vietnam and in future joint operations, would finally agree to the revision of MACV Directive 95-4, incorporating a description of the system as it actually existed, not as it was originally proposed.¹⁴

Upgrading of Aviation Assets

"Aviation is a dynamic profession," explained General McCutcheon. "The rate of obsolescence of equipment is high and new aircraft have to be placed in the inventory periodically in order to stay abreast of the requirement of modern war."¹⁵ New aircraft had been introduced periodically into the 1st MAW's in-

ventory since the unit arrived, and 1969 was to be no exception.

The Marines' fifth year in Vietnam witnessed the steady upgrading of the wing's aviation inventory, both fixed-wing and helicopter. In January, eight additional light attack and forward air control OV-10A Broncos, designed to replace the Cessna O-1, were ferried to Da Nang, where they were divided between Marine Observation Squadrons 2 and 6. The detachment brought the total number of OV-10As assigned to the wing to 24. The month also saw the trans-Pacific deployment to Vietnam of Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 225, with its Grumman A-6A Intruders, a low-level, long-range attack aircraft capable of penetrating enemy radar defenses and hitting small targets in any weather. VMA(AW)-225 was assigned to MAG-11 at Da Nang, where it replaced Marine Attack Squadron 121, and its older light, single-engined, McDonnell Douglas A-4C Skyhawks, scheduled to be reassigned to the 2d MAW at Cherry Point, North Carolina. In a similar trans-Pacific deployment in February, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232, with 15 improved F-4J Phantom IIs, relieved VMFA-323, equipped with older

Gathered to discuss aviation requirements for the 3d Marine Division are, from left, BGen Frank E. Garretson, Commanding General, Task Force Hotel; MajGen Raymond G. Davis; and BGen Homer S. Hill, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Courtesy of BGen Frank E. Garretson (Ret.)



model F-4Bs, bringing the number of 1st MAW F-4J aircraft to 32.*

April witnessed the continued improvement in the wing's helicopter gunship and lift capabilities. Equipped with new engines producing greater shaft-horsepower, additional Boeing CH-46Ds arrived to replace original CH-46A models, scheduled to be modified during the year. The benefits of the larger engine could be seen when payload weights were compared under combat conditions—operating at sea level, in 95 degree weather, the CH-46D was able to lift 2,720 pounds, while the older model was limited to 1,710 pounds. On 10 April, the first increment of a total inventory of 24 Bell AH-1G Cobra gunships arrived at Da Nang. The four Cobras, assigned to VMO-2 (Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang), began medical evacuation and reconnaissance escort, and strike and fire suppression missions, within six days of their acceptance by the squadron.

The tandem-seat Cobra supplied to the 1st MAW in order to meet the continued need for helicopter gunships, provided several advantages over the support available from the armed UH-1E, the aircraft it was to replace.** A 45 percent faster cruise speed allowed the AH-1G to maintain pace with the CH-46 troop carriers and lead them into combat landing zones. In addition, the Cobra, possessing a 3.4-hour endurance compared to slightly less than two for the UH-1E, could remain on station longer, providing required fire suppression. An augmentation system incorporated into the aircraft's gunsights, gave the Cobra added stability as a weapons platform. The resultant increase in accuracy permitted steeper attack angles, while reducing the aircraft's exposure to ground fire at low altitudes. Armed with a 7.62mm mini-gun, a chin turret-mounted 40mm grenade launcher, four externally mounted 2.75-inch rocket pods, and able to carry 2,000 pounds of ordnance, the Cobra provided the

*The McDonnell Douglas F-4J Phantom II, like its predecessor the F-4B, was a twin-seat, supersonic, all-weather fighter aircraft, designed primarily for interception and air superiority, but used as a close support aircraft in Vietnam. The improved F-4J, in addition to possessing more powerful engines and larger wheels, which permitted heavier ordnance loads, carried sophisticated bombing and radar fire-control systems, enabling it to strike targets with improved accuracy.

**Assignment of the AH-1G aircraft to Vietnam was an attrition replacement and not a force level increase. The introduction coincided with anticipated losses and the exhaustion of the UH-1E. Total authorized operating UH-1 and AH-1 aircraft remained at 72 for the 1st MAW.

wing with a significant increase in firepower. Monthly accessions by December equipped VMO-2 with 21 aircraft.***

In May, the wing's lift and troop transport capability again was increased with the arrival of the first CH-53D Sea Stallions, one of the largest helicopters produced by Sikorsky. Designed to augment the CH-53A, the newer model, like the CH-46D, was equipped with a more powerful shaft-turbine engine, increasing by 4,000 pounds the payload capacity of the "A" model. In addition, internal rearrangement made it possible for the CH-53D to accommodate up to 55 troops, compared with 38 in the CH-53A. Despite a number of transfers and combat losses, the wing by the end of year possessed a total of 79 CH-53D aircraft.

June witnessed the first of 10 trans-Pacific deployments, codenamed Key Quoit, by which new-production Grumman A-6A Intruders were delivered to the 1st MAW, replacing older models scheduled for progressive aircraft rework in the United States.**** The newer models, like the old, provided exceptional bomb-carrying capacity and a significant measure of versatility to the wing's in-country attack effort. The all-weather capability of the Intruder—supplied by automated navigational and attack problem-solving systems—complemented the varied radar modes for acquiring hostile targets. Using the aircraft's moving target indicator, the two-man crew could direct strikes against moving vehicles, while the aircraft's search radar could locate significant structures. In addition, the development and use of the radar beacon system allowed the Intruder to provide all-weather coverage against targets—whether radar significant or not—while under control of a ground observer.

Included in the Key Quoit deployments were a number of new-production EA-6A Prowlers, the electronic warfare version of the Intruder. Assigned to Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1, the newer EA-6As were to replace older models scheduled for rework and subsequent transfer to the 2d MAW, and the McDonnell Douglas EF-10. Utilized to

***Initially, the 1st MAW assigned the AH-1Gs to VMO-2, but in December the wing activated HML-367, an all-Cobra squadron, in order to assure better maintenance and efficient use of the aircraft.

****The Key Quoit deployments involved the flight-ferrying of two to five aircraft at a time from Naval Air Station (NAS), Whidbey Island, Washington, to Da Nang, with intermediate stops at NAS, Barber's Point, Hawaii; Johnston Island; Wake Island; NAS, Agana, Guam; and NAS, Cubi Point, Philippines. The total ferrying effort involved 24 Intruders and 12 Prowlers.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

The first of more than 20 tandem-seat AH-1G "Cobra" gunships, scheduled to replace the slower UH-1E "Huey" gunships through attrition, is off-loaded from a C-130 transport at Da Nang in early April for assignment to Marine Observation Squadron 2.

counter hostile antiaircraft, missile control, and surveillance radar, the EF-10 had, since its arrival in 1965, served as the wing's only electronic warfare aircraft until the introduction of the Prowler. After more than 9,000 sorties, the aircraft was to be reassigned to the 3d MAW, El Toro, California.

Early in August, the last 1st Wing Sikorsky UH-34D Seahorse squadron, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363, terminated combat operations in preparation for redeployment to the United States, completing the phased withdrawal of the aircraft. Initially used to put the vertical envelopment concept, perfected by Marine air and ground units during the 1950s and early 1960s, into practice, the UH-34 eventually became the workhorse of the Marine helicopter effort in I Corps until increasing numbers of CH-46 and CH-53 aircraft assumed the lead role in troop and cargo lifts. The Seahorse, however, compiled an impressive record. From its arrival with HMM-162 and -163 in March 1965 until its August standdown, the UH-34s assigned to the 1st Wing and Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet flew over 917,000 sorties in support of I Corps combat operations, proving to be the most

dependable aircraft in the wing's helicopter inventory. Designated to replace the outgoing Seahorses were 18 new CH-53D aircraft of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 361. Unloaded from the *New Orleans* (LPH 11) at Da Nang on 27 August, the Sea Stallion squadron joined MAG-36 at Phu Bai in support of the Army and remaining Marine forces in northern I Corps.

Despite the redeployment of helicopter and fixed-wing squadrons during the latter half of the year, the 1st Wing, by December, had completed the replacement of a majority of the aircraft it had arrived with four years before. The all-weather A-6A Intruder had replaced a substantial portion of the A-4 Skyhawks, and a majority of the F-4B Phantoms had given way to more capable F-4Js. Likewise, the EA-6A electronic warfare Prowler had replaced the Korean War vintage EF-10, and the OV-10A Bronco had superseded the Cessna O-1. In addition, the UH-34 transport helicopter was replaced by the CH-46, whose lift capability was further enhanced by the CH-53, and the AH-1G Cobra was introduced to provide a true attack helicopter capability, permitting the UH-1E to return to its

mission of observation. Of the wing's aircraft, only the KC-130 refueler-transport remained unaffected.

I Corps Fixed-Wing Support

American fixed-wing air operations in Southeast Asia, following the bombing halt, changed dramatically. No longer concerned with the struggle for air superiority and the defense of strike formations over North Vietnam, the role of airpower in interdiction and ground combat support in Laos and South Vietnam intensified.

Within the confines of I Corps Tactical Zone, the 1st MAW's fixed-wing aircraft, aided by United States Air Force, Navy, and small contingents of the Australian Air Force, performed a variety of missions in support of III MAF ground operations. While in-country interdiction of enemy troops and supplies was a continuous task, as were reconnaissance, airborne forward air control, and landing zone preparation, the wing's most significant function was that of providing close air support. Assisting troops on the ground, according to wing bombardier, First Lieutenant Earl C. Smith, was Marine aviation's basic mission: a task which he and other aircrew members found to be "the most gratifying mission" flown in Southeast Asia.¹⁶

Throughout the first eight months of 1969, Marine aircraft flew about 80 percent of the daily tactical air strikes and combat support missions in I Corps, assisting six divisions and two brigades. During this period, wing A-4Es, A-6As, and F-4Bs completed a monthly average of 6,480 attack and combat support sorties; the latter category included interdiction, reconnaissance, artillery and air strike control, the bulk of which fell to the wing's OV-10As. By the end of September, with the reduction of aerial support requirements created by the redeployment of the 9th Marines from northern I Corps and the resultant lower level of combat activity, the number of monthly attack and combat support missions plummeted to 4,017. Over the next three months, as the remainder of the 3d Marine Division and three fixed-wing squadrons redeployed, the monthly in-country sortie total dropped further to a December figure of 3,084—less than 41 percent of the January to August average.

While the decline of sortie requests was common to all forces throughout I Corps, there was a marked change in the distribution. Having received an average of 2,890 sorties during the first eight months of 1969, Marine units in October accumulated but 862, a majority of these going to the 1st Division. Conversely, as the 101st Airborne Division expanded its responsi-

bility from Thua Thien Province into Quang Tri, and the Americal Division continued operations in the southern two provinces of the corps tactical zone, the two Army units accounted for 60 percent of the wing's sorties during the last four months of the year. Air support rendered Korean and South Vietnamese units followed a similar pattern to that of the Marines, dropping from 282 sorties in January to 97 in December.*

With alterations in both the intensity and distribution of the wing's attack effort, as the level of combat diminished, a change came in mission assignment. As a result of the action generated during the numerous large unit operations of early 1969, close air support missions between January and August averaged 4,630, accounting for 90 percent of the 1st MAW fixed-wing operations. The remaining months of the year witnessed an inverse commitment. As combat activity decreased and troop density thinned, the requirement for air-delivered munitions in support of ground elements dropped significantly. Although redeployment affected the wing's capabilities, sufficient fixed-wing assets remained to shift greater emphasis to deep air support. By year end, the 1st Wing directed nearly 1,200 sorties a month (48 percent of the fixed-wing effort) on enemy base areas and lines of communications throughout the I Corps hinterland.

An example of the versatility of fixed-wing aircraft in support of and coordination with ground action can be seen in the assistance given a 1st Marine Division reconnaissance team, conducting operations in the Que Son Mountains south of Da Nang in late August. Capitalizing on persistent enemy movement through the Phu Loc Valley toward Go Noi Island, the patrol organized an air-supported ambush. Selecting a site centered on a portion of the well-traveled trail flanked by a lake and opposing steep terrain, the tactics envisioned initial detection by seismic intrusion devices, followed by surprise air strikes.

Shortly after sunset on the 28th, the team, situated on Hill 425 overlooking the valley from the southeast, began monitoring the seismic recorders, while the patrol's forward air controller initiated radio contact with all aircraft involved: a flight of three A-6As orbiting well to the north, and an OV-10A, carrying an airborne controller, on station to the east. Standing

*Reported air support sorties furnished South Vietnamese units during the year were somewhat deceiving, as the units increased participation in combined operations with U.S. Forces, to whom the sorties were primarily allocated.

by to provide radar-controlled bombing guidance was an air support radar team (ASRT) at An Hoa Combat Base. Additional aircraft, on alert status, waited at the Da Nang Airbase.

Within a short time, the sensors indicated movement within the target area, whereupon the team using night observation devices confirmed over 60 enemy troops moving east, directly into the killing zone. Selecting an initial impact point ahead of the enemy column, the team's ground controller immediately relayed the target information to the An Hoa ASRT. As the enemy moved forward, the radar team, using the TPQ-10 all-weather radar, vectored the first A-6A on target. Observing the initial string of twenty-eight 500-pound bombs strike the end of the enemy column, the ground controller made adjustment, bringing the next two strikes directly on the dispersing troops.

As the A-6s departed the target area, the Bronco moved in to illuminate the zone, and then called in a flight of three F-4 Phantoms, which had launched from Da Nang when the ambush was triggered. Circling the ambush site, the airborne controller gave each of the incoming F-4s a target until all enemy movement within the valley ceased. With the departure of the Phantoms, An Hoa-based artillery took over, responding to sensor activations as the enemy attempted to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades. In the morning, the reconnaissance team counted 48 enemy soldiers killed.

During 1969, 1st MAW attack aircraft operated under no formal sortie limit, and "continually overflowed

the program," noted Brigadier General Homer S. Hill, Assistant Wing Commander. Under single management, daily attack sorties were subject to Seventh Air Force assignment, which "fraggged" 1st MAW fixed-wing aircraft at a utilization rate of 100 percent (one operational flight by one aircraft per day). Combat support, emergency requests from troops in contact, and other wing-generated missions were not included. As a result, the wing's average daily utilization rate hovered around 150 percent, much to the distress of CinCPac air planners who were finding it increasingly difficult to finance excess flight hours and aircraft repairs and replacement during a period of growing economic constraints. Throughout the year efforts were made to cut the number of Air Force fraggged sorties by 25 to 30 percent in order to provide a cushion for the wide variety of wing missions, but without success. The tactical situation, however, provided some relief.¹⁷

Results of the wing's in-country support of ground maneuver units can be viewed in a number of ways. In terms of statistics, wing aircraft accounted for 1,614 enemy troops killed and over 20,400 bunkers and enemy structures razed. Less tangible were results accruing from strike missions which enabled ground units to reduce enemy strongpoints and to secure operational objectives rapidly and effectively with minimal friendly losses. Whether trapping the enemy in fortifications or driving him into the open, air strikes softened his resistance to allied ground attacks considerably. In addition, the psychological value of air support was evident as friendly morale rose and enemy morale plunged, resulting in increased enemy defections

Originally conceived of as an observation aircraft, the OV-10A "Bronco" gradually assumed a close air support mission, at times replacing both the F-4B Phantom and A-6A Intruder.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A373942



directly attributable to the fear of air strikes throughout I Corps.

The Interdiction Campaign

With the termination of the United States bombing campaign in North Vietnam in November 1968, the American air interdiction effort in Southeast Asia shifted to the southern panhandle of Laos, which was divided into two strike areas, Commando Hunt and Steel Tiger. Here the system of supply roads, known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, crossed the western border of North Vietnam through three major passes—Nape, Mu Gia, and Ban Karai—in the Annamite Mountains, and then turned south, branching off into the Communist base areas of South Vietnam and southeastern Laos. Over this road network, North Vietnamese troops, supplies, and munitions moved by foot, bicycle, pack animal, and by truck through a region of Laos rich in hidden natural limestone caves and dense jungle. Traveling mostly by night, the convoys vanished into the numerous well-camouflaged camps and storage depots protected by antiaircraft weapons at daybreak or at the first sign of danger, making interdiction difficult.

The flow of enemy troops and supplies along the road network, and the American effort to restrict it, was tied to the annual monsoon seasons. Between October and February, the northeast monsoon brought dry, clear weather west of the Annamite Mountains, while cool, foggy, rainy weather settled in along coastal North Vietnam and northern South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese customarily increased their activity in Laos by moving large amounts of supplies through the passes and down the road network during this period, requiring a corresponding increase in the American interdiction effort. With the beginning of the southwest monsoon in May, moisture-laden air from the southwest backed up against the mountains, resulting in frequent heavy rains in southern Laos. The poor weather not only posed obstacles to enemy truck traffic, turning the cratered and unimproved trails and roads that comprised the infiltration system into quagmires, but to American air operations as well.

Adapting interdiction efforts to the cyclical weather changes, MACV and the Seventh Air Force in November 1968 launched a series of air campaigns known as Commando Hunt, designed to disrupt the enemy supply lines in Laos, substantially increasing the time required to transport materiel and troops into South Vietnam. United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical aircraft and Air Force B-52s struck at exposed

vehicles, storage areas, and truck parks with blast and delay fuzed munitions, while seeding passes and river fords with MK36 air-delivered mines. By January 1969, the Seventh Air Force allotted 40 percent of all preplanned tactical air sorties and 60 percent of all B-52 bombing missions to the Commando Hunt campaign.

In addition to strikes into southern Laos, American aircraft flew other missions further north and, to a lesser extent, in North Vietnam. Over northern Laos, Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft flew armed reconnaissance missions and participated in Operation Barrel Roll, providing tactical air support to friendly Laotian forces. Over North Vietnam, American aircraft continued reconnaissance flights following the bombing halt, confirming a gradual buildup in the number of enemy fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, airfields, and antiaircraft artillery positions.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, at the beginning of 1969, provided an average of 35 sorties out of a total of 198 per day in support of the Commando Hunt area raids in Laos, and other air operations outside South Vietnam; an average that was maintained throughout the northeast monsoon season. During the southwest monsoon, beginning in late May, the daily sortie rate fell below 25, but rose again in November with the advent of the dry season. While F-4B Phantoms and A-4E Skyhawks carried the major burden of conducting daylight conventional bombing and strafing attacks at the beginning of the year, increasing reliance was placed on the night missions of the A-6A Intruder as the year progressed.

Described as "the finest all-weather bombing aircraft in the world," the Intruder, with its elaborate target acquisition radar and computer-controlled navigation and bomb-aiming systems, proved to be ideal for night and poor-weather bombing along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.¹⁸ Carrying as many as twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, Rockeye II cluster, or delayed-fuzed MK36 mines, the wing's A-6As were guided to selected targets by Air Force forward air controllers or the sensor readout station at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, which monitored strings of seismic and acoustic sensors airdropped along the main branches of the trail network. An A-6A assigned to the Commando Bolt, Commando Hunt, or Steel Tiger areas of Laos, would take off from Da Nang and fly to a prearranged point where it would orbit, awaiting target assignment. As trucks, known to pilots and bombardiers as "movers," activated sensors, the Nakhon Phanom station would notify the Intruder of the target location. The aircrew



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422876

Described as the finest all-weather bomber, a Grumman A-6A Intruder heads for targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the North Vietnamese Army's main supply route.

would then feed the relayed data into the craft's computer system and head for the truck convoy or storage site, destroying it by using offset bombing techniques or the aircraft's ability to pick up a moving target. In the course of the Commando Hunt series of air operations, Intruders destroyed or damaged an average of 300 moving or stationary targets per month.¹⁹

Marine Intruders flying missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail encountered a number of persistent problems, among them the Air Force's failure to understand and appreciate the capabilities of the aircraft itself. As First Lieutenant Earl C. Smith pointed out in describing an average mission over Laos:

We went over and we had to orbit 25 minutes, waiting to get on the route. They would not allow us on the route. We had the capability . . . to pick up moving targets. An Air Force EAC [forward air controller] was trying to work a couple of [Air Force] F-4s visually at night to pick up three trucks. We waited for 25 minutes; they were unable to find their trucks; they were dropping flares. Periodically through this 25 minutes we called and asked to go on the route to see if we could pick them up. We were rejected. Finally they had to hit the tanker and we were allowed on the route. We were on the route approximately five minutes, picked up the three movers, and wiped all three of them out. And it was confirmed by their F-4s as they were pulling off target.²⁰

Air Force controllers, despite their preference for visually controlled aircraft such as the Phantom and Skyhawk, grew to appreciate the capacity of the A-6 to loiter for longer periods without refueling and its capabilities during periods of darkness and poor weather.

Another major problem was heavy antiaircraft fire controlled by North Vietnamese gunners who aimed and fired either at the sound of an aircraft or the general area above a target.²¹ While inaccurate, the flak was potentially dangerous and the 1st MAW, in early December, began assigning F-4B Phantoms of VMFA-542, codenamed Commando Bolt Assassins, as escorts for the patrolling A-6s. The Phantom crews received the same briefing as the crews of the A-6As with which they were paired, but flew independently to the assigned orbiting point. When the Intruders were given a target and began the bombing run, the F-4Bs followed, watching for enemy antiaircraft gun flashes. If the A-6s were fired upon, the Phantoms attacked the Communist gun position with Zuni rockets or cluster bombs, and if not, the ordnance was expended on the Intruders' target.²² Accompanying an Intruder on a night bombing mission on the Ban Karai Pass or any one of the surrounding roads was no easy task, as Captain Laurence G. Karch pointed out:

Our escort mission over there is the most difficult of all. The A-6 has terrain-following radar and has all the goodies to do all-weather, night interdiction missions. Well, we don't. We have got an air-to-air radar which we can do air-to-air and all-weather work, but following this dude around right on the ground and then going in for a visual attack on a gun at night . . . it's really quite challenging . . . If you don't have radar you're really in a bind because he turns his lights out when he starts going into the pass. The only way you have of keeping up with him is have your navigational computer work and hope you can dead-reckon yourself to the target.²³

The use of the F-4 in flak suppression proved successful as both A-6A and F-4 pilots reported a dramatic decrease in antiaircraft fire directed at the Intruders.

Acquiring targets for, and at times controlling, Marine attack aircraft in Laos were the McDonnell-Douglas TA-4Fs of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 11. The aircraft's high speed and maneuverability made this small, two-seat plane ideal for conducting low-level reconnaissance, first over North Vietnam and then of the Ho Chi Minh Trail following the bombing halt. Flying between 2,500 and 5,000 feet, altitudes well below those later permitted the slower Cessna O-1, O-2, and North American OV-10A, and at speeds over 400 knots, the TA-4F could remain on station for about 40 minutes before refueling. By constantly maneuvering up and down and from side to side, and shifting from one section of the route to another, the aircraft avoided most hostile antiaircraft fire. Even with these tactics, two aircraft from H&MS-11 were shot down in more than 1,700 sorties conducted over Laos in 1969, and a number received extensive damage to their wing fuel tanks.²⁴

While Air Force OV-10As, F-4s, and F-100s monitored the overall trail network from altitudes above 7,500 feet, the TA-4F concentrated on small portions of the enemy supply system by making repeated passes. Using binoculars and hand-held cameras loaded with high resolution or infrared film, the pilot and

his accompanying observer searched for individual trucks, truck parks, supply depots, rest areas, and troop concentrations. During Operation Dewey Canyon, for example, TA-4F aircrews located a number of the enemy's 122mm field guns and trucks, which were subsequently destroyed by Marine attack aircraft. Despite a number of successes, thick jungle canopy and enemy camouflage techniques continued to prevent the location and destruction of a majority of lucrative targets in the area.²⁵

While interdiction of enemy lines of communications and supply was severely limited above the DMZ following the bombing halt, Marine pilots of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1 continued to conduct both intelligence gathering and electronic countermeasure (ECM) flights. The primary mission of VMCJ-1 aircrews during the year was the maintenance of an electronic screen above the DMZ to protect III MAF air operations in northern Quang Tri Province and reconnaissance sorties along Route 1 in North Vietnam from the enemy surface-to-air missile and radar-directed antiaircraft threats. Flying orbits parallel to the DMZ and southern coast of North Vietnam, squadron aircrews piloting the EA-6A (and the EF-10 before its phaseout in early October) provided continuous electronic support.

Further north, over the Gulf of Tonkin, VMCJ-1 aircraft, especially the versatile EA-6A Prowler, supported

Col Norman W. Gourley, Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 13, flying an F-4B Phantom, and Col Rex A. Deasy, Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12, in the smaller A-4 "Skyhawk," team-up on a mission to destroy enemy supply positions.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



Navy and Air Force reconnaissance programs centering on Vinh and the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. Protection for both manned missions near Vinh and unmanned (drone) operations in northern North Vietnam was possible since the Prowler, configured with jamming devices, electronically targeted radar-controlled antiaircraft, missile, and enemy fighter threats.

Although the allies possessed total command of the air, both over North and South Vietnam during 1969, North Vietnamese MIG fighter aircraft posed a continuing threat to friendly planes operating over Laos, North Vietnam, and to the Navy's Attack Carrier Striking Force (Task Force 77) in the Gulf of Tonkin. While maintaining a continuous airborne alert over Laos (MIGCAP), an average of 110 wing sorties a month were devoted to the Seventh Fleet's barrier combat air patrol (BARCAP) operations. Forming a screen across the primary North Vietnamese air threat axis, extending southeast from Hanoi and Haiphong, the barrier patrol provided 24-hour protection for American naval shipping and aircraft in and above the Gulf of Tonkin. In addition, rotational support of the barrier afforded wing F-4 aircrews the necessary experience in order to maintain proficiency in intercept techniques. Supporting the fighters deployed over the gulf and elsewhere were Marine KC-130 refueler/transporters orbiting nearby, providing a day and night refueling capability.

While these two missions placed a strain on the wing's fighter-bomber and financial resources, Major General Quilter and his deputy, Brigadier General Hill, considered them essential. Speaking of the wing's air-to-air capability, General Quilter noted:

There was nothing like putting a hot shot NFO [naval flight officer] and a good pilot alongside Haiphong, looking into that beautiful scope and seeing MIGs flying out there . . . It's meaningful that if we are going to ever tangle with them in an air-to-air way, and we may well, nobody knows, but you had better keep your hand and your foot in the door on this kind of capability, because things could deteriorate very rapidly.²⁶

Of the same mind, General Hill declared that participation in the barrier patrol maintained not only pilot proficiency, but the wing's close relationship with the fleet, a relationship that would continue with the end of the Vietnam conflict:

If you go so long in the air-ground role with these birds and with these crewmen that we have got here, we lose a hell of a lot of our capability, particularly true as far as the radar is concerned and the aircraft is concerned . . . If you don't exercise these things, and you don't keep your crew members exercised you lose the capability. If the Vietnam

War was over tomorrow and we had to sail off to Timbuktu or Zamboanga, we would need this air-to-air capability, and as a matter of fact, it is part of our mission.²⁷

Despite the drain on resources, the 1st MAW actively maintained an around-the-clock participation in the allied interdiction, reconnaissance, and air defense campaign. American intelligence officers estimated that the wing's effort, while small, along with that of the Air Force and Navy, produced an overall reduction of approximately 30 percent, when compared to 1968, in the amount of materiel reaching enemy troops in South Vietnam during 1969.

Air Control

Requesting and controlling fixed-wing air support throughout I Corps Tactical Zone, although complex, was an ever-increasingly-efficient process. All missions, except those specifically generated by the 1st MAW for specific purposes, were controlled by the direct air support control center (DASC) at Camp Horn, Da Nang. The senior tactical air control agency for I Corps, this combined U.S. Air Force, Marine, and Vietnamese Air Force control center could divert any preplanned fixed-wing mission assigned to the tactical zone, launch aircraft held on alert, or request additional Air Force or Navy aircraft for tactical emergencies. Working in close cooperation with the Horn DASC was the 1st MAW air control system, consisting of a tactical air direction center (TADC) at the Da Nang Airbase, responsible for command and control of all wing aircraft; a tactical air operations center (TAOC) on Monkey Mountain, tasked with conducting air surveillance and antiair warfare operations; and direct air support control centers (DASC) at both 1st and 3d Marine Division Headquarters, a wing agency controlling all aircraft assigned in support of the two divisions.* Victor DASC at Phu Bai, subordinate to the Horn DASC, controlled air support assigned to XXIV Corps units, although it was often bypassed by the 3d Marine Division.²⁸

Marine or Army ground units needing preplanned air support submitted requests at least 24 hours in advance to the division air officer, who ranked the requests. The consolidated division requests would then be sent to the wing where they were combined with other corps unit requests and transmitted to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) and Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Operation Center (TAOC) in Saigon. Seventh Air Force, with MACV su-

*Both the Americal and 101st Airborne had control centers similar to the Marine DASC, as did the Air Force.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Collocated with the headquarters element of each division was a direct air support control center where wing radio operators coordinated flights of both jet and helicopter aircraft with the needs of ground troops.

pervision, apportioned available sorties among the corps areas, almost always assigning 1st MAW aircraft to missions in I Corps. These mission assignments were transmitted to the wing in the form of daily or weekly "frag" orders on the basis of one mission per aircraft per day. To these allotted Seventh Air Force missions, the wing added special missions such as the BARCAP and landing zone preparations, which it directly controlled. The wing TADC would then inform the division DASC originally requesting the mission of the number, type, ordnance load, radio call signs, and time-on-station of the aircraft assigned. Once in division airspace, the division DASC took responsibility for establishing initial contact with the aircraft and turning it over to the forward air controller, either on the ground or airborne, who would direct the requested air strikes.

In cases of tactical emergency, the DASC, on its own authority, could divert preplanned flights already assigned to the division. If none were available, the division DASC would request the wing's TADC for additional strikes. The TADC then would scramble any

available Marine aircraft or pass the request on to the Horn DASC which would scramble Air Force aircraft based at Da Nang. If additional assistance was needed, the DASC could go to Saigon. Such was the case during Operation Purple Martin in fierce fighting around Fire Support Base Argonne. Air strikes over and above those already allocated were needed to blunt a number of heavy enemy attacks and the requests made their way to Saigon which scrambled both Thailand-based Air Force and Navy carrier-based fighters in the South China Sea.²⁹ As the tempo of ground action slackened during the year, commanders placed increased reliance on preplanned missions and less on emergency sorties, but as Brigadier General Hill continually stressed: "when our Marines get in trouble during the day and they need more air, of course we start scrambling, . . . You have no alternative. We are not going to let our own Marine units go short of support, if we have got the capability to do it."³⁰

All fixed-wing and helicopter fire support furnished Marine ground units was controlled by a ground or airborne forward air controller (FAC), or an air support radar team. Each Marine battalion had a tactical air control party which transmitted air support requests and controlled strikes; however, ground FACs were of limited value due to the mobile nature of combat operations resulting in a heavy dependence upon airborne FACs, flying OV-10As or Cessna O-1s. When not conducting visual and photographic reconnaissance, or directing artillery, these airborne controllers established contact with the ground unit, determined the type and amount of air support required, and then directed the assigned aircraft, passing on changes or additional targeting information received from the supported ground unit.

While ground and airborne air controllers were often limited by darkness or poor weather, AN/TPQ-10 radar course directing centrals, operated by the air support radar teams (ASRTs) of Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 3, were not. These combined radar and computer devices, located strategically throughout I Corps, could track an aircraft at distances up to 50 miles and direct it to the desired target in any weather condition. The air support radar teams normally received target assignments from the division DASC and when an aircraft was within range, the ASRT took control of the attack mission, determining the aircraft's relative position to both the target and TPQ-10, and then plotted a course to the objective, as well as bomb release time over the target.

At the beginning of 1969, MASS-3 maintained six

ASRTs deployed at Vandegrift; Quang Tri; Fire Support Base Birmingham, west of Phu Bai; Da Nang; An Hoa; and Chu Lai. Although routinely used for fixed-wing, low-visibility ordnance delivery missions, the teams also positioned helicopters for medical evacuations, reconnaissance runs, and supply drops. In February, when northeast monsoon conditions threatened the lift and logistical support of the 9th Marines during Operation Dewey Canyon, air support radar teams provided assistance. During a typical mission from Quang Tri or Dong Ha into the Da Krong Valley, the helicopter pilot, after an instrument-assisted departure and climb to a position above the cloud cover, would request flight clearance and ASRT assignment from the Vandegrift DASC. The assigned ASRT then tracked the helicopter with TPQ-10 radar, providing the pilot enroute navigational guidance. Arriving over the destination, the pilot, taking advantage of an opening in the clouds, would then proceed to the landing zone or to the release point for parachute supply drops. During the operation, team-controlled helicopters conducted 1,552 evacuation, command and control, and support missions, delivering 2,113 tons of supplies.

A less reliable, but more sophisticated all-weather electronic air strike control system was the radar beacon forward air control (RABFAC), known simply as the "Beacon," used in conjunction with the A-6A Intruder. The core of the system, introduced in 1968, was a six-pound, battery-powered transponder, carried by the ground forward air control team. Emitting a distinctive signal which was picked up by the Intruder's radar, the beacon provided the pilot with the approximate location of friendly troops. By radio, the ground FAC then provided target bearings and bombing direction in relation to the beacon's position. With this information, the Intruder's on-board attack-navigation computer system guided the aircraft to the objective where the aircrew employed off-set bombing techniques to destroy the target.

While A-6A Intruders flew numerous beacon sorties per day for both Marine and Army units, use of the system during 1969 was limited. Ground controllers, especially those unfamiliar with the aircraft, had difficulty in accurately determining target bearings, not only forcing the strikes to be adjusted like artillery fire, also but causing a number of accidents. As a result, distance restrictions eventually were placed on the use of the system when supporting troops in close combat.³¹ Equipment failure proved to be the most

annoying problem. Poor radio performance, attributed to battery wear or discharge, prevented the ground unit from contacting the supporting aircraft, or the Intruder's elaborate electronic systems oftentimes fell victim to the Southeast Asian environment. "When it worked," noted Lieutenant Colonel George C. Fox, commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, the RABFAC "was beautiful. We used it inside 300 meters, contrary to division SOP, to repel the attack on Fire Support Base Whisman on 29 May during Operation Cameron Falls. It and 'firecracker' artillery ammunition were instrumental that night."³² Despite the problems, the A-6A accounted for nearly 20 percent of the wing's in-country attack sorties and over 45 percent of the high-explosive ordnance expended.

Helicopter Operations

Despite the steady decline in combat operations over the year, there was little reduction in the demands placed on MAG-36, ProvMAG-39, and following the first redeployment, on MAG-16 for helicopter support. As Deputy Wing Commander, General Hill observed:

Viewing the nature of this war, the terrain, and the enemy, . . . we never have enough helicopters to satisfy the needs and requirements of the two divisions, and they are honest requirements. And so we have been attempting to do the best we can and satisfy as many of these needs as we can, and we have been doing it by overflying the program. This can only do one or two things; it can get you in trouble real fast, or sooner or later, it can drive you off the deep end. As [Major] General [Paul J.] Fontana said when he was out there, "you are eating your young."³³

The year began with the wing's fleet of helicopters flying 47,346 sorties a month, carrying 83,630 troops and passengers, and lifting 11,550 tons of cargo. Monthly sortie rates soared to over 52,000 in April, May, and June due to the heavy commitment of ground troops to enemy base areas in both Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces, but fell back to 46,303 in July. Over 90 percent of these sorties were consistently flown in support of Marine units, with the remainder divided among the Korean Marines, ARVN, and United States Army Special Forces.

Although each of the wing's helicopter pilots and aircraft types operated under maximum number of monthly flight hours prescribed by the Navy Department, the 1st MAW constantly overflew both. The standards, ranging from 31.5 hours for the CH-53 to 66.6 for the UH-1E, and 80 to 100 hours for pilots, were used by the Navy as a basis for the purchase of fuel, spare parts, and the training and allocation of pilots. By mid-1969, wing helicopters routinely were

flying at a rate of 150 percent of their authorized utilization, and during periods of heavy commitment, approached 200 percent. While these high usage rates created a shortage of spare parts, maintenance problems, and an excessive incidence of pilot fatigue, they were considered necessary. Speaking of the heavy use of the CH-53, General Hill remarked:

[Ground units] have been encouraged, and rightly so, to move into these inland base areas that have become sanctuaries over in the mountainous areas. As they do this, as we build these fire bases, and move over in there, it becomes necessary, of course, to support them with heavy artillery, ammunition; and you can't do this very well with a [CH]-46, you need a heavy lift helicopter. So we have ourselves on the horns of a dilemma here now. We are attempting to root the enemy out of these base areas next to the border of Laos and we need the heavy lift helicopters to support it, and at the same time, we are going to have to reduce flying time of these 53s.³⁴

The vexatious cycle of high usage rates and resultant supply and repair problems continued throughout the remainder of the year despite attempts at flight hour reduction.

As a consequence of Keystone Eagle redeployments and the coming of the monsoon season, the monthly sortie rate began a steady and continuous decline in July. From a summer high of 46,303, the number of monthly helicopter sorties fell to 30,957 in October, and to 28,292 by December. During this same period flight hours were cut by over 40 percent, from 13,289 in July to 8,965 by the end of the year.

The mission and tactics of the wing's helicopter fleet changed little. After four years of constant combat, missions and tactics had been refined and by the beginning of 1969 were set. The "workhorse" of the fleet was the CH-46 Sea Knight, which had gradually

Providing the bulk of troop lifts, medical evacuations, and routine supply missions, the CH-46 "Sea Knight" was the workhorse of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's helicopter fleet.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A372127



replaced the UH-34. Flying over 60 percent of the wing's monthly helicopter sorties, the medium transport performed the bulk of both assault and routine trooplifts, resupply missions, medical evacuations, search and rescue, and the insertion and extraction of reconnaissance teams. Support by this versatile, tandem-rotor aircraft increased during the year as "D" model aircraft replaced the original CH-46A versions, which by June were assigned primarily to special landing force squadrons.

Like the CH-46, older model CH-53A heavy-lift helicopters were augmented and replaced during 1969 by the more powerful CH-53D. The first of these new model helicopters arrived in May, and by December, 20 were assigned to HMH-361, joining an equal number of "A" model aircraft in HMH-463.* The Sikorsky Sea Stallions, to the frustration of the aircrews, were restricted to nonassault trooplifts and supply missions, and to the recovery of downed aircraft. Because it was an expensive and difficult-to-maintain aircraft, Marine commanders hesitated to expose the CH-53 to hostile fire. The aircraft, however, provided the wing with much needed lift capability, as it endeavored to support Marine ground units operating far from their established bases.

The UH-1E, or as it was more commonly termed, "Huey," was an aircraft in continual demand. Assigned initially to four squadrons, VMO-3 (redesignated HML-367), HML-167, and VMO-2 and -6, the unarmed Huey's (known as "slicks") performed a variety of tasks. Slicks allotted to III MAF Headquarters, the 1st MAF, the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, Force Logistics Command, and the Korean Marine Brigade, not only carried out administrative and command and control missions, but transported an endless stream of visitors, from allied service commanders, to U.S. Congressmen and government officials, to traveling performers. These "VIP" missions were a continual drain on the helicopters' availability, consuming as much as 25 percent of the aircrafts' flight hours.

Hueys also flew reconnaissance missions. While 1st MAF fixed-wing aircraft could provide ground commanders with detailed surface intelligence, such as terrain conditions and camouflaged enemy areas, they often lacked the capability to detect the presence of enemy formations concealed by heavy jungle canopy. To provide such intelligence, a number of wing UH-1E helicopters were equipped with the XM-3 "People

Sniffer" Airborne Personnel Detector (APD). As the pilot flew at tree top level, the 65-pound device monitored the air rising from beneath the jungle canopy, detecting human ammonia effluence, or the combustion products associated with human activity, such as fires and vehicle exhaust. Normally employed along trail networks, ridgelines, and stream beds, the APD was able to scan 100 square kilometers an hour, picking up evidence of enemy troop concentrations, as it did preceding Operation Dewey Canyon around an area which would later be developed into Fire Support Base Cunningham.

Although the primary mission of the Huey was observation, an armed version of the aircraft was used most often as an escort. Until the introduction of the AH-1G Cobra, Huey gunships carried the burden of escorting transport and resupply helicopters into hostile areas, and of supporting troops in contact. But the Huey's role as a gunship was considered a limiting factor in overall helicopter operations, as General Hill observed:

As the war seems to go on, we get more and more dependent on gunships, Huey gunships. The Marine Corps' position has come about 180 degrees since 1964, when we had no gunships and we subscribed to the theory . . . that we could escort all of our helicopters with the U-4 [UH-34A] or the fixed-wing aircraft. The greatest limiting factor in helicopter operations, right now—and this is substantiated by both division commanders—the greatest limiting factor is the availability of gunships. Their tempo of operations . . . to a large degree is based upon the availability of helicopters, and the operational helicopters are largely based upon the availability of gunships.³⁵

The AH-1G Cobra gunship, like its predecessor, played an ever-increasing role in Marine helicopter operations following its introduction in April 1969. Initially assigned to VMO-2 and -6, but later placed in HML-367 due to replacements and to ensure better maintenance support, the Cobra's primary task, like the Huey, was to escort transport, medical evacuation, and resupply helicopters. On flights into hostile landing zones, the lead gunship located and scouted the zones, and directed the transport helicopters into the LZs. If opposition was encountered, Cobras, circling above, immediately attacked enemy positions with minigun, grenade, and rocket fire. The AH-1G also was used to break up enemy attacks on Marine positions, firing within 15 to 30 yards of friendly forces. From their arrival, wing Cobras maintained a grueling flight schedule, compiling 21,310 sorties during six months of air combat operations.

During 1969, Marine helicopters flew a total of

*HMH-361 joined MAG-16 in August, eventually replacing HMH-462, which departed Vietnam in November with MAG-36.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 crewmen salute after folding the blades of a UH-34D, retiring the aircraft after seven years of service in Vietnam. With the arrival of CH-53 Sea Stallions, HMM-362 was recommissioned as a heavy helicopter squadron.

547,965 sorties, raising the total support provided forces in I Corps since March 1965 to over 2,300,000. The wing's transport effort accounted for the movement of 895,000 passengers and 115,000 tons of cargo by December. These lift totals represented a substantial improvement, as the average payload per cargo flight exceeded 2,200 pounds, a 23 percent increase over the 1968 figure. This increase benefited both ground and helicopter units, allowing ground elements, now unencumbered by numerous resupply requests, greater mobility, and permitting helicopter squadrons more economical use of time and aircraft by cutting the number of sorties and reducing exposure time to enemy fire.

Improving Helicopter Support

As Marine ground forces moved into enemy base areas with greater frequency following the 1968 *Tet* Offensive and thus became more and more dependent upon the helicopter for support, incidents of mutual recrimination between aviation and ground Marines arose during this period of maximum effort and high stress.³⁶ The frustration reached a climax early in 1969, when the wing, operating with an inadequate number of helicopters, endeavored to support not only two reinforced and widely scattered Marine divisions, but Korean and South Vietnamese units as well. As Major General Carl A. Youngdale, III MAF Deputy Commanding General, observed:

You would be surprised at the frustrations that exist today in the Marine Corps in our air-ground team. Let me give you some examples of what we got. Here are air quotes: emergency Medevacs: "we get up, we get out, we finally get down, all of a sudden the patient comes running from the bush and jumps in the airplane"; "we get word we got a clear zone, we come in and get our tail shot off"; "we have a patient to move, we try two or three times to get in, but they won't move him 50 yards in order to get a clear zone to move him out on"; "they are using us to haul water right up to their front line units." Dirty fire bases: one pilot was telling about coming into a fire base and all of a sudden this poncho sails up in the air just even with his rotor heads and came moving right over into his head. Said he just closed his eyes and figured he had it. Fortunately a down draft caught it and pushed it on down and didn't wrap in his rotor heads and he didn't crash. "Nobody is in charge at the fire base; some PFC is telling me how to bring this million dollar airplane in"; "troops are not ready when they say they have to go at a certain time." Now here are some ground quotes: "planes don't arrive on time or in the numbers they say they are going to send"; "they quit in the middle of the day and don't come back"; "they are too cautious in bad weather"; "pilots differ in the load they will carry"; "Army will fly when Marines won't"; "no control over what they will or will not do."³⁷

These notions eventually moved from Vietnam throughout the Marine Corps, raising doubts about the Marine system of helicopter command and control, and at times threatening the cohesion of the air-ground team as a whole.

In April, Lieutenant General Nickerson convened

a board of six officers headed by Major General Youngdale, and directed it to "examine the utilization, command and control of Marine Corps helicopter assets in III MAF."* During several weeks of inquiry, the board interviewed 64 witnesses, headed by the commanding generals, 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Division, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Each III MAF unit provided a cross-section of experienced officers from the regimental and group commander down to the company commander and individual pilot. In addition to officers, the board heard from a number of enlisted personnel, one of whom was a reconnaissance patrol leader with a record of 54 patrols.³⁸

After careful consideration, the board reaffirmed the basic Marine Corps concepts of the air-ground organization and helicopter command and control, declaring that most of the air-ground difficulties in Vietnam stemmed from the shortage of aircraft and from the fact that one wing was doing the work normally given to two. The board nevertheless found a number of deficiencies. Primary among them was a lack of understanding on the part of both air and ground commanders of the capabilities and limitations of the other, a deficiency which the board noted could be remedied by improved training at all levels, and by again requiring the assignment of naval aviators to the Amphibious Warfare School at Marine Corps Base, Quantico. While rejecting the Army's system of permanently attaching helicopters to ground units, the board recommended strengthening the wing's DASC at each division, in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of flight information between the division and the wing, and to permit the more timely response of helicopters to tactical emergencies. To improve support of the 3d Marine Division specifically, the board recommended the establishment of a 1st MAF auxiliary headquarters to be located with the division at Dong Ha.³⁹

Among the first recommendations implemented by Lieutenant General Nickerson was the creation of the wing auxiliary headquarters and the assignment of Brigadier General Ralph H. Spanjer as its commanding officer. Both produced immediate and beneficial results.⁴⁰ Among the other recommendations instituted were two exchange programs. The first was an exchange of staff officers. "We started sending," noted

General Youngdale, "infantry company commanders to aviation units and we started sending [aviation] captains to ground units, not as air liaison officers, but simply as extra staff officers in the staff itself, battalion, or regiment or whatever it might be."⁴¹

Although the rapport between aviator and infantryman was slow to be reestablished, the program did go a long way in increasing the understanding of the other's tasks and problems. To further enhance understanding, the wing and divisions began short orientation visits. Lieutenants from the division periodically spent a single or several days with the CH-46 squadrons of ProvMAG-39 or MAG-16, participating with pilots and aircrew in the daily routine of mission briefings and lift or supply sorties. Aviators, both fixed-wing and helicopter, in turn visited infantry regiments and battalions, touring positions, attending operational briefings, and viewing weapons demonstrations.

Other recommendations, while approved, took more time to implement. In the interval, the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division during the second half of 1969 resulted in the pairing of a single division with the wing, and a more favorable ratio of air support to ground troops. Taking full advantage of this new sufficiency of helicopters, Major General Thrash began experimenting with the delegation of the task of assigning helicopter missions by increasing the authority of the wing DASC, and making increased use of helicopter "packages." While not new, helicopter packages were now placed under the direct operational control of infantry regiments. Among the first of these quick-reaction packages was that established by the 1st Marines, codenamed "Kingfisher."** With the success of these patrols, additional innovative helicopter packages were created in 1970.

With the initial steps taken in 1969 to correct a number of deficiencies in helicopter support, the 1st Wing moved to provide greater flexibility and innovative assistance to ground operations. In this process, both ground and air commanders grew to understand and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of the other within the war zone. Changes also occurred outside of Vietnam, among them the greater integration of aviation and ground members within Headquarters Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Force staffs. In addition, the military education of Marine Corps aviators, especially of junior officers, was given greater emphasis as was cross training and duty assignment,

*In addition to Major General Youngdale, the board included Brigadier General Frank E. Garretson, Brigadier General Homer S. Hill, Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka, Lieutenant Colonel William D. Bassett, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Allen, recorder.

**For a detailed description of "Kingfisher" patrols see Chapter 11.

all of which aimed at promoting understanding among the members of the air-ground team.⁴²

Air Defense

Although Marine, Air Force, and Navy aircraft possessed total command of the air in Southeast Asia during 1969, the American command still found it necessary to maintain defensive arrangements in the event of North Vietnamese air strikes on vulnerable allied targets. In I Corps, while fighter aircraft and antiaircraft weapons could be alerted, major responsibility for ground antiair defense centered on the 1st Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion, armed with Hawk ground-to-air missiles.

Deployed to Vietnam in February 1965, followed by its sister 2d Battalion, which was withdrawn in October 1968, the 1st LAAM Battalion established its base of operations at Da Nang. Composed of three firing batteries and a fire assault unit, possessing 118 missiles, although authorized 252, the battalion came under administrative control of Marine Air Control Group 18, while operational control was vested in the Air Force's control and reporting center (CRC), code-named "Panama," located east of Da Nang on Monkey Mountain.

Commanded at the beginning of 1969 by Lieu-

tenant Colonel John W. Drury, relieved in July by Major Edward L. House, Jr., the battalion's batteries were strategically positioned around Da Nang. Located within the Da Nang Airbase itself was Headquarters Battery, while Battery A was atop the Hai Van Pass, Battery B at Monkey Mountain, and Battery C on Hill 327, west of the airfield. The battalion's fire assault unit "E" was deployed on Hill 55, south of Da Nang. Throughout the first six months of 1969, until withdrawn in mid-July, the battalion conducted numerous antiair exercises and practice raids using available Marine fixed-wing aircraft as targets to test the proficiency of the battalion's control and communications system. In January, the battalion engaged 1,375 targets during 75 exercises with a successful engagement rate of 99.8 percent. During the remaining months of its stay in Vietnam, as the number of exercises fell, so did the battalion's success rate. On 19 July, the battalion ceased operations and began preparation for redeployment to Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, California, where in September the battalion was reduced to cadre strength and its firing batteries deactivated.

Accomplishments and Costs

Despite the initial phase of unit redeployments, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continued to provide a vari-

Two Marines of the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion check out the battery of Hawk ground-to-air missiles located on Monkey Mountain, east of Da Nang Airbase.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422857



ety of air support, responding fully to the diverse combat conditions experienced in I Corps Tactical Zone. Marine fixed-wing aircraft furnished attack and reconnaissance assistance, contributing to the continued success of Marine and other United States, South Vietnamese, and Korean ground forces. Likewise, wing helicopters provided the necessary ingredient, and at times the sole means, for the increase in tactical mobility. The wing's versatility was also reflected in the successful out-of-country interdiction campaign, and the electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and air defense

assistance furnished Navy and Air Force operations.

While 1969 witnessed the continued modernization and increased flexibility of the 1st Wing's aviation assets, the year also saw the first sustained drop in aircraft losses. As the tempo of ground and air combat operations decreased so did the number of aircraft lost to hostile fire. By year's end, the 1st Wing had lost a total of 44 helicopters and 34 fixed-wing aircraft. In human terms, 92 wing officers and crew members had been killed, 514 wounded, and 20 were listed as missing in action.

CHAPTER 14

Artillery and Surveillance

Artillery Operations—Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities

Artillery Operations

As 1969 began, all Marine artillery units within I Corps Tactical Zone were either under the control of the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 1st Marine Division, or the 12th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 3d Marine Division.

The 11th Marines, commanded by Colonel Harry E. Dickinson consisted of four organic battalions and the attached 1st Field Artillery Group (1st 155mm Gun Battery, Self-Propelled [SP], later redesignated 1st 175mm Gun Battery); 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines; 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP); Battery G, 29th Artillery (USA); Battery B, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (USA); and the 1st Armored Amphibian Company. Attached specifically for Operation Taylor Common, which was to conclude on 17 February, were elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines in direct support of the 3d Marines.

Colonel Peter J. Mulroney's 12th Marines was composed of its three organic battalions and the attached 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP), under the operational control of XXIV Corps and assigned to the Army's 108th Field Artillery Group; 1st Searchlight Battery; 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery (USA); and the 3d Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery.* Also operating within Quang Tri Province, but not under the direct control of the 12th Marines, was the 5th 155mm Gun Battery (SP).** Headquartered at Dong Ha Combat Base, with its 155mm guns at Vandegrift and a reinforcing platoon of 8-inch self-propelled howitzers at Elliott Combat Base, the battery operated under the control of the 108th Field Artillery Group.

The two artillery regiments' 105mm howitzer batteries were deployed offensively in direct support of

Marine infantry units. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, with its command post on Hill 55 and batteries at fire support bases scattered about the flatlands south of Da Nang, supported the 1st Marines. From positions at An Hoa Combat Base, Liberty Bridge, and mountainous fire bases to the west, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines supported the 5th and 3d Marines, while the 3d Battalion, deployed at bases centered on Dai Loc and Da Nang, fired missions for the 7th Marines. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, headquartered on Hill 34 and batteries at the Northern Artillery Cantonment, west of Red Beach, Hill 55, and Hill 65, fired in general support of the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, which administratively controlled Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, fired missions from the Northern Cantonment and the Hai Van Pass in support of the 26th Marines.*** Of the general support artillery units, most were temporarily under the control of the 1st Field Artillery Group at An Hoa Combat Base in support of forces engaged in Operation Taylor Common.****

To the north, Colonel Mulroney's 12th Marines supported infantry units of the 3d Marine Division; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and to a lesser extent the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); the Navy's Task Force Clearwater; and elements of the 1st ARVN Division. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, headquartered at Vandegrift, fired missions for the 9th Marines, while the 3d Battalion, with batteries at Fire Support Bases Neville, Russell, Fuller, and Elliott, supported the 4th Marines. The 4th Battalion, with its command post at Dong Ha and batteries stretching in an arc from Cua Viet west to Elliott Combat Base, fired in general support of the division, as did units of the

*In general support, the 108th Field Artillery Group included the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (SP); 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (SP); Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery; 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (SP); and, Marine 1st 8-inch Howitzer and 5th 155mm Gun Batteries.

**With the arrival of 175mm guns in March and April, the battery was redesignated the 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP). The 1st 155mm Gun Battery likewise was redesignated following the re-tubing of its guns during the same period.

***Throughout most of the year, two batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines were in direct support of Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo.

****Following Operation Taylor Common, units attached to the 1st Field Artillery Group were released and the group reduced to cadre strength. On 14 July, administrative control of the group was passed from 11th Marines to Regimental Landing Team 9 and the unit departed Vietnam for Okinawa and eventual transfer to Twenty-nine Palms, California.

108th Field Artillery Group. Although under the control of the 12th Marines, the Army's 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery directly supported the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division from positions at Fire Support Bases Sharon, Hai Lang, and Nancy. Attached to each of the direct support battalions of the regiment was a provisional, four-howitzer, 155mm battery, which Colonel Mulroney noted, "we could not get along without."¹

Combined, the 11th and 12th Marines possessed a total of 242 howitzers, guns, and mortars at the beginning of the year. Three firing batteries in each direct support battalion were armed with the M101 A1 105mm towed howitzer, which had a maximum range of 11,000 meters and could be transported by CH-46 helicopters to distant fire support bases throughout the corps tactical zone; the fourth firing battery had six 107mm (commonly termed 4.2-inch) mortars with a range of 5,600 meters. The 4th battalion of each artillery regiment was equipped with M109A self-propelled 155mm howitzers, capable of striking targets at ranges up to 14,600 meters. Twenty-four helicopter-transportable, towed 155mm howitzers remained in both regiments' inventories in order to reinforce fires of the smaller caliber howitzers. Allocated among the direct support battalions, these heavy weapons normally were attached to either the 105mm or mortar batteries. The 155mm gun batteries initially were equipped with the M53 self-propelled 155mm gun, maximum range of 14,600 meters, but later replaced by the M107 175mm self-propelled gun, with a maximum range of 32,700 meters. Using the same tracked, motorized carriage as the 175mm gun, the fourteen M110 8-inch howitzers attached to the Force Artillery batteries were capable of hitting targets at a range of 16,800 meters.*²

Beginning in midyear, Keystone Eagle and then Keystone Cardinal spawned the redeployment of the 12th Marines and relocation of a number of artillery units. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines left Vietnam with the 9th Marines, the infantry regiment it supported, in August, followed in October and November by the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, which accompa-

nied the remaining elements of the 3d Marine Division. With the departure of the 12th Marines, control of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery passed to the 11th Marines, and the battery relocated to Quang Nam Province and its gun platoons to An Hoa Combat Base, Landing Zone Baldy, and Landing Zone Ross. Of Marine artillery units in Quang Tri Province, only the 5th 175mm Gun Battery and the 1st Platoon, 5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery remained. Under the operational control of the 108th Artillery Group and the administrative control of the 11th Marines, the batteries continued to fire long-range missions in support of elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st ARVN Division.

Within the expanded area of operations controlled by the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines moved to Landing Zone Baldy and then westward to fire support bases dotting the Que Son Mountains and Valley, as the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for that portion of southern Quang Nam Province vacated by the Americal Division in August. On the northern extreme of the division's area of operations, two batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, which had supported the 1st and 2d Battalions, 26th Marines serving with the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force, moved ashore in October.** Initially located at the division's Northern Artillery Cantonment, northwest of Da Nang, the batteries later moved to Fire Support Base Los Banos, a former Army fire base overlooking the Hai Van Pass, as the division assumed control of the area from the 101st Airborne Division. By December, the 11th Marines and attached general support batteries controlled 152 artillery pieces.

The basic mission assigned to both the 11th Marines and 12th Marines was to "provide fires in support of offensive operations within and beyond the TAOR's, AO, and RZ [Reconnaissance Zone]" for Marine, other American, South Vietnamese, and South Korean forces. In support of the mission, the artillery's primary task was to respond to calls for fire from engaged units, and to prepare landing zones and fire support bases for occupation, which often consumed a minimum of 1,000 rounds of artillery, in addition to air delivered ordnance. Among the collateral functions were base

*In addition to the standard artillery weapons, the two regiments possessed a number of "howtars," a weapon which combined the tube of a 4.2-inch mortar and the carriage of the 75mm pack howitzer. Although a high trajectory, helicopter-transportable weapon which could "deliver a round with more punch than a 105mm howitzer," the howtar was phased out during 1969 due to its inflexibility. See "Howtar is Phased Out," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 53 (Oct69), p. 1.

**Although the 11th Marines had had operational control of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines since November 1968, administrative control of the units was passed from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to the regiment on 20 October with the redesignation of Regimental Landing Team 26.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Artillerymen of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines on Hill 63 prepare to fire a 105mm howitzer, the most common piece of artillery used in Vietnam, in support of the 7th Marines.

defense and countermortar, rocket, and artillery missions. As part of this function, the 11th Marines controlled the Northern Sector Defense Command (NSDC), which consisted of various headquarters and support units, artillery and infantry, organized as an outer defensive shield for the Da Nang Vital Area.

In accomplishing the defensive mission, both regiments expended large amounts of ammunition on actual or suspected enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar sites, suspected Communist base camps, infiltration routes, assembly areas, sensor activations, and in efforts to neutralize concentrations of surprise firing devices.³ These essentially unobserved fires, or harassing and interdiction fires as they were commonly termed, were carried out in response to either specific intelligence from informants, radar, strings of anti-infiltration devices, radio intercepts, or according to specific fire plans to thwart periodic enemy concentrations, and accounted for approximately 85 percent

of the total amount of artillery rounds fired by both regiments at the beginning of the year.* As the tempo of ground combat operations slowly declined, the proportion of artillery fire devoted to unobserved missions increased, and by December these fires consumed over 95 percent of artillery ammunition fired by the 11th Marines.

Much of the unobserved fire was planned with information from the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions' Fire Support Information Systems (FSIS). Inaugurated in 1968, the system was located within the target information section of each division's fire support coordination center. Gathering input on enemy troop sightings, movement, cache sites, and rocket launching positions from a wide variety of sources, the section coded

*To prevent enemy infiltration of the Demilitarized Zone, the 12th Marines and the Army's 108th Artillery Group maintained a number of ground and counterbattery radar sites south of the zone at Alpha-4, Charlie-2, and Gio Linh.

and stored the information on computer tape, and on request provided artillery commanders with reports, plotting recurrent patterns of enemy movement in a given area. Using these reports, the artillery regiments placed unobserved fire on the most heavily traveled enemy infiltration routes and concentrations of cache sites in order to block movement and preempt an enemy attack.

Sensor activations also provided a number of lucrative targets. The 3d Marine Division, for example, monitored approximately 125 seismic and acoustical sensor strings, emplaced by reconnaissance teams and helicopters throughout the division's area of responsibility. Strings were assigned to certain batteries and upon activation the battery would fire a concentration a short distance from the end of the string. Excellent results were achieved, according to Colonel Wallace W. Crompton, who relieved Colonel Mulroney as commanding officer of the 12th Marines: "I recall the OIC [Officer in Charge] of the sensor unit telling me that one string which had been very active suddenly ceased. A team went out to see what had happened to the devices. They were surprised to see a sign on the trail warning not to use that trail as it 'led to death.' A new trail by-passed it, so the team moved the devices to that trail."⁴ The 1st Division used anti-infiltration devices more for gathering intelligence, than for delivering an immediate, preemptive response.

Despite the steady rise in unobserved fires, both regiments continued to conduct a large volume of direct support and observed fire support missions. As Marine infantry units found themselves operating in mountainous, jungle terrain, far from established cantonments and lines of communications, in areas accessible only by helicopter, a method of direct fire support was needed. Developed during late 1968 from Army techniques by the 3d Marine Division under Major General Raymond G. Davis, the mobile fire support base concept envisioned the rapid construction of temporary artillery positions in remote areas, defended by a minimum of infantry. Under a series of protective, overlapping artillery fans, infantry units could then rapidly search the designated terrain, always being assured of immediate artillery support.⁵

By 1969, this technique for landing reconnaissance and security elements, engineers, construction equipment, guns, crews, ammunition, and infantry on a remote peak in the midst of an enemy base area was perfected and used to such an extent that existent or abandoned fire support bases dotted the high ground



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371877
With each round weighing close to 150 pounds, loading a 175mm gun required two Marines. The gun was the largest weapon in the Marine artillery arsenal.

throughout the corps tactical zone and batteries could be emplaced and firing within hours of the initial insertion. This welding of artillery and infantry into teams allowed for much more flexibility on the battlefield, as General Davis was later to observe:

It was soon discovered that the NVA could not cope with this kind of highly mobile warfare when artillery batteries were positioned on razorbacks and high pinnacles throughout an area, eight kilometers apart so as to provide mutually supporting fire plus 3,000 meter overshoot to hit mortars beyond the base, with infantry battalions operating under the artillery fan. In brief, an infantry battalion with its direct support artillery battery formed a team In addition, the companies themselves operate independently as far as mutual support is concerned. As long as they're within the 8,000 meter fan of the artillery, there is no requirement for the rifle companies to operate together; they can be several kilometers apart.⁶

The normal application of this flexible team approach was to assign each infantry company a two to three kilometer-square area within which an artillery fire support base would be established, where helicopters could resupply and lift out casualties, and from which patrols could thoroughly search the area. Once

cleared, the company would then be lifted by helicopter to another area within the artillery fan. Using this method, detailed searches were made, revealing, as General Davis noted, "major trail networks and cache areas that the NVA had been using for the better part of ten years," and accounting for the success of such operations as Dewey Canyon in Quang Tri, and Taylor Common and Oklahoma Hills in Quang Nam Province.⁷

During Operation Taylor Common, conducted by Task Force Yankee from 7 December 1968 to 8 March 1969, for example, artillery batteries of the 11th and 12th Marines occupied 13 fire support bases in enemy Base Area 112, Go Noi Island, and the Arizona. Several batteries occupied as many as four different temporary bases during the course of the operation when almost all artillery displacement and resupply were accomplished by helicopter. Throughout the remainder of the year, the 11th Marines fired from an additional 52 positions, and by year's end artillery units of the regi-

ment occupied 17 bases stretching from Alpha-2 near the DMZ, to FSB Ryder in the Que Son Mountains.⁸

In addition to direct support and combat missions, observed artillery fire was used to supplement, and to a limited extent, replace the search and blocking activities of infantry patrols. All of these observed fires were directed to a degree by the traditional eyes of the artillery, the forward observer teams assigned to each infantry company. Often blinded by double and triple canopied jungle, elephant grass, mountainous terrain, climatic conditions, and distance between units, the artillery was forced to use additional means to supplement the eyes of the forward observers. Among these was the establishment of permanent observation posts in towers and on commanding terrain.

Although observation posts had been in use by the 11th and 12th Marines for some time, it was Colonel Don D. Ezell who, shortly after taking command of the 11th Marines in September 1969, instituted greater reliance on the technique, as he stated:

Typical of the numerous 11th Marines' mountaintop artillery positions was Fire Support Base Cutlass, constructed to support the 3d Marines' search of enemy Base Area 112.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



It appeared to me that when we first went in, the [Viet Cong] infrastructure and the organized units were lying together in the coastal plains, and that the Marines, through offensive operations, had disengaged the organized units from the infrastructure, knocking them back into the west and to the hills where they formed base camps. Now the infrastructure had to remain . . . to control the population. But they also had a great deal of dealings with the organized units in their mission; they reconned for them, they stored caches for them, they got food and medicine . . . And it would appear if there was a disengagement that there must be . . . a lot of travel back and forth across the battlefield by both the infrastructure and the organized units to perform their missions. My artillery was not in position to control this. My [Forward] O[bservers] were with the rifle companies, and they were certainly forward, but they weren't observers in six feet of elephant grass.⁹

Taking "100 people out of my hide," as Colonel Ezell noted, he initiated a regimental observation post system in an effort "to destroy the enemy as far away as *In addition to forward observers with each infantry company and electronic sensors, Marine artillery battalions relied on observation towers such as this one at Landing Zone Ross to provide accurate fire.*

Marine Corps Historical Collection



possible, to diminish his capabilities across the battlefield to perform his mission."¹⁰

These observation posts, each manned by a team of artillerymen and protected by infantry or reconnaissance elements, commanded the main infiltration routes into the populated lowlands surrounding Da Nang. The post atop Hill 190 covered Elephant Valley, north of Da Nang, while Hill 270, to the west, commanded routes leading from Happy Valley, Mortar Valley, Sherwood Forest, and Charlie Ridge. Covering the Thuong Duc corridor and the northwestern portion of the Arizona Territory were Hills 250 and 65. Farther south, Hill 425 in the Que Son Mountains watched Phu Loc Valley and the An Hoa basin, while artillerymen atop Hill 119 observed Go Noi Island and Dodge City. A post on FSB Ryder covered Antenna Valley and the northern section of the Que Son Valley to the south. Artillery observers at each of these positions searched the countryside for enemy movement and called fire missions on promising targets.¹¹

In mid-October, the regiment's ability to control the battlefield with observation and fire was further enhanced by the introduction of the Integrated Observation Device (IOD).^{*} This 400-pound instrument, valued at \$225,000, consisted of a high-powered Kollmorgan ships' binoculars, combined with an infrared night observation device and a laser range finder. Using the IOD, a trained observer could locate targets up to a maximum range of 30 kilometers in daylight and, employing the infrared observation device, 4,000 meters at night. Once the observer identified a target and determined its distance and direction from the observation post, firing batteries could fire for effect without the usual preliminary adjustment rounds and achieve accuracy of five meters in range and one mil in azimuth.¹² The IOD, with its ability to achieve first round hits, was, as Colonel Ezell observed, "just what we needed." "We were losing targets because during the adjustment phase while we were trying to bracket them they were jumping in

^{*}The Integrated Observation Device was a product of the Marine Corps' Special Procedures for Expediting Equipment Development (SPEED) program, administered by HQMC and coordinated by the Marine Corps Development and Educational Command (MCDEC). Initiated in late 1968, the program was designed to identify the operational hardware requirements of Marine forces in Vietnam, followed by quick procurement and delivery to the field. Production and delivery of the IOD, a combination of three existing devices, spanned approximately six months. Of the initial 10 devices constructed, four went to the Army and six to the 11th Marines. For details of other items developed and procured under the SPEED program see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 37-39.

holes." It proved to be the "missing ingredient as far as good fire support was concerned."¹³

Initially two teams, consisting of an officer and five enlisted men, were selected from the 11th Marines' pool of forward observers, trained in the use and maintenance of the device by intelligence personnel of the division, and then assigned to observation posts commanding the Arizona and Que Son Mountains. Eventually expanded to six by December, the IOD-equipped teams were positioned at observation posts on Hills 270, 250, 65, 119, 425, and FSB Ryder. Scanning the same countryside constantly, the trained observers in the course of time became so proficient in anticipating enemy evasive action that they could call in artillery fire so as to "lead" a moving enemy formation.

With the initial deployment of two teams in late October, IOD-equipped observation posts reported achieving considerable success. During the first 10 days of operation, the teams were credited with 72 kills, amounting to 28 percent of the total number of NVA and VC casualties reported by the 1st Marine Division for the same period. With the placement of four additional devices in November, enemy casualties mounted. On 10 November, the IOD team on Ryder observed nine enemy troops carrying packs and rifles in the Que Son Valley; Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines responded and killed all nine. Four days later, Battery E, 2d Battalion claimed 11 enemy killed of 16 sighted by the IOD team on Hill 65. In November, sightings by the six teams resulted in the deaths of 463 troops, 72 percent of the enemy casualties credited to the artillery and 42 percent of all enemy casualties reported by the division. December results were equally impressive, but as Colonel Ezell was later to report, confirmed enemy casualties probably did not accurately reflect the actual number of enemy killed:

Colonel [Gildo S.] Codispoti, who had the 7th Marines, had a valley called Antenna Valley which he used to keep one entire infantry battalion operating in. We were able to release that battalion for other operations . . . with one FO team with an IOD [on FSB Ryder]. In the first month they were there they had 300 confirmed kills. The infantry went back . . . and found hundreds of skulls, bones and they told us the place was stinking down there. It was interesting to find out that we were probably killing more than we thought.¹⁴

Another vital link in the control and surveillance of the battlefield was the artillery aerial observer. Supported by Marine and Army light observation helicopters (LOH-6A), UH-1E gunships, Cessna O1-G "Bird Dog" and OV-10A aircraft, aerial observers attached to the 11th and 12th Marines flew numerous low-level



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The Integrated Observation System was one of many new devices created during the war that enhanced Marine artillery's ability to control the battlefield.

reconnaissance and artillery registration missions in support of ground operations throughout the year. During Operation Dewey Canyon, for example, it was an airborne artillery observer attached to the 12th Marines who spotted the enemy's long-range 122mm field guns and directed their destruction. Similarly, aerial observers of the 11th Marines, supported by light observation helicopters from the Americal Division's Company A, 123d Aviation Battalion and gunships from the 282d Aviation Battalion, made three daily flights over the Da Nang rocket belt, searching for potential launch sites. On numerous occasions sites were located and destroyed before rockets could be launched at Da Nang or surrounding military installations. "The deterrent effect of aerial observers," noted Colonel Mulroney, "has been apparent in all types of counterfire. The enemy does not fire when a AO is in the vicinity. Enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks have all been obviously timed during gaps in AO coverage. Continued thorough coverage by aerial observers is an important part of the defensive program against enemy fire of all types."¹⁵

No less important was illumination provided Marines of the 1st Division by Battery G, 29th Artillery and to the 3d Marine Division by the 1st Searchlight Battery. Often transported to the remotest fire support bases, battery searchlights were used to illuminate suspected enemy infiltration routes and rocket sites, as well as camp and fire support base perimeters and bridges, to place small arms and artillery fire on enemy positions.¹⁶

For each of the varied tasks assigned Marine artillerymen, target clearance, both air and ground, continued

to be a complicated and often frustrating process. Except for specified or "free" fire zones, where artillery and other supporting arms could be used without restriction, a call for artillery fire had to be cleared at the province and district levels and through the division, regiment, and appropriate South Korean commands before the mission could be executed. Using well-established procedures, division fire support coordination centers (FSCCs) synchronized all artillery, air, and naval gunfire support within the division TAOR, as did each regiment and infantry battalion. The regiments and battalions were primarily responsible for maintaining contact with allied military and civil headquarters within their respective areas of operation and for obtaining the proper fire clearances from each. The division fire support coordination centers, in close coordination with the 1st Wing DASC, operated the Sav-a-plane system to prevent aircraft from flying into the artillery's line of fire. The safety system, however, became a point of contention between air and artillery as the commanding officer of the 12th Marines, Colonel Peter J. Mulrone, pointed out:

There is too much of a tendency to go to automatic check firing. The decision for check firing must be made by the regimental commander concerned, it can't be made by an AO, . . . it can't be made by the DASC, it can't be made by some pilot. We can have artillery and air at the same time The pilot must have, which they don't have now, faith in the artillery. The principle that XXIV Corps works on is that with troops in contact and taking casualties, artillery fire should not be held up while they take more casualties on the slim chance that an aircraft will be hit. None were hit in the 13 months that I served in the 3d Marine Division.¹⁷

A number of changes instituted during 1969 further simplified the clearance procedures and reduced delays in initiating fire missions. Among them were preclearing of areas void of allied patrol activities, instituting a permanent restrictive fire plan during daylight hours, codenamed "California," across division TAORs while still permitting fire support to be employed, and demanding careful fire planning and preclearance of likely target areas for planned reconnaissance team operations. These changes reduced clearance delays to a minimum, while maintaining appropriate safety requirements.

Throughout most of 1969, the volume of Marine artillery rose steadily. In January, the 11th and 12th Marines fired 329,500 rounds during 35,916 missions. By June, the amount of fire had risen to 358,816 rounds for 34,860 missions. The volume of fire remained about that level throughout August, but fell precipitously in September with the redeployment of the 12th

Marines. By December, the 11th Marines, in an expanded TAOR, fired 163,574 rounds during 14,421 missions.

Augmenting the fires of the artillery regiments were tanks of the 1st and 3d Tank Battalions, and the long-range guns of ships of the Seventh Fleet. The primary mission of the Marine tank battalion was combat support during amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore. In Vietnam, Marine tanks were employed in direct support of the infantry. The usual assignment was one tank company per regiment, with further assignment of tank platoons to battalions as required. The Marine command, however, often assigned tank companies to the direct or general support of separate task forces.

The M48A3 tanks of the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Maurice C. Ashley, Jr., and 3d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Sleger, Jr., attached to the 1st and 3d Division respectively, performed a variety of missions, the most important being direct support of infantry in the assault, perimeter defense, road, bridge, and strongpoint security, and convoy escort. They also supplemented artillery fires, providing unobserved missions when needed. In addition, when in support of infantry operations, they undertook the destruction of enemy fortifications by direct fire. As an added task, the 1st Tank Battalion coordinated and controlled all activities within the Southern Sector Defense Command, aimed at delaying or denying enemy penetration of the Da Nang Vital Area.

As elsewhere in Vietnam, the greatest concern of Marine tankers were mines or RPG ambushes. In addition to box mines, which were difficult to detect and thus detonated by the vehicle, the enemy employed command-detonated artillery rounds and aircraft ordnance. All were successful according to Lieutenant Colonel Sleger, who reported that between January and May 1969, the "3d Tank Battalion incurred a total of 38 mining incidents to organic tracked vehicles. Of the 50 M48A3 tanks on hand, 30 had been mined one time, 9 had been mined twice, and one had been mined three times."¹⁸

Reinforcing the two tank battalions were elements of the deactivated 1st and 3d Anti-Tank Battalions. Equipped with the Ontos, a lightly armored tracked vehicle mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, four .50-caliber and one .30-caliber machine guns, the primary mission of the battalions was the destruction of enemy armor. But in Vietnam, as a result of the



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Marine ground commanders, in addition to artillery and air support, relied on naval gunfire provided by ships of the Seventh Fleet, such as the battleship New Jersey (BB 62).

lack of such a threat, the vehicle initially was employed in support of infantry operations and convoy escort, and then only in perimeter defense due to the vehicles' vulnerability to mines.

Led by the battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62), until recalled in March, and then individual cruisers and destroyers, ships of the Seventh Fleet continued to provide accurate and timely fires in support of ground operations. Whether firing in support of engaged units, softening targets for advancing infantry, suppressing active enemy firing positions, or interdicting enemy lines of communication, the combat record of the ships was impressive. Hundreds of enemy fortifications, storage facilities, and firing batteries were destroyed, roads cut, and numerous previously occupied positions seized without opposition and friendly casualties. In addition, the availability of naval gunfire support allowed III MAF on several occasions to redistribute artillery assets in order to support mobile operations in the western reaches of the I Corps Tactical Zone.

The *New Jersey's* contribution was noteworthy. Firing in support of III MAF Marines, her battery of nine 16-inch guns enabled her to attack targets at a range of 24 miles with a shell weighing 2,750 pounds. The weight of metal, range, and penetration of the 16-inch round far exceeded that of the heaviest Marine artillery weapon—the 175mm gun. In addition, the battleship's secondary battery of 20 5-inch guns provided a fire support capability roughly equal to that of four destroyers. During her six month tour in Vietnam, the *New Jersey* fired over 3,000 16-inch rounds and

nearly 11,000 5-inch rounds, the bulk in support of the 3d Marine Division.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities

The key to all successful military operations lay in timely, accurate information about the enemy. In Vietnam, the guerrilla nature of the struggle made timely intelligence even more essential, and at the same time more difficult to collect and evaluate. By 1969, the Marines' intelligence effort had evolved from an initial reliance on conventional techniques into a multifaceted, highly sophisticated intelligence gathering system that combined traditional air and ground reconnaissance methods with a number of new technological advances.

The majority of intelligence obtained by III MAF and its subordinate units was derived from air and ground reconnaissance. Marine Observation Squadrons 2 and 6 served as the airborne eyes of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. Each month the squadrons' UH-1E helicopters, OV-10As, and Cessna O-1 and O-1G light aircraft flew hundreds of observation missions. In addition, wing helicopters provided a platform for the Airborne Personnel Detector, Detector Concealed Personnel, and the Side Looking Airborne Radar. The mixed complement of RF-4Bs, Phantom IIs, EA-6A Prowlers, and F-3D Skyknights attached to Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 also flew numerous conventional and infrared photographic survey missions. When the 1st MAF was unable to fulfill requests for photographic missions, the Seventh Air Force and Army aviation companies provided sup-

port. Rapid, expert interpretation and dissemination of aerial photographs was accomplished by III MAF's G-2 Photo Imagery Interpretation Center (PIIC), which included an automatic data processing system and a direct teletype link between III MAF and XXIV Corps. In addition, photo interpretation teams were assigned to tactical units to assist in the planning and execution of combat operations.¹⁹

Although small-unit infantry patrols continually provided information, the division's organic reconnaissance battalions generated the bulk of ground intelligence. III MAF reconnaissance forces consisted of two reconnaissance battalions and two force reconnaissance companies in January 1969. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion supported 1st Marine Division operations, while the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion supported the 3d Marine Division. Attached to each battalion was a force reconnaissance company. The original doctrinal purpose of force reconnaissance companies was to operate in an amphibious operation under the landing force commander (III MAF), providing preassault reconnaissance and long-range reconnaissance after landing. In Vietnam, the force reconnaissance companies were originally used for deep reconnaissance under III MAF control. But by 1969, the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company had become totally absorbed by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion during its support of operations undertaken by Task Force Hotel. Although attached to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company remained a separate entity.

Realizing the need for reconnaissance information beyond that provided division commanders by their respective reconnaissance battalions, Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., shortly after assuming command of III MAF in March, directed that the force reconnaissance companies be returned to the control of III MAF. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company became the first, beginning deep patrol operations for the MAF in June, followed by the reconstituted 3d Force Reconnaissance Company in October.

Although deep reconnaissance missions were conducted by units of the Army's Special Operations Group within I Corps, the information provided did not meet the specific tactical needs of III MAF. As a result of III MAF's desire for more coordination as well as coverage of areas not targeted by other operations, III MAF reassumed control of the 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies, which then were placed under the direction of the newly created Surveillance

and Reconnaissance Center (SRC), established in October. Under the SRC, the following missions were assigned to the force reconnaissance companies: perform deep reconnaissance to determine location and current usage of enemy base camps, storage sites, and lines of communication; fix and identify enemy units tentatively located by sensor devices and agent reports; provide specific targeting and bomb damage assessment for B-52 Arc Light strikes; execute POW recovery missions and wiretap operations; and emplace sensors across enemy trails and in other critical areas.²⁰

Based at An Hoa Combat Base initially and then at Da Nang, Major Roger E. Simmons' 1st Force Reconnaissance Company concentrated its efforts during the first half of the year in support of Task Force Yankee and 1st Marine Division operations. Conducting missions in areas surrounding Charlie Ridge and enemy Base Area 112 to the west, patrols, usually inserted and extracted by helicopter, attempted to locate enemy troops, base camps, and storage areas. In addition they spotted targets for artillery fire, assessed bomb damage, and occasionally engaged enemy forces. During January, for example, the company ran 116 patrols, sighting 1,339 enemy troops and killing 88, while sustaining 7 killed and 37 wounded. The company also directed 88 artillery fire missions and 25 air strikes. Following its transfer to III MAF, the company shifted operations to the far reaches of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, and as a result the number of patrols gradually declined, totaling only five during December.

The 3d Force Reconnaissance Company, based with and essentially absorbed by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion at Quang Tri, supported 3d Marine Division operations, conducting 20 patrols and observing or engaging 62 enemy troops while suffering one Marine wounded during January. With the redeployment of the battalion and the division in October, the company was brought up to authorized strength, control passed to III MAF, and the company relocated to Phu Bai Combat Base. During the remaining two months of the year, 3d Force Reconnaissance Marines concentrated on patrolling the Demilitarized Zone and the newly created western reconnaissance zones of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, focusing on the A Shau Valley and surrounding terrain.

At the beginning of 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Larry P. Charon's 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was over-strength, possessing five lettered companies, and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, instead of the nor-

mal four.* In support of Task Force Yankee and the 1st Marine Division, the battalion performed a variety of missions: furnishing teams to support regimental search operations; securing fire support bases and artillery observation posts; and training scuba divers to check bridges within the division TAOR for demolitions and searching waterways for obstructions and weapons caches. However, the principal function of the reconnaissance battalion was to patrol the western fringes of the TAOR. Operating in six-man teams, each composed of an officer or NCO patrol leader, a radioman, three riflemen, and a Navy corpsman, battalion Marines normally spent half their time in the field and the remainder preparing for the next operation or participating in refresher training.

Reconnaissance patrolling, by 1969, had become somewhat standardized. Each team member packed food, water, ammunition, and equipment to sustain him for up to six days in the field. The radioman carried the AN/PRC-25 and extra batteries, while the corpsman took charge of the medical supplies. After several hours of rehearsals and briefings, helicopters lifted the team to its assigned operating area. Upon insertion, a radio check was made with the aircraft, radio relay, and company command post, and then the team departed the landing zone, following a prearranged route. Carefully noting and then reporting details of terrain and enemy activity, or calling in artillery and air strikes, the patrol attempted in most cases to avoid contact. At the end of its assigned mission, or when discovered or attacked, helicopters extracted the team. On return, each member of the team was debriefed and all reports of the patrol were reviewed and then distributed to the appropriate regiment or battalion.

Patrolling during the year by 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines resulted in a steady stream of sightings and engagements. During April, for example, the battalion conducted 177 patrols, sighting 2,746 enemy troops, and directing 88 artillery fire missions and 31 air strikes. During the month, battalion Marines killed 177 at a cost of 7 dead and 39 wounded.

Like the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aydlette H. Perry, Jr., was also overstrength as 1969 began.** Instead of the usual four lettered

companies, five were present plus the attached 3d Force Reconnaissance Company under Major Robert W. Holm. Supporting Task Force Hotel and the 3d Marine Division, battalion Marines performed the same missions as those assigned to the 1st Battalion. Concentrating their efforts in the DMZ, in western Quang Tri, and in the piedmont west of Quang Tri City and Dong Ha, meant that "every indication of enemy activity," General Davis recalled, was "explored by the insertion of reconnaissance teams."²¹

Generally, two types of patrol missions were conducted by reconnaissance Marines within the 3d Marine Division TAOR. As General Davis explained:

Under the artillery fan as established at the time, we would use Sting Ray techniques with 8 to 10 men in a team, seeking the enemy, seeking opportunities to deliver fire upon

A patrol from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion moves along a trail south of the Demilitarized Zone in the continuing search for evidence of North Vietnamese infiltration into Quang Tri Province.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192449



*Lieutenant Colonel Charon was succeeded in February by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Mickelson, who was in turn replaced in October by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Grace.

**Lieutenant Colonel Perry was replaced in May by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Burritt.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192444

Concealing himself in a grove of bamboo, a reconnaissance Marine surveys the terrain and then directs artillery and air strikes on enemy troops and base camps.

them. Well-out, smaller teams—four or five men—going on the basis of secrecy: only to observe, stay out of sight. If the enemy is encountered, they attempt to escape. These are not normally reinforced unless we are able to insert artillery at the time. Under the artillery fan, normally they would be reinforced if the enemy presented an adequate target. On contact the team hangs in and fights it out or if it's a small contact and they start to take casualties, we might extract them. However, if it's a large contact and under the artillery fan and the opportunity presents itself, they are reinforced in order to attempt to destroy the enemy force in its entirety.²²

Using Stingray and deep reconnaissance techniques, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in May, for example, conducted 194 patrols during which 68 contacts with enemy troops were made, resulting in 80 enemy killed and the loss of 4 Marines killed and 31 wounded.* During this same period, battalion Marines directed 60 artillery missions, 35 air strikes, and conducted 14 scuba missions.

*For details of the Stingray concept of operations, see MajGen Raymond G. Davis and 1stLt J. L. Jones, Jr., "Employing the Recon Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May69, pp. 41-45.

Although the primary purpose of reconnaissance patrols was to gather information, direct artillery and air strikes, and not to fight, teams often found themselves involved in intense combat. Firefights erupted from ambushes, chance meetings with small enemy units, or from efforts to take prisoners. One such encounter took place in March in the southwestern corner of Quang Nam Province.

On the 23d, a team from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, identified by its radio call sign "Report Card," consisting of two officers, seven enlisted Marines, and a corpsman, was inserted by helicopter, shortly after noon, near the Song Thu Bon, southwest of Antenna Valley. The following morning, the team moved up to a trail where they were to set an ambush in an effort to snatch a prisoner. Once in position it became apparent that the trail was one of the enemy's main routes for moving supplies from western base camps, through Antenna Valley, into the An Hoa basin. During the first half hour in position, a group of approximately 32 enemy troops passed two to three meters in front of the team's ambush. Waiting for an enemy officer or NCO, the team let most pass. The last, dressed in full utilities, a pith helmet, boots, and "strutting along holding his rifle at port arms," appeared to be a good target and was ambushed. As the Marines dragged the enemy soldier into their ambush, they heard movement down the trail, both north and south of their position. Pulling back five meters into deep elephant grass, the team engaged two enemy soldiers, killing both. Then six more appeared to the front. While taking these under fire, and endeavoring to move down to a streambed, the patrol was hit from all sides by approximately 80 to 100 troops.

For 30 minutes, the team fended off probes by the large enemy force until two Huey gunships arrived; the only time the Marines used small arms was when an enemy soldier was actually sighted, otherwise they employed their grenades and the M79 launcher. The fighting continued for another two-and-one-half hours while the gunships were on station and then suddenly stopped. Searching the area around their position before being extracted, the patrol counted 10 enemy killed by Huey machine gun fire. "I learned," the team leader, First Lieutenant Wayne E. Rollings, later reported, "that with a small unit, if you keep good security, 360, that you can hold off a very large force that outnumbers you considerably, and suffer very few casualties. We had no casualties."²³ Although the patrol did not get its prisoner, who had been killed

by an enemy grenade during the fight, they did leave behind 22 NVA dead.

Two-and-one-half weeks later, Lieutenant Rollings and seven men were again on patrol. "The name of our reconnaissance patrol was 'Lunchmeat,' and with 150 North Vietnamese soldiers surrounding us, that's just how I felt, like a piece of lunchmeat in a sandwich." The mission assigned Rollings' patrol was to reconnoiter a trail and ridgeline, four kilometers southwest of An Hoa.

Near noon on 10 April, Rollings and his team were inserted into the area and began checking the ridgelines for enemy activity. Shortly after dusk the following day, they spotted 35 to 40 lights moving in a northeasterly direction, approximately 800 meters from their position. Before the team could move, they heard movement to their front and rear. "We hurriedly set up a defensive perimeter in some dense undergrowth on the side of the trail," noted Rollings, "and called in Spooky [Air Force C-47 aircraft equipped with mini-guns]."

With the enemy moving ever closer, Rollings called an artillery mission on a base camp spotted earlier in the day with the hope of forcing the NVA to call off the search and then radioed for Spooky to make a pass. As Lieutenant Rollings continued:

His first burst landed about 400 yards from us and I began to direct him in. He warned me to tell him when he was hitting within 50 to 75 yards of our position and that he would then start working out toward the enemy from there. But the enemy would still be between us and his fire so I waited until the outer fringe of his fire, which had a 25 yard radius, was within five yards and then told him to start working away from us. I didn't tell him how close his fire was to us, because I knew he wouldn't have gotten that close if he couldn't mark our position.²⁴

Patrol members counted more than 30 instances where they heard screams and groans as artillery and mini-guns scored hits. In one instance, related Rollings, "we saw 10 NVA get within 40 yards of our position before 'arty' caught them with a barrage that finished them all off."

At first light the patrol got word to move out, but within 100 meters of its position, it encountered 20 NVA troops. Spooky again called for, the Air Force's C-47 began working in from the rear while the team hit the enemy from the front. "We had them sandwiched between us, but after about a half-hour, the NVA . . . took off." The patrol continued to search the area, but without success, and was extracted on the 13th with one minor casualty.²⁵

Other teams were not so lucky. On 4 June, a patrol from Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, fought the battalion's most severe action of the year and lost. The team, identified as "Flight Time," consisted of six Marines. Helicopters inserted the patrol, which carried two strobe lights for illumination, at 0930 on the 2d near Hill 471, overlooking Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, in western Quang Tri Province. The team's arrival went unopposed and the Marines moved northward from the landing zone toward the high ground, finding evidence of recent enemy occupation in the area. The following day, after setting up its harbor site for the evening, the team observed five enemy troops in brown utilities and helmets, but did not take the troops under fire.

At 0250 the next morning, the team began receiving small arms fire and grenades from an unknown size enemy force. Reporting one killed and five wounded, the team leader requested an emergency extraction and all available "on call" air. When the aerial observer arrived on station 10 minutes later, he saw that the enemy was within 10 meters of, and surrounding, the team's position. He immediately requested that a reaction force be inserted to assist the team. At 0315, the observer expended his ordnance, heard a secondary explosion, and then lost all communications with the team.

The 12-man reaction force arrived in the area at 0620 and reported sighting three, and possibly five, members of the team in terrain which looked as though it had been "hit by a flame thrower." On the ground, the force found the bodies of five members of the team in an enemy trench and the sixth approximately 10 meters down the hill. An on-sight investigation indicated that the enemy had come up the northeast side of the hill, firing grenades, small arms, and throwing satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes. The reaction force leader surmised that the burn marks on the ground and bodies, and the way in which the equipment was scattered, indicated that the team must have been involved in hand-to-hand fighting before being overrun.²⁶

Enemy troops were not the only hazard faced by reconnaissance Marines when patrolling deep in mountainous terrain. In May, a seven-man team, again from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, codenamed "Centipede," while patrolling the steep, triple-canopied hills surrounding the Ba Long Valley, observed numerous tiger tracks. On two occasions during the four-day patrol, a tiger came within 10 meters of



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Cpl Sandy R. Reid of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion applies additional camouflage paint to his face and neck in order to blend in with the jungle and thereby avoid detection.

the team's position and had to be driven off with CS grenades.²⁷ Among other nonhostile hazards were lightning, friendly fire, the rugged terrain itself, and equipment failure. Although reconnaissance Marines did suffer a number of noncombat casualties, losses in most cases were a direct result of clashes with enemy troops.

With four years of experience behind them, reconnaissance Marines had, by 1969, developed tested techniques and equipment in order to supply the division

they supported with accurate and timely intelligence. To assure prompt artillery support when needed and at the same time prevent accidental shelling, special reconnaissance zones were established for each deployed team in which only the patrol could call fire missions. The 11th and 12th Marines designated a battery or platoon of howitzers to support each team and assigned a liaison officer at the reconnaissance battalion's command post to assist in fire planning and coordination. To ensure the rapid extraction of a team

under fire or in a tenuous situation, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing designated helicopters as part of a quick-reaction package, that at times included division infantry forces to assist.

When not on patrol, reconnaissance Marines continually trained for their exacting task. In addition to the initial indoctrination program for newly arrived personnel, which included instruction in the use of the AN/PRC-25 radio, map reading, first aid, rappelling from helicopters, observer procedures, and intelligence reporting techniques, the battalions conducted periodic refresher courses with special emphasis on weapons training, scuba diving, physical conditioning, and the use of new equipment such as extraction ladders. Selected personnel also were sent to the Army's Recon-do School at Nha Trang for more specialized training.

With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, Marine reconnaissance strength was halved. What had been the reconnaissance zone of the 3d Battalion was passed to reconnaissance elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st ARVN Divisions. The 3d Force Reconnaissance Company, now a separate entity under III MAF, moved to Phu Bai and was given the task of patrolling the A Shau Valley. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion continued to concentrate on Quang Nam Province, although by December, fewer patrols were assigned to deep missions in the western reaches of the province.

While direct air observation and ground reconnaissance provided the bulk of intelligence, the artillery's system of observation and target acquisition also produced information. Scattered throughout the divisions' areas of responsibility were numerous observation towers which not only directed artillery fire, but permitted general surveillance of enemy movement. Supplementing the artillery's intelligence gathering capability were Integrated Observation Devices and the computerized Fire Support Information System.*

Captured enemy documents and prisoners yielded additional information. To extract the intelligence, the divisions relied heavily upon specially trained Marines attached to interrogation-translation teams, interpreter teams, and counterintelligence teams. Working within the division G-2 sections, the interrogation and interpreter teams, as their names implied, interviewed NVA and VC prisoners and suspected civilian detainees, and reviewed all captured documents for in-

formation on enemy unit strength; designations; attack and withdrawal routes; staging, rally, and base areas; mines and surprise firing devices locations; and enemy combat effectiveness and morale. In September 1969, a typical month, teams attached to the 1st Marine Division interrogated 1,397 detainees, 18 of whom were classified prisoners of war, 45 as civilian defendants, 13 as returnees, and 1,321 as innocent civilians. During the same month, the teams screened 3,107 documents for translation.²⁸

Counterintelligence teams, in addition to performing normal security and counter-espionage tasks at every Marine cantonment where South Vietnamese civilians were employed, accompanied Marine units to the field in search of their primary target, the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Working closely with ARVN intelligence agencies, National Police, National Police Field Forces, Provisional Reconnaissance Units, and Revolutionary Development Cadre in numerous cordon operations, they checked the identities of civilian detainees against lists of known infrastructure members and carried out immediate exploitative operations.²⁹

The Marines also employed numerous South Vietnamese interpreters and informants, tasked with ferreting out the local infrastructure. Many in the intelligence community, however, thought Marines should not be involved in such activity because, as the 1st Division's G-2, Colonel Anthony J. Skotnicki, pointed out, "we didn't have the skill or language ability," and that others among the near dozen agencies involved in such activity were better qualified.³⁰

Marines in the field also relied heavily on Kit Carson Scouts, due to their proven loyalty and knowledge of the people and terrain. In addition, some Marine units, especially those operating in the heavily populated lowlands, worked closely with South Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Teams. Although primarily involved in psychological warfare, the teams, through informal contacts with villagers, did collect information concerning local guerrilla and infrastructure activity, which was passed on to the appropriate Marine unit.

Under the Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), Marines enlisted the assistance of South Vietnamese civilians in the intelligence gathering effort. Administered by the division's G-2 staff, battalions were provided funds with which information could be purchased. A majority of the funds, however, went to rewarding Vietnamese who brought in or pointed out munitions, such as grenades, dud artillery rounds, and aircraft ordnance, which could be used by the enemy

*For additional detail on artillery targeting and operations, see pp. 245-249.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Under the Voluntary Informant Program, South Vietnamese civilians turned in dud ammunition, mortar rounds in this instance, that might otherwise be used to make boobytraps.

in constructing surprise firing devices. During May 1969, for example, 1st Marine Division units spent a total of 1,502,454 piasters (approximately 1,200 dollars) in 764 separate payments for the return of ordnance, while making two payments for "casual information."³¹

As an adjunct to the VIP program, the 3d Marine Division Psychological Operations Office established its own program, dubbed "Circuit Rider." Composed of a psyops officer and an explosive ordnance disposal team, Circuit Rider traveled Route 1 weekly purchasing ordnance local children had found. The program, continually advertised by audio-visual trucks, leaflet drops, and aerial broadcasts, was considered highly successful. The area of greatest activity during the year, proved to be along Route 1, between Dong Ha and Gio Linh, where it was thought children had found and ransacked a number of enemy caches.

Marines also relied on information generated by signal intercepts. During the year, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Fennell, Jr.'s 1st Radio Battalion provided III MAF with this capability. Headquartered at Camp

Horn, with its Headquarters and Service Company at nearby Camp Hoa Long and Operations Company at Dong Ha, the battalion's six task-organized platoons, deployed at fire support bases and observation posts throughout Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces, provided immediate tactical support for both regimental and division operations. Using both ground installations and airborne platforms supplied by the Army and Air Force, Marine radiomen listened to enemy verbal and message communications in an effort to determine the location of transmitter sites. As a result of these efforts, the battalion passed on an average of 4,000 fixes each month to tactical commanders who in turn used artillery, air, or ground operations to destroy them. In addition to monitoring enemy communications, the battalion also monitored friendly transmissions to ensure against security violations or compromises. During March, for example, the battalion reported 194 violations in 118,920 messages monitored.³²

Electronic sensors provided yet another source of intelligence information. Products of the aborted Demilitarized Zone barrier project initiated by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and abandoned

in October 1968, sensors, by 1969, were being employed tactically throughout South Vietnam under a new program, Duffle Bag.* These "24-hour silent sentinels" not only contributed to economies in force, but provided early warning of attacks on base camps and cities, and contributed to the reduction of rocket attacks. "It appears," noted a MACV message, "that . . . sensor technology may be one of the more important developments to come out of the Vietnam war. At the present time, the only limitations on successful sensor-supported operations are the availability of sensors, and the degree of imagination, initiative, ingenuity, and resourcefulness of tactical commanders."³³

The Marines first used sensors during the siege of Khe Sanh in early 1968. At that time, Air Force Igloo White aircraft—dedicated EC-121s in orbit over Laos—provided readouts from out-of-country sensors. The sensor information was relayed to Nakhon Phanom where it was assessed and targets passed to Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. Towards the end of the siege, some local readout and assessment capability was given the Khe Sanh Marines. As a result of the experience at Khe Sanh, coupled with the onset of the rainy season in the Laotian Panhandle, sensors became available for limited test and evaluation in support of ground combat operations. Upon completion of the evaluations, codenamed Duck Blind, in August 1968, it became apparent that sensors, originally designed to impede or substantially reduce infiltration from North to South Vietnam, could make significant contributions in surveillance and target acquisition operations in South Vietnam.

A majority of the sensors employed by III MAF were of the radio-type, which transmitted information electronically directly to monitoring stations. These small, camouflaged, battery-powered devices could be dropped from aircraft or implanted by hand. Once in position, the sensors reacted to minute physical changes in the surrounding environment. Seismic sensors, known as Seismic Intrusion Devices (SIDs), responded to ground vibrations, such as human footsteps. Magnetic sensors, or Magnetic Intrusion Devices (MAGIDs), detected moving metallic objects, and infrared sensors (PIRIDs) reacted to heat emanating

from bodies, vehicle engines, and campfires. Acoustic sensors picked up audible sounds. Once activated, the sensors sent a signal to a receiver from which the operator could determine the location and probable nature of the object. Acoustic sensors transmitted the sounds they detected directly to the monitoring stations.

Sensors were generally planted in groups, or "strings" as they were more commonly termed, along enemy infiltration routes from the mountains into the lowlands. A typical string, designed to detect movement, consisted of several seismic and a few magnetic and acoustical sensors. Once activated, the monitoring station operator could request an artillery fire mission, alert a nearby ground unit, or simply record the time and direction of movement for later analysis. Seismic, magnetic, and infrared line sensors also were employed around fixed installations such as fire support or combat bases. The Da Nang Barrier contained 106 such sensors and plans called for the future implantation of an additional 775. By mid-1969, each division had over 100 sensors, maintained and monitored by the divisions' G-2 staffs.

Whether obtained by sensors, air and ground reconnaissance, or from a paid agent, intelligence information had to be quickly evaluated, correlated, and transmitted to units in the field to be of any value. In order to facilitate this process, III MAF established the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center at Da Nang in late 1969, under Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel John S. Canton. The center, according to Colonel Canton, was to "physically and functionally integrate and coordinate all intelligence collection means in ICTZ, thus reducing the time lapse between the initial collection of intelligence information and the dissemination of processed intelligence to tactical commanders." In addition to directing deep surveillance missions of the force reconnaissance companies, the SRC "monitored all intelligence collection in ICTZ. This ensured round-the-clock, timely and reliable communication of perishable intelligence data to using units, thus producing a quantum increase in the immediate utilization of intelligence assets."³⁴

"In this war, like no other war in the past generation" noted Colonel Anthony J. Skotnicki, "we never worked under a lack of information. We actually acquired so much intelligence information we couldn't handle it." Despite advances in processing and organization, there remained "a considerable amount of difficulty in manually recording it and manually extracting it in order to put it together into useful intelligence."³⁵

*The use of sensors within South Vietnam, nicknamed Duffle Bag, was one of four continuing sensor programs carried out by MACV in Southeast Asia. The remaining three were: Igloo White, which involved the out-of-country use of sensors; Duel Blade II, the sensor supported anti-infiltration system in and along the DMZ; and, Tight Jaw, the combined US/GVN border surveillance operation.

CHAPTER 15

Supplying III MAF

*Force Logistic Command—Naval Support Activity, Da Nang—Engineer Support
Motor Transport—Medical Support—Communications—Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal*

Force Logistic Command

For supply, maintenance, and service support, III MAF relied on Force Logistic Command (FLC). At the beginning of 1969, Brigadier General James A. Feeley, Jr. commanded the logistical arm supporting Marine operations in Vietnam. A Massachusetts native, combat veteran of World War II and Korea, and trained as an aviator, General Feeley assumed command of the FLC in October 1968.*

Composed of 430 Marine and 22 Navy officers and 9,164 Marine and 150 Navy enlisted men, Force Logistic Command was headquartered at Camp Jay A. Books, part of the expansive Red Beach support complex, northwest of Da Nang. Under the operational control of III MAF and command and administrative control of FMFPac, FLC was organized around the Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions of the 1st Force Service Regiment and included 1st Service Battalion/Force Logistic Support Group Bravo (FLSG-Bravo), 3d Service Battalion/Force Logistic Support Group Alpha (FLSG-Alpha), 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions, 5th Communication Battalion, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion.

The three battalions of the Force Service Regiment performed a majority of the logistical functions of Force Logistic Command. Headquarters and Service Battalion provided administrative, communication, and motor transport assistance for elements of the FLC and units of III MAF. In addition to operating graves registration and maintaining internal and perimeter security for Camp Books, it also managed the III MAF Transient Facility, through which passed all incoming and outgoing personnel, and the R&R Processing Center. The Supply Battalion received, stored, distributed, and accounted for all supplies, while operating ammunition supply points (ASPs), baking most of III MAF's breadstuffs, and providing personnel for the logistical support subunit at Chu Lai. Maintenance

Battalion repaired all types of Marine ordnance and equipment, with the exception of aviation items or equipment requiring extensive overhaul. The battalion transferred these items either to 3d Force Service Regiment facilities on Okinawa or Japan, or to maintenance depots in the United States.


Force Logistic Support Group Alpha, initially headquartered at Phu Bai but moved to Camp Books on 5 January, directly supported the 1st Marine Division. Composed of the Headquarters and Service, Maintenance, Supply, and Truck Companies of the 3d Service Battalion, the FLSG maintained logistic support units (LSUs) at Hill 55, An Hoa, and Phu Bai, which served the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. Each LSU drew rations, fuel, and ammunition from the FLC for issue to its supported regiment, repaired equipment and ordnance, and operated a laundry. On 15 July, FLSG-Alpha assumed control over the logistic support subunit at Chu Lai, which provided rations, ammunition, and maintenance support for Marine Aircraft Groups 12 and 13, 9th Engineer Battalion, and the 1st Combined Action Group.

During November 1969, Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, which in like manner had supported the 3d Marine Division, assumed the support of the 1st Marine Division and portions of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. On the 7th, FLSG-Bravo adopted FLSG-Alpha's mission and initiated standdown procedures at Quang Tri, Vandegrift, and Dong Ha Combat Bases prior to moving to Camp Books. At the same time, FLSG-Alpha's organizational colors moved to Okinawa with the remaining elements of the 3d Marine Division. FLSG-Bravo continued to provide support for the 1st Marine Division through the operation of three logistic support units located at Hill 55, An Hoa Combat Base, and LZ Baldy (established in August), and the subunit at Chu Lai (FLSG-Bravo Sub-Unit 1).¹

Under the amphibious concept, each division and the wing possessed its own logistical support capability. But as the war intensified, the accretion of troops and equipment necessitated a change. A viable, semipermanent logistic support organization, Force Logistic

*Brigadier General Mauro J. Padalino replaced General Feeley in November 1969. As a colonel in 1965, he headed FLC's predecessor, the Force Logistic Support Group.

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Command, was thus created from the previously fragmented logistic command and control structures. As a result, the divisions gave up their organic service battalions and thus maintained no separate supply or accounting facilities. Many Marines continued to view this loss as detrimental to the divisions' capabilities to perform their missions. Among them was Colonel Frank R. DeNormandie, G-4, 3d Marine Division, who noted that with the creation of FLC and subordinate groups, division control over logistical support moved from direct management to one of cooperation and coordination. "As a result, supply support rapidly

changed from unit distribution to supply point distribution. In addition, changes in priority for either unit supply or equipment repair had to be effected at the highest level." The division commander now not only had no readily available source of supply, but no established third echelon maintenance and supply or materiel storage capability. "We make a division that is supposed to be self-sufficient," noted Colonel DeNormandie, "that is capable of taking care of itself, that is capable of supporting itself far removed from any other headquarters and yet we take away from that division commander the thing that makes

him tick, and the thing that makes any military organization really tick and really able to fight is its logistics support capability.”²

Despite the lack of direct division control and the imposition of additional management levels, the logistics of support, on the whole, remained rather simple. Individual battalions of the 1st Marines, for example, radioed their supply requests to their representatives on Hill 55 each day prior to 1500. Battalion support personnel then drew supplies from FLC, either directly or through a logistic support unit and staged the loads for next-day delivery. Trucks or helicopters then transported passengers and supplies to the battalion and on the return trip, removed retrograde equipment and troops.³

As helicopter resupply became more prominent, each division became more dependent upon the activities of its shore party battalions. Originally established to facilitate the movement of men and equipment across the beach, the battalions expand-

ed their mission to include support of heliborne assaults. Organic to each division, these battalions deployed a company with each infantry regiment. Shore party support teams located with each LSU assembled and prepared supplies for helicopter pickup, while control teams with the rifle companies marked the landing zones, briefed the incoming helicopter crews, and supervised unloading.

Supply and maintenance support for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was more complex since the wing drew upon both Navy and Marine sources. Force Logistic Command provided non-aviation supplies and ammunition, while a variety of Navy agencies supplied replacement aircraft, spare parts, vehicles, and maintenance support. Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet, a subordinate of CinCPacFlt, was responsible for aviation logistic support of the wing. As a result, the wing requisitioned its Navy material from the Naval Supply Depot at Yokosuka, Japan, which also contracted for and oversaw major repair and

BGen James A. Feeley, Jr., right, Commanding General, Force Logistic Command, guides LtGen Herman Nickerson through the command's data processing center at Camp Books.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A193236



rebuilding of Marine aircraft. Within the wing, each aircraft group stored and issued supplies and performed routine maintenance and limited repair of aircraft. Augmenting the groups' organic battle damage repair capabilities were civilian teams from naval aircraft repair facilities. Marine Wing Support Group 17 provided Marine Corps supply, postal, post exchange, and disbursing services for all wing elements, while maintaining group equipment, aircraft launch, and recovery systems, and overseeing the shipment of aircraft into and out of Vietnam.

The logistic supply and repair system supporting Marine units within I Corps ran smoothly during 1969. It responded quickly and effectively to III MAF's highly mobile, wide-ranging offensive maneuvers with the establishment of expedient positions in rugged, mountainous terrain in order to sustain extended combat operations. Temporary shortages of ordnance, spare parts, radio batteries, wet weather gear, and malaria and salt tablets did occur, but these shortages were quickly remedied by borrowing from the Army or by emergency shipments from Marine supply facilities on Okinawa or in the United States. Despite these occasional shortages, Marine units experienced few supply system problems. As Major General Wilbur F. Simlik, former commanding officer of the 3d Marines and later III MAF G-4, noted: "never have troops been supported in such abundance as in the Vietnamese war. The chow, the ammunition, the supplies, the transportation, were there when we needed it, in abundance; as a matter of fact, probably too much."⁴

As a direct result of abundance of support, the problem of supply discipline arose. It varied from the solitary Marine who abandoned his gas mask along a trail because it was too bulky or heavy to carry and was issued a replacement in preparation for an inspection, to the battalion commander who requested a dozen sets of utilities be issued per man when only three were authorized. "As a practical matter," noted 1st Marine Division Supply Officer and later division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel John L. Schwartz, supply discipline "is non-existent. It does not make any difference whether it is ammunition, fuel, chow, or what it is. There is gross extravagance There seems to be in the minds of many many commanders three questions: How much stuff have I got? How soon can I use it? and Where can I get some more?"⁵ Although numerous attempts were made, the problem continued to defy solution.

On 27 April 1969, the III MAF logistic support sys-

tem was tested severely when a grass fire brought about the destruction of Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)-1, three kilometers southwest of the Da Nang Airbase. The fire first ignited unserviceable ammunition slated for disposal, and the resultant explosions spread in chain reaction to the two main ground and air ammunition storage areas and a nearby fuel storage area. Colonel William D. Bassett, Jr., FLSG-Alpha's commanding officer, described the effects:

On that Sunday afternoon, the Helicopter Utilization Review Board was in session at III MAF Headquarters. The smoke and fire could be seen across Da Nang at a distance that I would guess to be 10 to 12 kilometers. There were two significant explosions which were far greater than the rest. Both produced fire balls similar to small nuclear explosions, complete with shock waves which could be seen moving out in a circular pattern through the smoke and haze. The first of these two exceptional blasts hit III MAF Headquarters at approximately 1430. The meeting was in a converted single story warehouse with a solid wall toward ASP-1. The seaward side of the building had two large warehouse-type doors which closed together and had steel drop-bar closures into the concrete floor. The reverse, counter pressure actually pushed the doors in, breaking the concrete around the holes that the bars were in The second similar blast took place around 2200 and was not as strong as the first, but the shock wave did hit III MAF Headquarters.⁶

Major destruction occurred in the ammunition supply point, the fuel storage area, and a nearby Air Force bomb dump, while extensive damage caused by the blast and flying debris was done to FLC facilities between the ASP and the airfield. Continuous secondary explosions forced the temporary closing of the Da Nang Airbase to all but emergency traffic; normal airfield operations were resumed within 18 hours. Casualties were limited to one American and one Vietnamese killed and 65 wounded, while 1,500 Vietnamese were left homeless when the nearby village of Hoa Phat was destroyed by the fire and explosions.

Approximately 38,000 short tons of ground and air munitions, valued in excess of 75 million dollars, were destroyed; an amount equal to 40 percent of the total Marine munitions on hand at FLC facilities throughout I Corps.⁷ Nevertheless, the destruction of the supply point caused no interruption in ordnance support for continuing combat operations. As the commanding officer of the 11th Marines, Colonel Samuel A. Hannah, noted:

When the ammo dump started going, we put a little restriction on our shooting to slow it down a little bit and keep it down because we weren't sure exactly the extent of it. But within a day or so, this cleared up and we got a general feeling about what the ammo supply was and we were able to go



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422546

The large mushroom cloud produced by exploding ordnance stored at Force Logistic Command Ammunition Supply Point 1 was visible for several miles. While close to half of III MAF's ammunition was destroyed, Marines experienced no interruption in support.

back to what might be called a normal rate of fire From a shooting standpoint, no great problems with it. There may have been one or two cases where we ran a little short of a certain type of fuze, but it was of no great consequence to the actual support.⁸

Immediate action was taken on the 28th when FLC shifted munitions storage operations to nearby ASP-2 and ordered replenishment stocks from storage areas in the Western Pacific and the United States. Although ground stocks for four months remained below the 45-day level authorized, and the ASP was idle for six while repairs were made, there was no degradation in ordnance support for continuing III MAF operations.⁹

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang

The United States military logistic system in I Corps was composed of three elements, of which Force Logistic Command was one component. For most standard supply items and for a wide variety of support services, III MAF depended upon Naval Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, headquartered at the "White Elephant" within the city until 15 August, and then

at the China Beach Public Works Compound ("Wooden Elephant") in East Da Nang.

Commanded by Rear Admiral Emmett P. Bonner, who was replaced in December by Rear Admiral Robert E. Adamson, Jr., Naval Support Activity, Da Nang consisted of close to 11,000 United States Navy officers and enlisted men and a civilian work force of over 6,700 South Vietnamese. An equal number of Americans, Vietnamese, and other Asians worked for the activity's private contractors. Established in late July 1965 to support the initial elements of III MAF, NSA Da Nang was under the immediate operational control of Commander, United States Naval Forces, Vietnam, while overall command was exercised by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet through Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet.¹⁰

The Naval Support Activity operated the port of Da Nang as well as transshipment points at Cua Viet/Dong Ha and Hue/Tan My in northern I Corps and Sa Huynh and Chu Lai in the southern provinces. With a fleet of over 350 ships and other small craft, vast warehouses, storage lots, and tank farms, NSA

handled, stored, and issued all incoming and outgoing military cargo. NSA's public works department provided electricity, water, and ice to American cantonments, while its civilian contractors maintained over 700 miles of roads and the attending construction equipment. In addition, the activity managed Navy and Marine real estate holdings and operated the 720-bed naval hospital at Da Nang.¹¹

Army units operating within I Corps Tactical Zone received logistical support from the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, an organization which performed functions similar to those of Force Logistic Command. Under the operational control of the Commander, 1st Logistical Command, the Da Nang Support Command, by 1969, had grown to a strength of about 7,500 supply and transportation troops. The command included a field depot at Da Nang and two general support groups, the 26th, located at Phu Bai, and the 80th at Da Nang, which supported Army units in northern and southern I Corps.¹²

At its peak in 1969, the Navy by way of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, provided 98 percent of the commonly used supplies, construction materials, and service support for the 190,000 troops in I Corps. Marines and Army troops, through the Force Logistic Command and U.S. Army Support Command, distributed supplies drawn from the NSA to their own units, and procured, stored, and issued their own ammunition and those other supplies unique to the particular service. In addition to supporting the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FLC supported the 2d ROKMC Brigade, while Army Support Command maintained petroleum pipelines used by all Services, as well as providing mortuary assistance and property disposal. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and the relocation of FLSG-Bravo to Da Nang in November, the Army Support Command assumed the function of furnishing supplies and services for the remaining Marine elements in northern I Corps.¹³

With the implementation of plans for the withdrawal of Marine units from I Corps, the Army would assume a greater role in supporting the remaining forces. As redeployment planning began, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, proposed that the Army, which already furnished support for all United States forces outside of I Corps, assume the missions of Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. With a proviso that the Navy would end its support only in conjunction with the redeploy-



Marine Corps Historical Collection
A Force Logistic Command forklift unloads artillery ammunition from a Navy LST. The Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, provided Marines most standard supply items and a wide variety of support services.

ment of Marine units, Zumwalt secured approval for his proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Also endorsing his plan, General Abrams, in late May 1969, ordered U.S. Army, Republic of Vietnam to make a study of the cost and manpower requirements of an Army logistics takeover in I Corps.¹⁴

When informed of these preliminary steps in early June, Lieutenant General Nickerson, III MAF commander, protested the move. Expressing complete satisfaction with Navy support, he urged that the present logistical structure in I Corps not be dismantled at a time when major redeployments and realignment of allied forces were to take place and the threat of enemy action remained high.¹⁵ General Marine reaction to the possible loss of Navy support was one of apprehension. As Major General Simlik later recalled: "We had great misgivings of losing Navy support. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA) had done such a marvelous job for a number of years and had given us such magnificent support. All of a sudden

with NSA leaving we had a sinking feeling—almost one of despair.”¹⁶

The Navy-Marine Corps team had worked well and few were willing to see the formal and informal relationship dissolved. According to General Simlik:

It wasn't as simple as writing a contract for janitorial services . . . NSA had been supporting the Marines in Vietnam for 5 years or so. Both NSA and the Marines knew the major areas of support. But there were so many areas that were covered by the Marine gunnery sergeant-Navy chief routine. For example, . . . a gunnery sergeant may have gotten a chief to take care of certain functions—to render certain support, small that it may be—by seeing that he got a couple bottles of booze or a case of beer at the right time. It was an informal, unwritten agreement of course, passed on from gunnery sergeant to gunnery sergeant, and chief to chief. Undoubtedly, there were a number of such agreements—difficult to discover, impossible to reduce to written form for a formal contract. And we were apprehensive, a psychotic apprehensiveness, that the Army would not respond if the written contract didn't include it.¹⁷

The greatest area of concern was the possible loss of the naval hospital. As Lieutenant General Leo J. Dulacki, then a brigadier general and III MAF G-3, later commented:

When the redeployment plans were first drawn up, it was envisioned that substantial Marine forces would be redeployed out of country in the very first phases. Consistent with those plans, the Navy developed a plan for the early redeployment of the Naval Support Activity (Da Nang) concurrent with the redeployment of the Marines. However, the original plan was modified, as a result of which, the Marines forces would be redeployed on a slower and more extended time schedule. Nevertheless, the Navy determined that it would continue with its original plans regardless of any changes in the timing of the Marine redeployment. Suddenly we were faced with the prospect of some 40,000 Marines continuing operations in ICTZ but without naval support which had been such an integral part of the overall campaign in ICTZ. Of particular concern was the closure of the Naval Hospital (Da Nang) since it was prudent to assume that the enemy might attempt to exploit reduction of forces in ICTZ by launching increased offensive operations; if the latter eventually occurred, the availability of the hospital was essential. Formal representations were made to Admiral Zumwalt, Commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Admiral Adamson, the Commander Naval Support Activity (Da Nang) to no avail; the Navy intended to proceed with its original redeployment plans. The situation was also discussed with General Abrams, COMUSMACV; General Abrams, as he stated, “preferred not to get involved in a ‘Navy-Marine Corps controversy’ ”; he then gave his personal assurances that, if the enemy embarked on large-scale offensive operations, at the outset, a hospital ship would be made available off the coast of ICTZ, and if necessary, a MASH would be moved into ICTZ to render medical support to the Marines.

“It was my understanding,” General Dulacki continued, “that CG, FMFPac made a similar representation to CINCPacFlt in Hawaii for the continuation of hospital support in Da Nang, but also to no avail.”¹⁸

Despite Marine protests, planning for the Army takeover of the activity's support functions continued. In September 1969, MACV established a joint Army-Navy planning group, at Admiral Zumwalt's suggestion, to work out the practical details of the gradual transfer to the Army as the Marines pulled out. The group, chaired by the Army and located at Da Nang, included representatives of MACV, USARV, NavForV, III MAF, 1st Logistical Command, NSA Da Nang, Army Support Command Da Nang, and Force Logistic Command. Divided into functional subcommittees, MACV tasked the group with determining requirements for personnel and equipment, costs, and defining problems and proposing solutions.

With Marine redeployments and joint studies underway, General Abrams, in mid-November, instructed the Army and Navy to develop a support turnover schedule for formal presentation to MACV by 1 January 1970. Noting that particular functions not directly required for the support of III MAF could be transferred earlier, Abrams directed that the final assumption of common support by the Army would follow the complete removal of Marine combat units.

Discussions dragged on past the 1 January MACV deadline with Zumwalt pressing for early Army takeover of ports and activities not needed by Marines in northern I Corps, and indicating that once the Army assumed the common support mission, NSA Da Nang would be replaced by a smaller naval support facility, whose primary concern would be small-craft maintenance and assisting the South Vietnamese Navy. At the same time, III MAF stressed the need for the slow and deliberate transfer of functions to the Army, while reemphasizing that Navy support continue until all Marine combat forces were withdrawn from Vietnam. USARV sought the loan or outright transfer of Navy facilities and equipment to supplement Army logistical resources in I Corps, while all the Service components sought to minimize the cost of supporting the remaining forces.

On 21 January, General Abrams set 1 July 1970 as the date for final turnover of common service support to the Army. The changeover would take place even if Marine combat units remained. Preliminary turnovers of equipment and minor facilities in northern I Corps began in November 1969, following the

redployment of the 3d Marine Division, but not until February 1970 did the first of a series of major transfers occur. On the 15th, Naval Support Activity, Da Nang disbanded its detachments at Sa Huynh and Cua Viet and transferred the port facilities to the U.S. Army Support Command. Additional transfers were made during March, April, and May, and on 30 June 1970 NSA Da Nang was disestablished. The following day U.S. Naval Support Facility, Da Nang came into being.¹⁹

Engineer Support

At the beginning of 1969, five Marine combat engineer battalions were deployed in I Corps. The 1st Engineer Battalion, organic engineer element of the 1st Marine Division, reinforced by a platoon of Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion, and a platoon of Company A, 5th Engineer Battalion, performed light construction throughout the division's area of responsibility, maintained water points, swept roads of mines, and conducted the division's Demolitions, Land Mine Warfare, and Viet Cong Boobytrap School. The 3d Engineer Battalion, organic to the 3d Marine Division, performed similar functions in Quang Tri Province. Assisting the 3d Engineer Battalion was the 11th Engineer Battalion, reinforced by the 3d Bridge Company. Of III MAF's two force engineer battalions, the 7th, with attached 1st Bridge Company, worked almost exclusively for the 1st Marine Division, performing heavy construction in the Da Nang area, maintaining and improving roads, and conducting sweeps in search of enemy mines. The 9th Engineer Battalion, with its command post and three companies at Chu Lai and part of the fourth at Tam Ky, concentrated its main effort on maintaining and upgrading Route 1 between Chu Lai and the Song Cau Lau. The battalion also provided secondary road maintenance and other tactical support to the Americal Division. The battalions, in addition to normal combat tasks, carried out an extensive civic action program, that included repair of local school and government buildings, irrigation canals, and plowing acres of rice paddies.

In addition to the five Marine engineer units, naval construction forces (Seabees) of the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and the four-battalion U.S. Army 45th Engineer Group operated in I Corps at the beginning of 1969.²⁰ The Seabees rotated battalions in and out of I Corps throughout the year and had 10 battalions at the beginning of 1969, 12 at midyear, and 5 at the end of the year. Like the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, the Americal and 101st Airborne Divisions, and the

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, had organic engineers. The Air Force relied on a heavy repair squadron, located at the Da Nang Airbase.²¹

With Marine, Army, Navy, and the public works division of NSA Da Nang involved in large and varied construction projects, the lines of responsibility among the engineer elements, specifically between Marine direct and general support battalions and the Seabees, became "blurred," noted Colonel Nicholas A. Canzona, G-4 of the 1st Marine Division. "I never saw so many engineers in all my life working in a given area," Canzona continued, "and I must admit that I don't think I've ever seen so much attendant confusion as to who is supposed to do what and why and who is in charge of this and that. And this can get somewhat exasperating at times."²²

Redeployments during the last months of 1969 reduced the III MAF engineer force by two Marine battalions: the 3d Marine Division's 3d Engineer Battalion and the 11th Engineer Battalion, a force unit. Among the principal contributions of the battalions in northern I Corps was development and perfection of the fire support base concept. With the increased dependence on mobile operations to exert maximum pressure on enemy formations, there occurred a requirement to provide close artillery support for combat units deployed beyond the range of guns at existing support bases. The solution was to establish small fortified positions on defensible terrain, large enough to accommodate the required artillery and service units supporting the maneuver elements. The construction of these sites proved to be a major engineering task, requiring first a detailed reconnaissance and then the formation of a task-organized engineer unit. Engineer equipment and troop requirements varied according to the nature of the terrain and the amount of clearing necessary following the supporting arms preparations.

The general sequence of engineer buildup on the selected fire support base site began with a small reconnaissance team accompanying the security force and helicopter support team. The contingent grew quickly as engineers began initial work with hand and power tools, and demolitions, to carve out a landing zone capable of receiving heavy equipment, such as tractors and backhoes, for the construction of gun pits, ammunition storage facilities, a helicopter pad, a fire direction center, and other defensive positions.

The primary piece of engineer equipment used in the construction of a fire support base was the Case

450 bulldozer, a helicopter-transportable tractor procured specifically for this task. Delivered to the site in two lifts, the tractor proved invaluable in reducing both manual labor and the time required to complete the base. In addition, the tractor was used to rapidly unearth enemy supply caches.

A substantial portion of the efforts of all five Marine engineer battalions, and Army and Navy engineers as well, was expended in upgrading major lines of communication throughout I Corps. Their effort was part of the general MACV bridge and LOC restoration program which sought to create a passable road network throughout South Vietnam, both to facilitate tactical maneuver and promote economic development. The tactical advantages were evident. Not only could troops be moved more quickly, but the construction of wide, modern paved roads forced the enemy to place his mines on the shoulders or on unimproved roads. This practically eliminated mining incidents on primary roads, reducing the daily minesweeping burden of III MAF engineer units and freeing them for other tasks. Road improvements undertaken during the year cut travel time between Da Nang and Hue from six hours to two, and between Da Nang and Dong Ha to four and one-half hours. An ancillary effect was to decrease vehicle maintenance requirements. Concentrating on Routes 1, 4, and 9, Marine, Navy, and Army engineer forces had completed the upgrading of over 370 kilometers and were at work on the

remaining 100 kilometers by year's end. In addition, they continued the task of bridge construction and repair, which, during a typical month, involved work on 15 spans.

Among the major engineering accomplishments during the year was the opening of the new Liberty Bridge by naval construction forces to traffic on 30 March, thereby restoring a permanent overland route into the An Hoa basin. Replacing the original 2,000-foot bridge washed away by monsoon floods in late 1967, the new 825-foot, timber-pile-supported, concrete-decked bridge not only cut travel time between Da Nang and An Hoa by half, but increased the capacity of allied forces in support of tactical and pacification operations and assisted local Vietnamese in the economic development of the industrial area. In July, Marine engineers reopened the Song Tra Bong bridge on Route 1, following its partial destruction by enemy sappers, which again provided a vital link between Chu Lai and the southern extremes of the corps tactical zone. During the same month, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion completed the upgrading of a portion of Route 4, permitting increased access to western Quang Nam Province.

In addition to road construction and maintenance, all Marine engineer battalions regularly swept assigned segments of highway for enemy mines. Sweep teams not only employed electric mine detectors, but also purchased large quantities of ordnance from Viet-

Once cleared of trees and vegetation, a mountaintop becomes a fire support base as members of the 1st Engineer Battalion take preliminary steps to create artillery positions.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371975





Marine Corps Historical Collection

Marines of the 9th Engineer Battalion apply a fresh layer of asphalt to Route 1 as a part of the continuing country-wide effort to upgrade South Vietnam's primary road network.

namese civilians under the Voluntary Informant Program. During May 1969, for example, teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion swept over 1,800 kilometers of road, detecting and destroying 91 mines and booby-traps. In the month they also purchased 2,717 ordnance items, ranging from small arms ammunition to 105mm artillery rounds.²³

While construction efforts were directed, in the main, toward upgrading and maintaining lines of communication, engineers still faced endless requirements for cantonment and fire base construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Except for the six-month reconstruction project required to return ASP-1 and other nearby damaged facilities to full operation following the 27 April fire, Marine, Navy, and Army combat engineers each month built or improved bunkers, SEA huts, showers, watch towers, and mount-out boxes; provided potable water and electricity; and laid barbed wire entanglements around base perimeters. For the 1st Medical Battalion, they constructed a 200-bed hospital, dental clinic, and support facilities. For FLC, engineers completed a new maintenance complex, consisting of 25 Butler build-

ings with attendant support hardware. And for the 1st MAW, they constructed over 100 steel and concrete "Wonder Arch" shelters at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Marble Mountain air facilities. Introduced during 1969 to provide maximum possible protection of aircraft from high-trajectory weapons, such as rockets and mortars, and to reduce the danger of a fire spreading from one aircraft to others, each 48-by-70 foot shelter was constructed of bolted steel sections covered with 12 inches of high-strength concrete.²⁴

Engineers also constructed facilities where the Marine infantrymen could get away from the stress of combat, among them "Stack Arms," the 1st Marine Division's in-country rest center located in the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion cantonment just south of the Marble Mountain Air Facility. While "this program did not win the war," as Lieutenant General Ormond R. Simpson, then commanding general of the division, later noted, "it was damn important to the 'man with the rifle.'" Infantry companies were brought to the center by helicopter. During their 48-hour stay, Marines could, as General Simpson noted, take "all the showers they wanted, were supplied with health and

comfort items free, got new clothing and 782 gear, if needed, swam in the sea, had beer and soft drinks, wrote letters, called home . . . got haircuts, watched movies, slept, ate the best hot food we could beg, borrow, or steal, literally, and had absolutely NO DUTY!"²⁵

With the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Division from Vietnam, Marine engineers from the 3d and 11th Battalions ceased all construction projects and began demolition of a number of installations they earlier had built. Before redeploying on 29 November, elements of the 11th Engineer Battalion completed the destruction of Vandegrift and Elliott Combat Bases and assisted the 3d Engineer Battalion in policing up Cua Viet and Dong Ha Combat Bases, prior to their transfer to ARVN and other allied units remaining in Quang Tri Province.²⁶

During the year, the enemy relied, as he had done throughout the earlier years of the war, on networks of caves, tunnels, and fortifications. To destroy these fighting positions, as well as remove foliage used as concealment, Marine engineers engaged in "land-clearing" operations—the systematic destruction of selected portions of the countryside. In addition to employing organic engineer elements, III MAF organized a number of provisional land-clearing units, consisting of men and equipment from Marine force engineer battalions and the Army's 45th Engineer Group, for specific purposes.

General land-clearing operations followed an established pattern. Vietnamese provincial authorities would designate the target area, and the military unit operating within the area would furnish a company-size security force for the engineer effort. Land-clearing bulldozers would then begin scraping the assigned area section by section, clearing trees and brush and simultaneously demolishing enemy trenchlines, bunkers, and tunnels, and detonating boobytraps. Ordnance not destroyed by the initial engineering effort, as well as impenetrable tunnels and bunkers, would be demolished separately.

During 1969, III MAF land-clearing efforts concentrated on two areas—Leatherneck Square in Quang Tri Province and Go Noi Island, southeast of Da Nang. Leatherneck Square, a 450,000 square meter corridor between Gio Linh and Con Thien, bounded by Route 9 on the south, was covered by scrub growth, crisscrossed by hedgerows, and dotted by numerous enemy harbor and fighting positions. By midyear, Marines of the 11th Engineer Battalion had reduced the area

to a dusty, hot piece of ground that would eventually be reclaimed by farming. To the south, in Quang Nam Province, portions of Dodge City and all of Go Noi Island, a long-time enemy stronghold, also were denuded. During 1st Marine Division Operation Pipestone Canyon, elements of the 1st, 7th, and 9th Engineer Battalions, in conjunction with Army land-clearing forces, leveled more than 8,000 acres, destroying an extensive enemy command post, 97 tunnels, 2,193 bunkers, 325 fighting holes, and 3,246 meters of trenchline.²⁷ As Lieutenant General Simpson noted: "We knew it was a staging point. We did clear it; there wasn't anything left." The engineers "went in there with . . . plows and actually plowed the whole damned thing up; every square foot of it."²⁸

Despite restraints in manpower and materials, Marine combat engineers, working in conjunction with their Army and Navy teammates, continued to provide combat and combat service support to maneuver elements deployed throughout I Corps. Their accomplishments were many and varied, ranging from water supply to the time-consuming and hazardous task of mine sweeping. Throughout it all, Marine combat engineers found the time to assist a Vietnamese village in building a new school or repairing an antiquated water system.

Motor Transport

III MAF possessed six motor transport units at the *A 3d Engineer Battalion sweep team checks a road for mines ahead of an advancing tank. Daily road sweeps consumed a portion of the Marine engineering effort.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192390





Marine Corps Historical Collection

The men of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines line up for the daily barbecue at the 1st Marine Division's in-country rest center, "Stack Arms," at China Beach south of Da Nang.

beginning of 1969. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced in October by Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, 5th Marine Division, was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, as was the 11th Motor Transport Battalion, a force unit. Supporting the 3d Marine Division was the 3d Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced until 23 March by a platoon of Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, and the 9th Motor Transport Battalion. Force Logistic Command had operational control of the large truck company of Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, which supported FLSG-Bravo at Quang Tri. Both of these units supported Force Logistic Command, as well as other III MAF elements.

The motor transport battalions organic to each division consisted of a Headquarters and Service Company and three truck companies. Each truck company was equipped with thirty 2.5-ton trucks. The force transport units, 7th, 9th, and 11th, whose mission was to reinforce other elements of the MAF, each consisted of a H&S Company, three truck companies, and transportation company. The transportation compa-

ny was authorized 30 tractors and 47 trailers of various sizes, while each truck company had thirty-one 5-ton trucks. The Truck Company, Force Logistic Command possessed a variety of specialized vehicles as well as a large fleet of 2.5- and 5-ton trucks.

Throughout 1969, III MAF still relied heavily on trucks to move cargo and personnel despite the ever-increasing use of helicopters. Major combat bases and the two logistic support units received most of their supplies by "Rough Rider" truck convoys. During 1969, Marine transport battalions covered 6,801,188 miles, carrying 2,416,802 passengers and 970,092 tons of freight.

Although improved roads permitted trucks to reach most major Marine positions in both western Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces, Marine truckers still had to contend with ambushes and mines. "On several occasions," noted Lieutenant Colonel Laurier J. Tremblay, 9th Motor Transport Battalion's commanding officer, "these convoys had to fight their way through well-established ambushes and as a result sustained many casualties in troops and equipment. During the early months of 1969, Route 9 was considered a

'Gauntlet' that our convoys were required to run through almost daily in order to provide urgently needed supplies and munitions to our combat troops operating out of Vandegrift Combat Base." Although a number of protective modifications were made to trucks, the simplest being the lining of floor boards with filled sandbags, casualties continued to mount.²⁹

The year witnessed the introduction of two new vehicles into III MAF's motor transport inventory, the M116E1 marginal terrain vehicle and the M733, its armored counterpart. Designed to replace the M76 Otter of World War II vintage, the M116E1 was placed into service in April by the 11th Motor Transport Battalion to support the 1st Marine Division in the low and often inundated areas south of Da Nang. Virtually unaffected by weather, this versatile vehicle had the effect of reducing reliance on helicopter support. The armored version of the vehicle was placed into service in August as a convoy escort.³⁰

The 3d and 9th Motor Transport Battalions were among the last units to redeploy with the 3d Marine Division. Needed to move the redeploying combat units and their equipment to coastal ports for embarkation, both units left Vietnam in late November. The

7th Motor Transport Battalion remained behind to assist in the relocation of Marine personnel and equipment from northern I Corps to the Da Nang area, to which it moved on 2 December.

Medical Support

Medical service support available to III MAF at the beginning of 1969, included the 1st Medical Battalion, reinforced in October by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion, which maintained the 240-bed 1st Marine Division Hospital. A similar size hospital was maintained by the 3d Medical Battalion for the 3d Marine Division. In addition the 1st Hospital Company, a force unit, operated a 100-bed treatment facility at Da Nang. Approximately 250 Navy medical officers and 2,700 hospital corpsmen were attached to the divisions, wing, FLC, and other combat support units throughout I Corps. Two Navy hospital ships, the *Sanctuary* (AH 17) and the *Repose* (AH 16), each with a capacity of 560 beds, which could be increased to 750 during an emergency, were stationed off I Corps to treat the more seriously ill and wounded. At Da Nang, the 720-bed Naval Support Activity Hospital provided most services available at a general hospital in the United States. Also available were the facilities of the

A 7th Motor Transport Battalion "Rough Rider" convoy, originating at Quang Tri, pauses at Phu Bai south of Hue before proceeding over Hai Van Pass and into Da Nang.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800437





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800568
A wounded Marine is hoisted on board a hovering Marine CH-46 helicopter. Rapid evacuation and the use of innovative techniques saved valuable time, increasing the survival rate among the seriously wounded.

95th U.S. Army Evacuation Hospital near Da Nang.

Although the medical evacuation chain and policy remained unchanged throughout 1969, improvements to shorten the time between injury and treatment continued. Hot pads specifically tailored to the dedicated two-transport, two-gunship helicopter medical evacuation package were established. This not only had the effect of reducing scramble time, but also promoted "dialogue among crews of the package, before, between, and after missions which is an important factor in teamwork." In addition, specific ultra-high-fre-

quency (UHF) channels were dedicated solely for medical evacuation communications. During the year a joint medical regulating center was established by placing a Navy and Marine regulating section with its Army counterpart at the 95th Evacuation Hospital. After helicopters picked up casualties, the flight corpsman, or a member of the helicopter crew in the absence of the corpsman, would contact the regulating center on the dedicated radio frequency and report the number of patients and the type and severity of the wounds. A center regulator would then check the status board indicating the facilities, specialties, and space available at each hospital, and direct the helicopter to the appropriate destination for treatment.³¹ Specially designed litters and forest penetrators were also introduced to aid in helicopter rescue operations in jungle terrain or in combat areas too dangerous for a helicopter to land.

"The swift and orderly chain of evacuation is a many faceted thing," noted Colonel Eugene R. Brady, former commander of HMM-364, "many procedures have been adopted to shorten and strengthen the chain. The dedicated four plane package, the hot pad, the dedicated frequency . . . are but a few links in the chain. There are many other links, some small, some large. Non-essential links have been discarded." Although the process may have been evolutionary, "the dedication, motivation, and courage of those involved in tactical air medical evacuation will," Colonel Brady continued, "never change."³²

Admissions to hospitals serving III MAF declined over the year, reflecting not only redeployments but also the slackening of combat. Of the 22,003 patients treated during 1969, 26 percent were admitted for wounds received as a direct result of combat. Illnesses, such as fevers of undetermined origin or malaria, like the year before, accounted for the majority of admissions (61 percent), while the remaining 13 percent were as a result of nonbattle injuries. Of the Marines admitted to III MAF medical facilities, 11,355 were evacuated to out-of-country installations through the Air Force's 22d Casualty Staging Facility at Da Nang for specialized treatment.

Like other support organizations, III MAF medical support facilities experienced a reduction during the latter half of 1969 as a result of redeployments. The 3d Medical Battalion, which supported the 3d Division, left Vietnam on 24 November. However, those Marine units remaining in Quang Tri Province were not without medical support. Casualties were either

transported to Company B, 75th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, or to Army or Marine facilities further south.

Communications

The corps-wide communications system which allowed Commanding General, III MAF to administer, coordinate, and direct the various commands under his control was installed, maintained, and operated by the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions.* In addition to the common functions associated with communications, installation of telephone poles, cable construction and splicing, maintenance of switching apparatus, and manning of radio relay sites, members of the battalions staffed the various Marine communications operations centers located throughout I Corps.

Centered at Da Nang, the corps-wide communications system provided III MAF with various capabilities: teletype and data, radio, and telephone operations. The III MAF teletype and data capability rested mainly with the administrative communications center at Camp Horn, although similar operations existed at the divisions, wing, and Force Logistics Command, and on down to the regimental and in some instances, battalion level. The center, staffed by officers and men of the Communications Company, 5th Communication Battalion, processed and distributed over 2,500 messages generated daily by dedicated point-to-point teletype circuits to all major subordinate units. In addition, the center maintained other dedicated circuits which provided entry into four world-wide teletype systems; to FMFPac in Hawaii, to the Navy's Naval Command Operational network in the Philippines, to CinCPac's Joint Pacific Teletype Network, and to the AUTODIN telephone network via teletype.

Instead of maintaining control over subordinate elements by voice radio communications, III MAF relied on the various teletype networks. The circuits to major units were all secure point-to-point utilizing encryption devices. In addition, the center maintained secure circuit links with the Korean Brigade at Hoi An, Army Special Forces operating in I Corps, ARVN I Corps Headquarters, and a special radio teletype net which connected major subordinate commands as well as the special landing forces and Navy ships providing gunfire support. Lastly, teletype circuits were main-



Marine Corps Historical Collection

PFC Richard J. Wellnitz, left, of the 7th Communications Battalion, checks out the telephone line after LCpl Kenneth D. Ellis completes a wire patch.

tained to MACV and the Air Force's Task Force Alpha in Thailand.

While secure communications by radio was kept to a minimum, it was maintained as a backup to the teletype systems. III MAF did possess an unsecure command radio net with the Da Nang harbor patrol, the Navy Hospital, and hospital ships in the vicinity, but this like other unsecure radio nets was used sparingly.

The initial telephone system within I Corps Tactical Zone was tactically oriented, but as III MAF grew, larger and more complex fixed equipment was added. The final result was a combination of the tactical system, utilizing automatic dial telephone switching equipment at the division and force level, and the Defense Communication System operating fixed dial central offices. In the spring of 1969, the Air Force, under the direction of the Defense Communications Agency, inaugurated the Da Nang tandem switching center which provided intra-corps switching between all five dial central offices, stretching from Phu Bai to Chu Lai, as well as providing access to other corps tactical zones and Thailand. The system terminated in the AUTOVON switching center in Saigon, providing all users with direct dial capability throughout the world.

*On 15 April 1969, the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions were combined under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Brady. Both battalions maintained their separate identities, but were controlled by one commanding officer and his staff.

Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal

The redeployment of men and equipment of the 3d Marine Division posed one of the most complex logistic problems facing III MAF during the latter half of 1969. Units scheduled to be redeployed did not simply cease operations, pack up, and leave Vietnam; instead, with each withdrawal, the selected units would disengage from continuing operations. Once extricated, the departing units would exchange, if required, most of their personnel and equipment with other organizations still in combat before embarking for destinations in the Pacific or the United States. The movement was not all in one direction, for normal rotation of personnel and replacement of equipment had to continue. This flow had to be stringently regulated so as to leave III MAF at the prescribed personnel strength and Force Logistic Command with manageable materiel levels at the completion of each redeployment cycle.

In consultation with MACV, the White House and Department of Defense determined the number of troops to be withdrawn and timetable for each redeployment. MACV then apportioned the troops to be removed among the Services and requested from each component commander a list of specific units to be redeployed. CinCPac and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn reviewed and approved the list, determining the destination of each redeployed unit. Based on the transportation requirements provided by the separate Services, CinCPac would then prepare a schedule and timetable for the sea and air movements of men and equipment.³³

Coordinating redeployment planning and execution for Marine Corps units was FMFPac, headquartered at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Under the command of Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., a Naval Academy graduate and recipient of the Silver Star in World War II, FMFPac, in conjunction with III MAF, proposed specific Marine units to be redeployed. Following general guidelines established by Headquarters Marine Corps, FMFPac coordinated the movement of men and equipment from South Vietnam to other Marine Corps bases in the Pacific and the continental United States. "FMFPac was the prime coordinator," according to Major General Wilbur F. Simlik, then III MAF G-4. "FMFPac arranged the shipping—which was the controlling factor, of course. FMFPac told us which regiment, which element would be retrograded when and where."³⁴

On redeployment matters, the relationship between

FMFPac and III MAF was, as General Simlik later remarked, "constant and close, and personal." Buse or members of his staff made frequent visits to Da Nang to observe, consult, and to provide guidance. At the same time, a constant and friendly dialogue was maintained with CinCPac, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., and his staff. For its part, III MAF regularly sent representatives to FMFPac and CinCPac planning and movement conferences, in addition to coordinating with MACV, the other Services, and the South Vietnamese on such matters as area responsibility, base transfers, and equipment turnovers.³⁵

Redeployment plans were drafted in terms of units to be withdrawn and the total number of troops to be deducted from the authorized strength of each Service within Vietnam. For the Marine Corps, FMFPac and III MAF determined which unit, and further, which individual Marine would be removed in order to bring III MAF down to the required strength. In deciding who should redeploy and who should remain, tour equity would overshadow all other considerations. Those Marines with the fewest months remaining in their current 12-month tour would normally be selected for redeployment.

As with all other combat and support units in Vietnam, Marine units were made up of personnel with varied end-of-tour dates, and thus no unit could simply be withdrawn with its complete complement of existing personnel. Instead, for each unit selected for redeployment to Okinawa or continental United States, a process nicknamed "mixmaster" was instituted. Mixmaster involved the transfer of noneligible Marines to units remaining in Vietnam and the filling of the redeploying unit's ranks with eligible men from other Marine commands. In Keystones Eagle and Cardinal, the only major unit to undergo extensive "mixmastering" was the 3d Marines. Those Marines of RLT-3 who had served a minimum of seven months were considered eligible for return to Camp Pendleton with the unit or to normal and accelerated rotation drafts, while the remainder were transferred to other units in Vietnam, Okinawa, and Japan. Units remaining in Vietnam in turn provided a number of Marines to fill the void. Commands bound for Okinawa and Japan underwent less "mixmastering," and these units embarked with a majority of existing personnel, including those otherwise ineligible, in order to maintain the unit's integrity and combat readiness.

In implementing this complex reshuffling of manpower, each redeployment was broken down into the

number of Marines of each rank, grade, and skill to be removed either by transfer to a withdrawing organization or by normal rotation. FMFPac, which held broad transfer and reassignment authority, issued strength reduction requirements and assisted, where necessary, in their implementation. Through its G-1 section, each major III MAF subordinate command then selected those Marines eligible for redeployment, arranged for the transfers, and prepared and issued the necessary orders. FMFPac, in addition, periodically adjusted the flow of replacements to III MAF to assure compliance with stated manpower ceilings, and directed special transfers of III MAF personnel to units on Okinawa or in Japan, not only to reduce numbers in Vietnam, but to rebuild other Western Pacific commands gutted during the war.

Redeploying units involved in Keystones Eagle and Cardinal began embarkation planning and preparation one to two months before their scheduled date of departure. While still conducting combat operations, equipment was inventoried and those supplies not immediately needed were disposed of or packed for shipment. Two to three weeks before embarkation, the units normally stood down and moved to secure cantonments, in the case of units of the 3d Marine Division, to Dong Ha Combat Base. There, battalions "mixmastered" their personnel, turned in supplies and excess equipment, and completed packing in preparation for shipment.

In the redeployments carried out during 1969, units leaving Vietnam carried with them their standard allowances of supplies and equipment. They, however, were to divest themselves of all rations, ammunition, fuel, and excess Southeast Asia equipment, and in the case of those units deploying to Okinawa and Japan, jungle fatigues.³⁶ The fatigues were one of the items that were not to be taken out of country. However, "the distribution of regular utilities had started," reported Colonel Raymond C. Damm, "but supplies were not sufficient to outfit the troops going to Japan and Okinawa. We requested authority to retain one set of jungle utilities for the movement . . . FMFPac approved the request with the proviso that we gather them up as soon as we could issue regular utilities on Okinawa. The troops, much to the satisfaction of the troop leaders, embarked in jungle utilities."³⁷

Excess equipment and supplies were turned over to Marine organizations still committed to combat or used to replenish the mount-out and mount-out aug-

mentation (MO/MOA) stocks of the displacing forces.* Force Logistic Command acted as the conduit for redistributing these excess supplies, ensuring that those units departing Vietnam were fully prepared for expeditionary service.

All equipment and supplies accompanying units being redeployed to the United States had to meet the strict standards of cleanliness established by the United States Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service to prevent the introduction of Asian insects and contagious diseases into the United States. Meeting these standards proved a problem, as General Simlik later noted:

One of our most aggravating problems was that all of the gear, all of the equipment, all of the vehicles that we retrograded to the United States had to pass an agricultural inspection. So consequently they had to be spotless, absolutely spotless. And there were inspectors that were at the docks and aboard ships . . . With vehicles that had been in combat only a few days before, this was a very difficult task to accomplish. We [therefore had to] set up all sorts of washing and scrub down stations by the docks.³⁸

Packing boxes had to be constructed of termite-free wood, and all containers, vehicle bodies, and shipborne aircraft had to be sealed and treated with insecticides and rodent poisons before being loaded.

Of the total number of Marines redeploying during 1969, more than 50 percent left Vietnam by ship. The remainder departed on commercial aircraft chartered by the Military Airlift Command. In contrast, over 90 percent of all Marine equipment and cargo went by sea. Most of this cargo, as well as those surface-transported Marines, traveled by amphibious vessels provided by CinCPacFlt. During each redeployment, one of the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces stood down temporarily to permit the vessels of its amphibious ready group to join the sealift. During Keystones Eagle and Cardinal, FLC squeezed 604,884 square feet of vehicle and 3,952,911 cubic feet of freight onto eastbound amphibious shipping. This

*Marine Corps units, as forces required to be constantly ready to be committed, maintain stocks of reserve supplies in order to support themselves during their initial period of deployment should supplies not be readily available. These stocks are divided into two 30-day blocks, the mount-out and mount-out augmentation. The mount-out block is held by the unit itself and moves with it when the unit is deployed. The augmentation block is carried by the division or regiment service support unit and is intended to supplement the primary block of supplies. Following initial Marine deployments to Vietnam in 1965, mount-out blocks were consumed and by early 1969 had to be rebuilt.

reliance on Navy ships instead of contracted vessels of the Military Sealift Transportation System (MSTS) saved the Marine Corps approximately \$5,000,000 in commercial freight costs during the last half of 1969.

As the Marines left with their equipment and supplies, III MAF disposed of the vacated bases and camps. Although it possessed authority to demolish fire bases and combat positions, all major installations were first offered to the other United States Services and then to the South Vietnamese. If rejected then they were demolished. Real estate transfers, especially to South Vietnamese forces, was a complex, and often involved task. The secrecy of redeployment planning prevented III MAF and other commands from initiating discussions of base turnover with the South Vietnamese until late in each withdrawal cycle. Poorly organized and equipped to manage their own facilities, the Vietnamese made decisions slowly, and as General Simlik noted, demanded much paperwork:

III MAF and XXIV Corps, of course, did their best to influence how the ARVN would deploy and utilize the fire bases which we occupied. But the Vietnamese were indepen-

dent. There were certain fire bases which they wanted and others which they didn't, and they made up their mind with deliberate speed The fire bases and the camps which the ARVN and other units were to occupy had to be left in spotless condition—A-1; all the electrical wiring had to be exactly right, all the heads had to be functioning, all this sort of thing. And there was a formal agreement, a real estate agreement, which was to be signed by both parties and forwarded down to MACV affirming that all was in order. This almost required the services of a professional real estate negotiator. Each fire base posed its own problems, and negotiations were constant.³⁹

The transfer of real estate, while at times frustrating, proved to be less of a problem than cleaning up the battlefield, as Lieutenant General William K. Jones, then Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, later noted:

These [fire support bases] were built with huge 12 by 12 timbers. It was necessary, of course, that we completely dismantle them so that they could not be used by the enemy. This was a major problem—a major engineer problem. The ARVN were very interested in acquiring this material and I was given authority to give it to them. So they would come

The electronic equipment of the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion heads out of Da Nang Harbor by ship bound for Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, California.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



up and haul this bulk of material back to their camps. But, even so, why was this the big problem, was that we had to close up and police up an area that had been used by Marines for many, many years.

Everything had to be removed or buried:

We had to remove all mines. We didn't have to remove the barbed wire, but we had to take out all the mines or give the minefield maps to the ARVN if they wanted them left in; and there weren't very many that they wanted left in, actually. So, we had to clear all that. And then, just the debris, just the cans and boxes, . . . accumulated trash we

had to bury . . . We left it absolutely clean—everything. Everything was buried and there was no trash whatsoever.⁴⁰

The logistical effort in moving a reinforced division, in addition to an appropriate share of supporting air units, from the war zone to Okinawa, Japan, and United States bases was accomplished successfully despite the problems which arose. The mistakes and the actions taken during the Keystones Eagle and Cardinal redeployments served as useful guidelines for units involved in the increasing number of redeployments the following year.

PART VI

UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS

CHAPTER 16

Pacification

The National Perspective—Pacification Planning In I Corps—Line Unit Pacification Civic Action—The Grass Roots Campaign—Results

The National Perspective

Long a major concern of Marines in South Vietnam, pacification, by 1969, had become the major goal of the allied country-wide strategy. Although definitions varied with time, pacification was a complex military, political, economic, and sociological process with the principal thrust of providing security for the population of South Vietnam as well as peace, prosperity, political stability, and social justice. Broad in concept, it combined a myriad of individual programs and efforts which had the following basic objectives: establishing or re-establishing local government which was responsive to the citizenry and that involved their participation; providing sustained security; destroying the enemy's infrastructure; asserting or reasserting South Vietnamese political control; involving the people in the central government; and initiating sustained economic and social growth.

In theory, a sound pacification program was inherent in successfully combating counterinsurgency. In practice, however, the program during the early years was marked by confused policies and goals, divided authority and fragmented administration, all of which permitted corruption and created little or no progress. Beginning in late 1966, major efforts were begun to create a meaningful program to deny the enemy his vital base of popular support and to coordinate security planning. Further refinements were made the following year with the combining of most American personnel engaged in pacification under one organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and placing it within the MACV command structure. Paralleling CORDS, the South Vietnamese Government created the Central Recovery Committee (CRC), first chaired by the Vice President and then by the Prime Minister. The two organizations through deputies and councils at all governing levels, coordinated, planned, and directed the pacification effort.

Following the 1968 *Tet* Offensive, during which the enemy attempted not only to inflict a major military defeat, but also to coerce the South Vietnamese people

into an uprising, a comprehensive review of pacification policies and management was undertaken, resulting in the launching of a "special campaign" to seize the initiative from the enemy and expand governmental authority and control. Announced on 11 October by President Nguyen Van Thieu, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) had as its major objectives the consolidation of past achievements and the extension of government control over necessary territory and a minimum of 80 percent of the population. The main effort was to be directed at maintaining security in those hamlets rated "under GVN influence" (A, B, or C) by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), in order that local government and community life could flourish.* In those areas rated "contested" (D and E hamlets) efforts were to be directed toward restoring security and limited community development. As for enemy-controlled hamlets, emphasis was

*Instituted in 1966, the Hamlet Evaluation System arranged and analyzed information on all aspects of pacification—security, political, and socio-economic—provided by province and district advisors. The computerized system then supplied information on demand, with the most important being the placing of areas in specific categories assigned the letter grade A, B, C, D, E, or V. These security categories were defined as:

A. Hamlet has adequate security forces; infrastructure has been eliminated; public projects are underway and the economic picture is improving.

B. A Viet Cong threat exists, but security is organized and partially effective; infrastructure has been partially neutralized; and self-help and economic programs are underway.

C. Hamlet is subject to infrequent VC harassment; infrastructure members have been identified; and the population participates in some self-help programs.

D. Viet Cong activities have been reduced, but an internal enemy threat in the form of taxation and terrorism still exists. The local populace participates in some hamlet government and economic programs. The hamlet is contested but leaning toward the central government.

E. The Viet Cong are effective although some government control exists. The enemy infrastructure is intact, and government programs are nonexistent or just beginning.

V. Hamlet under Viet Cong control. No government official or advisor may enter except on military operations, and the population willingly supports the enemy.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371861

Navy Corpsman Donald W. Vogt, accompanying a Company L, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines patrol south of Da Nang, pauses to treat a South Vietnamese woman's injured leg.

to be placed on conducting military operations designed to disrupt enemy troop movements and destroy enemy logistical storage areas.

The primary tasks of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign were to: improve the Regional and Popular Forces; promote the anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure plan (Phoenix); reform local government; organize the people into self-defense forces; enforce economic revival measures; improve information and propaganda; implement the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program; and assist in the accelerated rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees. For each task, a specific target goal was assigned: drive the enemy from populated areas; upgrade 1,000 D and E hamlets to category C; neutralize 3,000 members of the infrastructure each month; rally at least 5,000 Hoi Chanh; expand the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) to one million, of which 200,000 would be armed; and expand the information and propaganda campaign to exploit enemy failures and demonstrate the government's seizure of the initiative to end the war in victory.

After the various organizations and units necessary to implement the tasks were set up, the target hamlets selected, and the supporting military operations arranged, the campaign was launched on 1 November. As with all undertakings of this magnitude, problems arose, but for the most part they were overcome. An early and potentially difficult problem was that of centralized management. As the campaign progressed, it soon became apparent that the loosely organized Central Recovery Committee was ill-equipped to manage effectively a program as all-inclusive and as urgent as the APC. As a result, the permanent Central Pacification and Development Council was established, under the Prime Minister, composed of representatives of the ministries most directly involved in pacification. This new arrangement not only fostered authoritative centralized control, but assured that the momentum achieved during the initial stages of the campaign would be maintained.

Expanding upon the special 1968 plan, which was to terminate on 31 January 1969, the South Vietnamese

issued the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan on 15 December. This authoritative document served not only as the foundation for the 1969 program, but was in itself a notable achievement in cooperation and coordination between the newly formed Central Pacification and Development Council, various government ministries, and MACV, therefore ensuring that the yearly pacification plan would receive widespread support throughout South Vietnam.

As a continuation and extension of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the essential task to be accomplished during 1969 remained the liberation of the people from the coercion and control of the enemy and to prevent his return. Underlying all pacification efforts was to be the guiding principle of "Community Spirit." As the 1969 Pacification and Development plan stressed:

The Community Spirit Principle must originate with the people; every effort of the Government must be developed based on that principle, while carrying out any program or operation. The Community Spirit principle must work on a three-fold basis: cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the Government, and cooperation among Government organizations. Only then can the Government be more powerful and stable; then the people will realize that they are involved and will cooperate with the Government to defeat the common enemy.¹

The practical goals for action were established in eight mutually supporting objectives: provide territorial security; establish local government in villages; organize People's Self-Defense Forces; increase the number of Hoi Chanh; reduce the Viet Cong Infrastructure; intensify information and propaganda efforts; stimulate the rural economy; and reduce the number of refugees.

Under territorial security, the Vietnamese Government committed itself to controlling and providing security for 90 percent of the population which lived in hamlets and villages with a Hamlet Evaluation System pacification rating of A, B, or C. Responsibility for this security involved both the Vietnamese Armed Forces (including RF and PF), Free World Military Assistance Forces, together with People's Self-Defense Force, and National Police. Each of these military and paramilitary forces would be used according to its capabilities.

As the South Vietnamese had no long tradition of nationhood, the government placed primary emphasis on unifying the village and hamlet governments with the central government, rather than attempting to win support of the state by individual loyalty. In contested hamlets and Viet Cong-controlled villages, elections

were to be held, competent officials trained, and administrative organizations established, ensuring a real and durable presence of the government in rural areas.

Originally organized to obtain the commitment of as many people as possible to the government and actively involved in its defense, and to strengthen security in both rural and urban areas, the People's Self-Defense Force, the civilian home guard, had by the end of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign grown to approximately 1 million, of which nearly 200,000 were armed.* Ultimately to include all males not liable for military service and women, aged 16 and above, organized into local combat and support groups, the PSDF was potentially one of the government's most promising pacification devices. The objective of the 1969 Pacification and Development plan was to increase membership to a minimum of 2 million with 1.6 million of this number trained and 400,000 armed.

The Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program was considered vital to the 1969 pacification campaign. Deemed one of the most successful programs initiated, more than 90,000 Hoi Chanh, or ralliers, had returned to government control since the effort was begun in 1963, of which more than 10,000 came from enemy military units and over 4,000 from the enemy infrastructure. The 1968 Chieu Hoi program produced approximately 18,000 ralliers, with nearly 8,000 being returned during the last three months of the year. Based on these results and the desire to step up propaganda efforts, the government set a goal of receiving 20,000 Hoi Chanh during 1969.

The anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure program, code-named Phoenix by the Americans and Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, had been in existence for some time. Again calling for the elimination, by death, capture, or desertion, of the enemy's entrenched infrastructure, the 1969 plan specified goals and targets. The main targets of the campaign were to be members of the National Liberation Councils and their subor-

*Four groups composed the People's Self-Defense Forces: the Female Support Group; the Youth Self-Defense Group; the Elders Self-Defense Group; and the Combat Group. Membership in the combat group included all males 16 and 17 years of age and able-bodied females, between the ages of 16 and 40, who joined voluntarily. Women between the ages of 16 and 50 composed the female group, while males over 51 were included in the elders group. Youth between 13 and 15 joined the youth group. Membership in the female, elder, and youth groups was voluntary, and tasks included social welfare, health activities, and morale support. (COMUSMACV msg to JCS, dtd 9Jun69 [MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56]).

dinate organizations on provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels, with particular emphasis given to areas considered contested or under temporary Communist control. For goals, the 1969 Pacification and Development plan called for the political elimination of 33,000 individuals.

Since "winning the hearts and minds of the people" was the ultimate aim of the pacification effort, a broad information and propaganda program was necessary to explain and encourage active participation and cooperation with the government in achieving the eight objectives of the 1969 campaign. In secure areas, the aim was to exploit the government's military and political successes, appeal for the people's active cooperation in destroying the enemy infrastructure, and warn against Communist attempts at terrorism, sabotage, and use of distorted propaganda calling for a coalition government. In contested areas, emphasis was to be placed on exposing Communist intentions and methods, while expounding upon the good intentions and programs of the government.

The 1969 Pacification and Development plan took careful notice of the refugee problem, stressing that the number of refugees be reduced to less than one million by resettling or returning 300,000 people to their native villages. In discussing efforts to revive the rural economy, rice production was to be encouraged, roads were to be repaired, low interest loans were to be made, farming equipment was to be available, and all unnecessary permits, taxes, and checkpoints were to be eliminated. Although committed to, but not mentioned, land reform would have to await the decision of the government as to the exact pattern a program should take.

Responsibility for achieving the eight goals was assigned to various government ministries and to military corps, provinces, and districts. Officials concerned were to draft pacification and development plans, based on the national plan, for their areas of responsibility, and to coordinate their activities with each other and with local corps and province officials.

With the 1969 pacification program well underway, the South Vietnamese Prime Minister unexpectedly announced to the 23 May meeting of the Central Pacification and Development Council that the program would be advanced to meet the 1969 goals by the end of October. This new program, termed the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, contained two objectives: the fulfillment or over-fulfillment of the original eight goals set for the 1969 campaign by

31 October, and the achievement of fully secure status (HES rating of A or B) for 50 percent of the hamlet population. Of the eight goals, only three were changed. On the subject of rendering the infrastructure ineffective, the Prime Minister proposed sentencing 5,000 VCI during the period in order to effectively remove them from the war. Acknowledging that the goal of resettling refugees could not be met, he suggested that every effort should be made to resettle as many as possible. The only goal prescribed under the objective of stimulating the rural economy related to land reform, whereby the government would dispose of excess land and initiate the purchase of additional land for distribution to farmers under the "Land to the Tiller" Act. As with the comprehensive plan, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign required the support and coordination of all appropriate agencies during the four-month program.

Pacification Planning in I Corps

In I Corps Tactical Zone, as elsewhere in South Vietnam, the 1968 Pacification and Accelerated Pacification Campaigns had achieved considerable success. Of the nearly 3 million civilians living in the five provinces, 2,200,000 people or 73.7 percent were considered to be residing in secure hamlets, with 85.7 percent under government sovereignty. The People's Self Defense Force had enrolled 225,000 members; however, the training program could indoctrinate but 98,000, with weapons available for only 30,000, far below the goal of training 128,000 and arming 48,000. Over 2,000 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure had been arrested or killed, and almost 2,800 Hoi Chanh rallied to the government. With over 690,000 refugees comprising 25 percent of the population, I Corps had approximately 55 percent of the refugees in all of South Vietnam. Although strides were made to resettle or return as many as possible to their native villages, this area posed a grave challenge for the coming year.

Corps- and province-level pacification and development plans for the year included efforts to achieve the national goal of bringing security to 90 percent of the population, eliminating 2,600 infrastructure members, and rallying 2,500, later raised to 3,600, enemy troops. Plans also called for the substantial enlargement of the People's Self-Defense Force from 225,000 to 320,000, of which 256,000 would be trained and 64,000 would be armed, if training cadre and weapons were available in adequate numbers. Of the 509 villages in I Corps, 187 had elected councils during 1967, 194 had

nonelected committees, and 128 were to elect governing bodies during the year. Thus, by the end of 1969, all Corps villages were expected to have governing bodies, 62 percent of which would be popularly elected. Although planners did not include specific numerical goals for refugee resettlement and economic development, much activity was promised in both fields.

The pacification effort in I Corps was organized to conform with the standard CORDS structure. Control of the regional CORDS effort rested with III MAF, with overall guidance administered through the Joint Staff, later renamed the Program Coordination Staff, headed by a civilian deputy for CORDS. As deputy, Mr. Charles T. Cross, replaced in May by Mr. Alexander Firfer, held Foreign Service rank equivalent to that of a major general and directed the efforts of close to 1,000 military and civilian personnel drawn from the four Armed Services, Department of Defense, Agency for International Development (AID), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal agencies. The staff controlled divisions responsible for each element of the pacification program: Government Development, Economic Development, Agriculture, Phoenix/Phung Hoang, Public Health, Refugees, Revolutionary Development, Regional Forces and Popular Forces, and Chieu Hoi.²

Under the control of the Deputy for CORDS were the five U.S. Army province senior advisors, each with a staff similar to that at the corps-level. The senior advisors worked closely with the province chiefs, who directed all aspects of civil government as well as commanded the territorial forces within the province. Under the five province advisors were the district senior advisors who worked directly with the local district chiefs, who in turn were responsible to the province chiefs.

Marine Corps representation on the CORDS staff during 1969 was relatively small in comparison to the size of its forces in I Corps. The highest-ranking Marine with CORDS was Colonel George C. Knapp, replaced in April by Colonel Howard A. Westphall, who served as chief of staff to the Deputy for CORDS and a member of the joint staff. In addition to Colonel Knapp, four other Marine officers held corps-level staff billets. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, five additional officers, who had time to serve in-country, were added as advisors to the Revolutionary Development Cadre. Below corps-level, Marines had very little representation at the important province and district senior advisory levels.³



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371966
A Vietnamese woman has her teeth checked by Lt David W. Syrek, USN, a dentist with the 1st Dental Company, during a visit to her village as part of the 1st Marine Division Dental Civic Action Program.

III MAF and its subordinate military units maintained contact with CORDS and the provincial and district governments primarily through the G-5 or S-5 (Civic Affairs/Civic Action) staff sections, added to the headquarters staff in 1965. Responsible for pacification, psychological operations, and civic affairs, the G-5 and S-5 officers at corps-, division-, wing-, regiment-, and battalion-level attempted to fit military civic action into overall pacification planning, in addition to coordinating Marine operations in populated areas with those of local security forces and settling disputes and damage claims by local citizens against Marines. Both III MAF and the 1st Marine Division had a number of civic affairs officers during the year. At III MAF, Colonel Westphall headed the G-5 office until assuming the position of chief of staff at CORDS in April; Colonel Gilbert R. Hershey served until July; Colonel Theodore E. Metzger until September; and Colonel Clifford J. Peabody until September 1970. The 1st Marine Division G-5, Colonel Harry F. Painter, held the post until August when he was replaced by Colonel William J. Zaro and then by Lieutenant Colonel Vincent A. Albers, Jr. Colonel William E. Kerri-gan headed the 3d Marine Division's G-5 section un-

til the division departed South Vietnam in November.⁴

In addition to III MAF, ARVN, and Korean combat forces, a wide range of military and civilian agencies were involved in the pacification effort throughout I Corps. Provincial and district governments were active and relatively successful. At the beginning of the year there were about 49,800 men of the Regional and Popular Forces, organized into companies and separate platoons. Although improving in military effectiveness, they tended to be tied to static defensive positions and commanded by relatively inexperienced leaders. The People's Self-Defense Force boasted over 98,000 trained and 30,000 armed members. The corps' 11,000-man National Police Field Force and National Police, previously concentrated in the larger villages and hamlets, were beginning to move into the countryside where they relieved territorial forces of the task of maintaining public order.

Besides the police, the People's Self-Defense Forces, and territorial troops, groups of Revolutionary Development Cadre assisted the pacification effort at the hamlet-level. Organized into teams of approximately 30, recruited and trained by the central government, cadre teams worked with the local populace in organizing themselves for defense and assisting in political, economic, and social self-help programs. In order to spread the government's message throughout the corps tactical zone, Armed Propaganda Companies were kept in the field to encourage enemy desertions.

Despite this variety of organizations, the population of I Corps at the beginning of 1969 was far from secure. Of its over 2.9 million people, about 2 million resided in areas considered secure, while another 45,000 lived in areas considered contested, and the rest under Viet Cong domination. Thus, about 74 percent of the population were considered under government control. Social and economic improvement efforts left much to be desired as did proposed solutions to the resettlement of the estimated 690,000 refugees. Nevertheless, Marines throughout 1969 continued to work to strengthen and expand upon past pacification achievements.

Line Unit Pacification

"Without security your whole 1969 Pacification Campaign is down the drain," noted Colonel George C. Knapp.⁵ The primary mission of Marine rifle companies and battalions during 1969 was to attack enemy military units with the aim of improving population security. Whether searching jungle-covered mountain valleys or working with Vietnamese forces

in cordoning and searching villages, protecting rice harvests, or furnishing protection for government elections, the ultimate goal of Marine infantry operations was to ensure the security of the population so that normal social, economic, and political activity could be restored and allowed to flourish.

While multi-battalion attacks took place, cordon and search operations of varying sizes increased in frequency. From a single raid on a hamlet by a platoon in search of a Viet Cong Infrastructure member to a week-long search of a village complex, the tactic proved increasingly productive as the year progressed. In the larger cordons and searches, several Marine companies or battalions, working with ARVN troops, Regional and Popular Force units, the Vietnamese National Police, and allied intelligence and counterintelligence teams would move into an area, establish blocking positions, allowing no movement in or out. Vietnamese troops, aided by Marines, would then collect all the civilians at a Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) where they would be questioned and their identities checked against lists of known or suspected Viet Cong. Searches, meanwhile, would be conducted for hidden Viet Cong and each house would be examined for concealed arms, food, and equipment.

While the searches took place, Vietnamese and Americans provided the assembled villagers with a place to sleep, food, and entertainment, which consisted of concerts, and government-oriented motion pictures, plays, and skits. Whenever possible, Marines sent in medical and dental teams to treat minor illnesses or injuries and provide instruction and advice on health. By means of these activities, the allies hoped not only to win the allegiance of the villagers, but also to increase their support of the war effort and government-sponsored pacification programs.

Although successful in weeding out the infrastructure, by the end of the year, cordon and search operations were doomed. By their very nature, these operations produced refugees. "Call them what you want," noted Major John J. Guenther, III MAF's counterintelligence officer, "people are taken out of their homes and put into a CHIC. As far as the CORDS organization is concerned, they are in the refugee category. And the word from Saigon, both U.S. and GVN, is don't generate any more refugees."⁶

During the year, Marines, aided by territorial forces, continued their effort, termed "Golden Fleece," aimed at protecting the twice-yearly rice harvest from being seized. Before the April-May and September-October

harvest periods, each Marine regiment launched attacks into known enemy base and cache areas and placed patrols along infiltration routes into the rice-growing areas. During the harvest, the number of patrols and ambushes around rice paddies was likewise increased. Following the harvest, Marines assisted in guarding and transporting the rice to central storage facilities.

In March, elections were held for 128 village council and 717 hamlet chief positions throughout I Corps. Held on the four consecutive Sundays of the month, Marines cooperated with provincial and district authorities in protecting the polling places and voters from Viet Cong terrorism. While not actually guarding the polls, the Marines were deployed in the countryside to block likely enemy avenues of approach and to deny the enemy access to known mortar and rocket launching sites. Rapid reaction forces were maintained to reinforce hamlets or villages under attack. Marines

were instructed to avoid populated areas unless they were under enemy attack and refrain from any activity that might be taken as an American attempt to influence the elections.

Behind the screen provided by Marine and territorial forces, the March elections were completed and were unmarred by major enemy interference. By the 23d, the last polling day, 126 village and 713 hamlet elections had been conducted, with more than 85 percent of the eligible voters participating. Fall elections for representatives to the National Assembly also experienced little enemy interference.

In addition to ferreting out the Viet Cong in cordon and search operations, securing the rice harvests, and protecting local elections, Marine combat units assisted in resettlement. Go Noi Island, a previously fertile agricultural area, inhabited by nearly 27,000 Vietnamese before the war, by 1969 was a tunneled, cave-infested Viet Cong haven. Driven out by the Viet

MajGen Raymond G. Davis, center, and Dr. Tran Lu Y, left, South Vietnamese Minister for Health, Social Welfare, and Relief, lay the cornerstone for the 120-bed, 10-building 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital complex at Quang Tri on 9 April.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800546



Cong, floods, and numerous allied sweeps, most of the island's residents had joined the growing refugee population of Quang Nam Province. During Operation Pipestone Canyon, conducted between May and November, the 1st Marine Division, assisted by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment and 2d Korean Marine Brigade, swept the island again of its NVA and VC occupiers and cleared over 8,000 acres of underbrush and treelines, at the same time destroying the enemy's extensive network of tunnels and fortifications.⁷

During the operation, the division proposed a plan for resettling Go Noi Island once it had been cleared. The plan had obvious advantages. Not only would the repopulation of the area with pro-government civilians make future Communist infiltration more difficult, but the area could provide homes and livelihoods for thousands of refugees, ultimately contributing to the economic revival of Quang Nam Province. The appropriate corps and national agencies took interest, but it was not until the end of August 1970 that the first refugees were resettled in newly constructed villages. While this was the major effort during the latter half of the year, numerous other smaller resettlement projects were carried out with Marine assistance throughout both Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces.⁸

During 1969, III MAF continued to support and to benefit from the Kit Carson Scout Program. Initiated by Marines in 1966 with the hiring of six former Viet Cong guerrillas as combat scouts, the program proved to be such a success that MACV extended it to all U.S. commands in Vietnam. At the beginning of the year, III MAF employed 476 of the former enemy soldiers and by the end of the year the number had grown to 597, despite the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division.

Following extensive screening, training, and indoctrination, the scouts were placed with Marine units and given a number of tasks. Scouts guided Marine patrols, participated in propaganda broadcasts, led Marines to supply and equipment caches, pointed out mines and boobytraps, and assisted in the identification of members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.⁹ In addition, many conducted training for Marine infantrymen in the enemy's use of surprise firing devices and sapper tactics. During the year, Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units conducted over 13,700 patrols and were credited with killing 191 enemy, apprehending 539 prisoners, and capturing 195 weapons, in addition to detecting 518 explosive devices and 143 caves, tunnels, and caches.

Civic Action

When Marines first landed in I Corps Tactical Zone in March 1965, they spontaneously undertook to assist the people among whom they were fighting by providing food, relief supplies, and medical care. Acting from a variety of motives, they not only hoped to win the friendship of the Vietnamese who in turn would provide information about the Viet Cong, but generate popular support for their own activities and those of the South Vietnamese Government. As pacification programs were developed, civic action activities contributed to them by promoting economic and social improvement, thus assisting "the government of the Republic of Vietnam in stabilizing the political situation and building respect and loyalty of the people for the legally constituted authority."¹⁰

The III MAF Civic Action Program by 1969 had grown from initial spontaneous acts of charity into a large-scale effort, coordinated by G-5 and S-5 staffs and integrated with the government's pacification and development plans. The program emphasized the requirement that the people, with Marine assistance, help themselves. Villagers were to identify the need, whether it be a new school, well, bridge, or dispensary. Marines would then furnish the materials, tools, and equipment, drawn from their own resources, CORDS, or from private charities; the technical know-how; and some labor. Villagers in turn would supply most of the labor and additional construction material if available. However, Marines often found themselves more heavily committed to projects than was necessary, often to the detriment of South Vietnamese efforts to assist.

In addition to community-sponsored projects, III MAF units provided individual assistance to I Corps' inhabitants with special emphasis on the large refugee population. During 1969, through the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) and Dental Civic Action Program (DENTCAP), units, in coordination with province and district medical officials, furnished over one million medical and 35,000 dental treatments and administered 100,000 immunizations. Through Project Handclasp, they distributed large amounts of food, clothing, and other essential commodities. Also, monies made available through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund were used to purchase school and medical kits, rice, soap, and clothing through the relief agency CARE, and to support the General Walt Scholarship Fund which helped to finance the secondary and college education of selected

Vietnamese youth. Additional funds made available through a variety of other relief agencies purchased fertilizers, seeds, farm machinery, and improved strains of vegetables and livestock, enriching the economy at the village and hamlet level.¹¹

The most ambitious project begun in 1969 was the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital, built in Quang Tri City and dedicated to the memory of Marines and sailors who had lost their lives in Vietnam. The cornerstone of the 120-bed, 10-building complex was laid on 9 April and by the end of the year over \$135,000 of the projected cost of \$471,000 in materials had been collected. Originally, construction was to be accomplished by the 3d Engineer Battalion and the 128th Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, with Vietnamese assistance. But with redeployment of the 3d Marine Division before the hospital could be completed, remaining U.S. Army forces in Quang Tri Province assumed responsibility.

At the time construction of the permanent hospital began, a temporary facility at Dong Ha Combat Base was in operation. The 3d Medical Battalion furnished the physical plant, and, along with 19 Vietnamese nurses and 22 other civilians, undertook the task of providing the temporary hospital's medical support. By December, the complex had treated a total of 20,600 outpatients, with referrals coming from as far north as the Demilitarized Zone and as far south as Hue. When the 3d Marine Division redeployed the facility was moved to Quang Tri Combat Base and the Army's 18th Surgical Hospital, 67th Medical Group assumed the task of providing medical support.¹²

Under the administrative and operational control of Force Logistic Command, the Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital near Da Nang had grown from a small roadside dispensary into a fully equipped 120-bed pediatric facility by 1969. Built with thousands of hours of donated Marine labor and sustained by over \$300,000 in annual contributions by servicemen and concerned groups and individuals in the United States, the hospital treated hundreds of children, who would have otherwise died or become permanently incapacitated from a wide variety of the simplest of childhood accidents and illnesses.¹³

While assisting in major civic action projects, individual Marines and their units continued to help Vietnamese who lived within their TAORs or near their camps and bases. Marines participated in numerous minor construction projects and provided supplies and money for local schools, religious institutions, and

refugee centers. Typical of the efforts were those of Force Logistic Support Group-Bravo at Dong Ha, which in January began collecting and hauling scrap lumber and cement declared unusable for the rebuilding of approximately 200 homes and temples destroyed the year before. By May, 175 homes and two temples had been completely repaired. Marines not only shared excess material, but also their time. Three times a week, for example, members of Headquarters Battery, 12th Marines conducted English classes at the Buddhist High School, Semi-Public High School, and District Headquarters High School at Dong Ha.¹⁴

The effectiveness of the Marine civic action program, however, was questionable. The immediate effects were obvious: medical treatment cured illness and healed wounds; a new well provided water where there was none before; and discarded lumber built houses and schools. But the question of whether the program won support for the South Vietnamese Government and greater acceptance for the Marines among the local populace remained unanswered.

The Grass-Roots Campaign

The primary pacification mission of Marine combat units was to provide security for the local population. Much of their activity was directly or indirectly involved in keeping enemy military units from cities, villages, and hamlets, and assisting the government in eradicating the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Those Marines involved in the Combined Action Program had security at the village- and hamlet-level and the suppression of local guerrillas as their exclusive mission.

The Combined Action Program originated with the Marines in 1965 when III MAF, in attempting to secure the heavily populated area around the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield, discovered a "ready-made ally" in the surrounding hamlets—the part-time soldiers of the Popular Forces, the lowest echelon of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Minimally trained, armed, and paid, and commanded at the district-level, they could do little towards the basic mission of providing hamlet- and village-level security. From the beginning, Marines on patrol had taken members of the Popular Forces along as guides and interpreters, but with proper support and training, it was thought they could relieve regular Marines of the local defensive mission and assist in weeding out the enemy.¹⁵ From this ad hoc effort in 1965, the Combined Action Program was to grow from seven platoons in January 1966, to 57 a year later, and to over 100 platoons deployed throughout I Corps in late 1968.



Abel Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center

Col Edward F. Danowitz, left, head of the Combined Action Program, interviews a volunteer. All CAP members were volunteers, but not all were accepted into the program.

To work with the Popular Forces, III MAF created the combined action platoon (CAP), consisting of a 15-man Marine rifle squad composed of a squad leader, M79 grenadier, Navy corpsman, and three fire teams of four men each. Together with a Popular Force platoon of approximately 35 men, the combined unit defended one village or group of hamlets. Each element of the team complemented the other. Marines provided advice, training, encouragement, and access to American medical evacuation and fire support. The Popular Forces, being local residents, provided knowledge of the area, rapport with the people, information about the enemy, and "the motivation that was inherent in the defense of one's home."¹⁶

Unlike conventional American and ARVN combat forces which swept through a village and then moved on, the Combined Action Platoons remained to protect the villagers from Viet Cong terrorism. As the Marines increasingly won the confidence of the people with whom they lived and worked, the platoons not only became a major source of allied intelligence, but a screen behind which the government could reestablish its authority and undertake social and economic

improvements. As the platoons' successes grew so did the number of platoons, and by 1969 the program had been extended to all five provinces within I Corps. To administer and coordinate the activities of the platoons, III MAF subsequently created combined action companies and then combined action groups (CAGs).

At the beginning of 1969, four combined action groups were in operation: the 1st, under Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Hunter, headquartered at Chu Lai, controlled 4 companies and 26 platoons scattered throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces; the 2d, the largest, was composed of 8 companies and 36 platoons under Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Lewis, Jr., and worked out of Hoi An in Quang Nam Province; the 3d, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Whitesell, controlled 5 companies and 31 platoons in Thua Thien Province; and the 4th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Greenwood, was composed of 3 companies and 18 platoons operating in Quang Tri Province. Attached to each group was a mobile training team which assisted in the training of the Popular Force Platoons. The teams' function was taken over during the year by the Army's Mobile Advisory

Teams.¹⁷ Over 1,600 Marines and 128 Navy corpsmen composed the four Combined Action Groups; these Americans worked with about 3,100 Popular Force soldiers. By year's end, the program achieved its authorized strength of 20 companies and 114 platoons.

III MAF exercised control of the four groups through the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, Colonel Edward F. Danowitz and his successors, Colonel Charles R. Burroughs and Colonel Theodore E. Metzger. Lieutenant General Nickerson, in consultation with General Lam, the I Corps commander, passed on every change in deployment of a Marine squad assigned to the program. To improve coordination and administration of the growing program, Nickerson late in 1969 recommended the establishment of a Combined Action Force (CAF), with its own headquarters under III MAF, as the groups, General Nickerson noted, were essentially "battalions."¹⁸ The proposal was approved and instituted in early January 1970.

In the field, the combined action platoons operated under a complex chain of command. The Marines assigned to squads were commanded by the assistant chief of staff for the program through the groups and companies, while the Popular Forces were responsible, in theory, to their village chief, but in practice took orders from their district chief and through him from the province chief and corps commander. Generally, each combined action group headquarters was collocated at the province headquarters and provided administrative support for the companies under it, in addition to training both Marines and Popular Forces and assigning areas of operation in consultation with province chiefs and regular unit commanders. Combined action company headquarters, located with district headquarters, maneuvered the platoons in consultation with the district chief and his U.S. Army advisor, arranged for artillery and air support, evacuation of casualties, and reinforcement for platoons under its control.

The area of operation assigned to each platoon, normally a single village or group of hamlets, was mutually agreed to by the province chief, the group commander, and the commander of the regular infantry battalion operating in the area. The village or hamlets, once assigned to the platoon, became the exclusive territory of that platoon and non-CAP units were prohibited from entering the area without the permission of the district chief and combined action company commander. Within each platoon's area, the Marine squad leader and the Popular Force sergeant,

neither of whom had command over the other, directed the daily operations of the platoon by consultation and agreement. The effectiveness of this system of dual command depended entirely upon the trust and respect which existed between the Marine and Popular Force leader.

Initially, Marines who joined the Combined Action Program were volunteers obtained from the two divisions. This proved to be a problem as Colonel Charles R. Burroughs noted: "we would get the man after maybe six months in-country. First thing would be R&R, then we would send him to school. We lost about a month, which left five months with the CAPs."¹⁹ By 1969, a majority of combined action Marines were obtained directly from the United States, the remaining volunteers, those who requested transfer to the CAPs, came from other III MAF Marine units. Once personally screened to ensure adaptability to the program, the selected Marines attended the two-week Combined Action Program School at Da Nang where they received refresher training in basic infantry weapons, small unit tactics, first aid, map and compass reading, the basic techniques for requesting and controlling artillery, air strikes, and medical evacuation flights, and language. Upon graduation, the students were given a language examination and those who exhibited an aptitude for language returned to Da Nang after two to four months in the field with a platoon to receive intensive Vietnamese language instruction at the program's language school. Most training, however, was of the "on-the-job" variety: "the CAP Marine conceives of himself as a combat Marine, and therefore his classroom is the 'bush' where the VC provide the necessary training aids."²⁰

Throughout 1969, the CAPs continued to perform the six basic missions assigned them: destroy the Viet Cong hamlet-village infrastructure; provide public security and help maintain law and order; protect the local governing structure; guard facilities and important lines of communications within the village and hamlet; organize local intelligence nets; and participate in civic action and psychological operations against the Viet Cong. The Marine element of the CAP had additional missions assigned: conduct training in general military subjects and leadership for Popular Forces assigned to the platoon; motivate, instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the Popular Force soldier; conduct combined day and night patrols and ambushes; conduct combined operations with other allied forces; and ensure that information

gathered was made available to nearby allied forces. Marines were to prepare the Popular Force element to assume effectively the platoon's mission upon the Marine squad's relocation to a new village where government authority was contested and where the local PF were ineffective in dealing with the enemy. "Thus, CAP Marines are engaged in a process of perpetually working themselves out of a job, a procedure which exemplifies the concept of Vietnamization."²¹

Combined action platoons accomplished their security mission by continually deploying day and night patrols and setting ambushes in and around their assigned villages. When not on patrol, the CAPs, initially, tended to be tied to fortified compounds, one of which Corporal Michael E. Gordy, platoon leader with the 4th CAG, described:

When we first moved out here, we cleared all the trees and started laying wire. The wire around here consists of a continuous belt, this belt consists of one row of triple-strength concertina, then one row of tangle-foot, then another row of triple-strength concertina, another row of tangle-foot, another row of triple-strength concertina, another row of tangle-foot, and then a double-apron fence, and that is all the way around this compound. Now interlaced in all this wire are about 150 tripflares and there are about 40 claymores around this position . . . We have an

81 mortar here. We have a 60 mortar. We have one M60 machine gun. In the compound at all times there is at least one M79, and of course the Marines and PFs are all equipped with M16s . . . We are not really sweating getting overrun that much because we feel that we have a pretty tight compound here and we think our defenses are such that we could hold off probably anything up to a company until we could get some tanks here.²²

These compounds, Marines found, not only offered the enemy lucrative targets, but weakened the security screen around the village by tying many of the platoons down to defending a fixed position.

By mid-1969, a majority of the platoons had abandoned the defensive role of the past and adopted the "Mobile CAP" concept of operations. Establishing no position more permanent than a command post at a specific location during any 12-hour period, platoons were to patrol and ambush continually among their assigned villages and hamlets without using the same routes, trails, or setting a pattern of operations. All villages and hamlets were to be checked at least once every 24 hours.²³ By doing so, they would make it impossible for the Viet Cong to feel safe anywhere in or near the protected hamlets. This tactic not only allowed the platoons to screen a larger area more effec-

Capt John D. Niotis, Commanding Officer of Combined Action Company 2-5, discusses the placement of platoons in Hoa Vang District with District Chief, Maj Mai Xuan Hau.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192928



tively with the same number of men, but it kept the enemy uncertain as to the platoons' whereabouts and thus less likely to enter the protected hamlets.²⁴

While security patrols and ambushes occupied a majority of their time, CAP units also participated in other types of operations and activities. They often worked with U.S., ARVN, and territorial forces in cordon and searches or helped in offensive sweeps of the villages and hamlets under their care. During Operation Bold Mariner, for example, platoons of the 1st CAG assisted Army and Marine units in sweeping the enemy-infested Batangan Peninsula. In addition to training Popular Forces so as to promote greater self-sufficiency, combined action units also provided allied forces with a substantial amount of local intelligence on such subjects as the location of heavily-used enemy trails, identity of Viet Cong Infrastructure members, and the sites of emplaced mines and boobytraps.

Away from combat and training, CAP Marines spent much of their time helping the villagers improve their daily lives. The attached Navy corpsmen held periodic sick calls where the people gathered for the treatment of minor injuries and illnesses. The corpsmen also taught personal hygiene and trained volunteers in basic first aid for service in the local dispensary. CAP riflemen distributed food, clothing, building materials, and school supplies, as well as assisted the villagers in self-help projects, as one Marine sergeant and CAP squad leader noted:

They already had the dispensary set up, we just supplied them with necessary items. We built them two new bridges. The old bridges were rotted. The two good ones they had, someone blew them up . . . So we built them new bridges so they could bring their buffalo carts across, bring their goods to the market for sale. We built, I don't know how many, buffalo pens. We got bags of cement for them, and everything, lumber, and for the church, we got them all new desks for the classrooms.²⁵

Throughout 1969, the Combined Action Program continued to achieve success in its primary mission of improving local security, but the program did experience a number of problems. Disputes often arose between regular infantry units and the platoons over the requirement that line units obtain both CAP and district approval before entering the CAP area of operations. In an effort to ameliorate the situation, both formal and informal arrangements were made among the local commanders to ensure greater cooperation and coordination. At the platoon-level, difficulties remained. Of major concern was the reluctance on the

part of the Popular Forces to adopt the mobile concept, preferring instead to remain in compounds or other fixed installations. This lack of mobility was a direct consequence of village pressure to keep Popular Forces as close to the village as possible in order to afford maximum personal security for the village and its officials.

Although disagreements sometimes arose that brought Marines and Popular Forces close to blows, working and social relationships were for the most part harmonious, as one platoon leader reported:

Whatever we ate, we let them eat. Like if we got a chow supply, they'd eat right along with us. We never separated them like a lot of the CAPs I've seen. They'd tell the Fox-trots [PFs], time for chow and they'd take off for the ville . . . and eat. Well, we all ate together here, or if we wanted to go in the ville some place, one of the mama-sans, we had several of them, we had three of them we called mother, just like American mothers, and they cooked us chow and stuff . . . and we'd all eat together and play games . . . Just a close relationship, working with them and treating them like you're treated and it helped them understand, well he's treating us just like them, there's no difference.²⁶

In spite of problems, Marines and others alike, remained convinced of the success of the Combined Action Program. Among the program's ardent supporters was Mr. Alexander Firfer, I Corps Deputy for CORDS, who noted:

Unless you had the Vietnamese governing themselves, feeling responsible for what is going on, and feeling they really had a share in decisions, instead of being told by the province chief or by the zone commander what they were going to do, it was obvious you could not get the support of the people and without the support of the people you could not beat the enemy. Within this kind of context, the CAPs played a very important role. For one thing, they were stationed out there with the people, near their villages or in their villages, helping defend those villages. Thus, in addition to the local Vietnamese military, in whom perhaps the villagers did not have great confidence, you had a group of U.S. soldiers, Marines, whom the villagers trusted and depended on. And the Marines were trained in such a way that they did more than just participate in village defense, they made friends with the people and sought ways to help them, in what I suppose you would call a "civic action way." This involved health, this involved just plain loving care, this involved small technical assistance, this involved the provision of certain commodities that the village didn't have, and this involved an organization which allowed them to call up the headquarters and say, "look my village needs so and so, please get it for me." Now with that kind of an interrelationship, the CAPs were a way of stimulating the Vietnamese hamlet residents to do something about their own defense.²⁷

"You are," he continued, "fish in the sea and the sea is the population . . . If you want the people with



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800440

Cpl Walter Rebacz and his scout dog, King, lead a CAP patrol composed of Marines and local Popular Forces out from a protected village three kilometers south of Tam Ky.

you, you had better be in touch with the people and find some way to reflect their needs, their concerns, and some how get their involvement . . . This was the approach taken by the Marines.”²⁸

Operationally, 1969 was an active year for the program. Aided by the increase in size and a mobile posture, combined action platoons conducted in excess of 145,000 combat patrols and ambushes, 73 percent of which were conducted at night. Although these

operations were nearly double the number executed the previous year, the overall enemy toll, 1,938 killed, 425 taken prisoner, and 932 weapons captured, was lower, reflecting the enemy's inability to penetrate, or desire to avoid, platoon-protected villages and hamlets.

Capitalizing on the success and effectiveness of the Combined Action Program, General Nickerson, in October, initiated the Infantry Company Intensive Pacifi-

cation Program (ICIPP). Realizing that the Marines were about to be phased out, he felt that the concept of the combined action platoon should be continued, and thus he convinced the Army, which was to succeed the Marines in I Corps, to accept a similar program.²⁹ Employing the basic principles of the CAP, infantry companies, and eventually battalions, were to be assigned the primary mission of pacification; squads were to be combined with Regional or Popular Force platoons and deployed to target hamlets, selected by the province chief in close coordination with the local brigade or regimental commander. The ICIPP, however, differed from the Combined Action Program in two respects. Unlike CAP Marines, ICIPP Marines and Army infantrymen were not formally selected nor trained; they remained as members of a rifle company which had been given a special mission. In addition, the ICIPP companies remained under the operational control of its parent unit and were for the most part deployed within the regiment's or brigade's area of operations.

On 3 October, the Americal Division began ICIPP operations in Quang Ngai Province, deploying Company D, 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry in three contested Son Tinh District hamlets. Then, on 15 October, Company A, 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry was inserted into two Son Tinh hamlets, one contested and one under Viet Cong control. Initially, platoons rather than squads were deployed with encouraging results.

Participation by the 1st Marine Division began in late November with the deployment of squads from Company M, 1st Marines to three contested hamlets near Hill 55. Five additional hamlets were added in early December. Following its first complete month of ICIPP operations, the security efforts of Company M had raised the four VC-controlled and four contested hamlets to the status of five relatively secure and three contested. As the year ended, the 7th Marines selected nine hamlets for operations beginning in mid-January, and the 5th Marines started ICIPP training and initiated the selection of target hamlets in coordination with district and provincial officials.³⁰

Results

Throughout South Vietnam, progress in pacification during 1969 was dramatic. Unhindered by a massive *Tet* Offensive, as in 1968, which temporarily sidetracked pacification efforts, the government made substantial gains in the reestablishment of governmental and economic structures as well as in the return of stable living conditions for both urban and rural inhabitants.

Under the three separate, but interrelated, country-wide pacification and development programs, I Corps made steady progress during 1969 in achieving most of these programs' goals. This success was largely attributable to the efforts of the government working hand-in-hand with III MAF to produce a comprehensive effort involving even the most remote communities and the lowest military echelons.

Although the overall population security posture of I Corps increased during the year from 69.3 percent to 93.6, exceeding the assigned 90 percent level, each province achieved varying degrees of security. With the shift of enemy interest in late 1968 from northern I Corps to the three southernmost provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien reached the highest levels. Thua Thien, the first province to indicate 100 percent of its population free from Viet Cong and NVA domination, reached this plateau at the end of June, with Quang Tri following suit three months later; however, about 9,000 persons in Thua Thien returned to Viet Cong control during December. Despite being subjected to increased enemy efforts to disrupt the various pacification programs, the three southern provinces made dramatic increases in population security. Although Quang Tin exhibited the largest increase, 57.2 to 86.7 percent, its year-end security-level rating remained the lowest of the provinces within the tactical zone. Quang Nam advanced from 62 to 92 percent, and Quang Ngai moved from 63 to 91 percent. Of a total population of 2,998,200 in I Corps, 2,805,900 inhabitants were considered secure at year-end.

The concerted drive to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure was also successful. By the end of December, 5,363 members of the infrastructure, 82 percent of whom came from the three southern provinces, had been killed, captured, or had rallied, exceeding the set goal of 4,800 by more than 500. As a result of the heavy losses, NVA troops began to assume a more prominent role at the local level in an effort to create a stronger, viable organization. "This was considered by many," noted Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, Commanding Officer of the Combined Action Force, "to be an act of desperation. At the local level, it was a development productive of much resentment by the old time VC who had survived, but who were now being told what to do by aggressive, overbearing NVA regulars who were neither familiar with local problems nor with the terrain, the people, and the opposing forces."³¹ Although the network had been weakened by neutralizations, the Viet Cong and NVA had

replaced many of those lost during the year, leaving an estimated strength of some 19,000. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan prescribed an even more ambitious campaign to ferret out and destroy this enemy faction.

The 1969 Chieu Hoi campaign was the highlight of the year, as an unprecedented 5,996 Hoi Chanh rallied to the government in I Corps, a dramatic increase over the 3,600 expected. Two distinct trends were reversed during the year. First, the two northernmost provinces yielded less than 10 percent of the year's total, whereas during the previous year, better than 50 percent had come from Quang Tri and Thua Thien. This reversal was caused primarily by the enemy's shift of emphasis from the northern to the southern provinces, where his soldiers and nonmilitary supporters, demoralized by personnel losses and lack of support, rallied in large numbers. The second reversal was seen in the type of defector, as more nonmilitary supporters than armed combatants switched sides, bringing with them fewer weapons when they surrendered.

Although the goal of completely reestablishing popularly elected governments at the local level was not met during the year, 91 percent of I Corps' vil-

lages and 99 percent of its hamlets could boast of having elected representatives; the remainder were government-appointed officials. While the specific goal was not met, two important things did occur. First, 85 percent of the population voted, indicating the elections "meant for them something about local control, something about their involvement and their rights." Secondly, younger, more dynamic individuals replaced approximately one third of the older politicians. Thus, the elections saw participation, real campaigning, new faces, and new blood.³² The goal of resettling and restoring to self-sufficiency all but 55,000 refugees by the end of the year, was likewise not met, although the refugee population was reduced from 619,000 to 169,000.

The effort to develop a local self-defense system showed dynamic growth in the number of citizens organized, trained, and armed during 1969. The People's Self-Defense Forces at the end of the year encompassed 548,190 members, 287,000 of whom were trained and 81,000 armed, fulfilling the stated goal in each category. Advances were also made in rejuvenating the rural economy, such as on Go Noi Island and in Leatherneck Square, but there were setbacks. Among them was the attempt to reclaim land around Phu Loc,

As part of the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, a Marine instructs a member of the Popular Forces in the care and cleaning of the infantryman's M16 rifle.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A372497



south of Hue, and place it back into agricultural production. "There was a simple problem," the III MAF Deputy for CORDS noted, "there were land mines, there were bombs, and what was needed were some Rome Plows to just go over the field and try to explode or pull out any remaining explosives. Well, I never succeeded in convincing anyone to respond to what was proposed Putting the land back into production was giving the villagers a stake in the South Vietnamese Government."³³ In the area of psychological operations, III MAF, ARVN, and South Vietnamese Government agencies joined together in continuously providing the civilian population with

information concerning government plans and policies, while degrading enemy morale through exploitation of his losses and inevitable defeat.

After five years of American involvement, the allies had erected a strong defensive screen, behind which pacification and development had taken root. Security operations had reduced Communist control of the villages and hamlets and with it the enemy's ability to draw popular support and disrupt nation-building efforts. The South Vietnamese at all levels had begun to establish elected governments and stable economies. Yet for the Marines, Army, and South Vietnamese in I Corps, much remained to be accomplished.

Special Landing Force Operations

The Strategic Reserve—Organization and Operations—The Fleet's Contingency Force

The Strategic Reserve

The United States Seventh Fleet's amphibious arm, Amphibious Task Force 76, composed of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Special Landing Force (SLF), was established by the Commander in Chief, Pacific in July 1960 as a balanced mobile contingency force to meet strategic reserve requirements throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. From the beginning of the major United States commitment in Vietnam, the fleet's Amphibious Ready Group and its embarked Special Landing Force either augmented forces already ashore or conducted amphibious raids along the entire coast of South Vietnam, fronting the South China Sea. Since 1967, when a second force was established, their deployments, as arranged through mutual coordination between the Commander, Seventh Fleet and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and as made available by CinCPac through Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, provided for separate and alternating employments of the two forces. However, due to the heightened level of conflict in South Vietnam, notably in I Corps Tactical Zone beginning in the summer of 1967, III MAF often employed the two SLFs concurrently for operations within the zone.


By mid-1968, the Special Landing Forces were being committed ashore more often and stayed longer than originally envisioned, resulting not only in a deterioration of the fleet's strategic reserve capability, but in the Marine Corps' amphibious character in the region. Both Task Group 79 and the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, which directly controlled the two Marine landing forces, were "under constant and conflicting pressures concerning the employment of its combat assets," according to brigade Chief of Staff, Colonel John Lowman, Jr., "each completely justifiable from the viewpoint of the commander involved." The commonly-held view at III MAF was that "any combat Marine not ashore and fighting was not being properly utilized. Hence, the periods of OpCon ashore grew longer and longer." With the SLFs constantly ashore, the Seventh Fleet's amphibious reserve was thus unavailable to meet a sudden crisis elsewhere, and there-

fore "it was hard for the Navy to justify the expense of keeping under-utilized amphibious shipping hanging off the Vietnamese coast." Charged with the responsibility for operations throughout South Vietnam, constant demands were made on MACV for the use of the SLFs in areas other than I Corps, especially in the coastal region south of Saigon. "This viewpoint," noted Colonel Lowman, "had some measure of support from Seventh Fleet staff and none at all from III MAF. In fact, the easiest way to get thrown out of the III MAF compound was to even mention the subject."¹

"The operations of the SLFs, for a long while, we were quite perturbed about," noted Colonel Clyde W. Hunter, G-3, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, "primarily because we thought they were being misused; that the divisions were using the SLFs improperly, actually ginning up operations just to get them ashore and then tie them down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, that had no connection to their mission as an SLF."² Although shore demands on the two landing forces diminished somewhat following *Tet* and the allied response, both forces by the beginning of 1969 had not yet fully resumed their role as forces afloat, ready to respond to any contingency throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility.

Some critics, both in and out of South Vietnam, continued to express the opinion that amphibious operations were a waste of time and that the Special Landing Forces should be left ashore permanently. Others saw it differently. "This is the name of the game," observed one special landing force commander, "there should be more of it. Let's face it, we are amphibious in nature, and there are only two little small units in the Marine Corps today that are active in a truly amphibious role."³ Frustrations were evident as another remarked:

The tenor [of operations] seems to be to go through your amphibious assault phases and as soon as you get yourself established on the beach you are chopped OPCON to the unit commander ashore, which is a pretty frustrating business As an SLF commander, you are somewhat of a minister without portfolio; you spend most of your time in III MAF trying to get some targeting for yourself and trying to get your troops out on board ship for necessary training and rehab[ilitation]. You play the role, so-to-speak, to get



in the show yourself with your SLF, the entire SLF This SLF business is the last grasp we have on amphibious business . . . it has to be pushed. You have to target it properly and employ these BLTs in the amphibious role.⁴

The failure of some observers to realize that the United States had other commitments and responsibilities in the region, and that the two Marine landing forces could not be dedicated solely to the war in South Vietnam would be corrected in 1969.

Organization and Operations

A part of the Pacific Command reserve, the Special Landing Forces were "balanced, self-sustaining fighting units," each consisting of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM). The battalion landing team was task-

organized and thus had no standard composition or size; it could vary in the number of personnel from a minimum of 1,060 to a maximum of 1,937. Typically, the team was composed of an infantry battalion with attached combat support units, ranging from artillery to reconnaissance and shore party detachments. The helicopter component was a twenty-four CH-34D, or CH-46A-equipped squadron. Also included were separate billets for the force commander and staff.

The two landing forces, Alpha and Bravo (Navy designated Task Groups 79.4 and 79.5) were under the command of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, headquartered on Okinawa. While at sea, they were under the control of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Seventh Fleet. When in Vietnam they were

STRENGTH, ARMS, AND EQUIPMENT OF A TYPICAL SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

UNITS EMBARKED*	STRENGTH				EQUIPMENT
	USMC		USN		
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
SLF Headquarters Detachment	10	46	0	0	68 M60 Machine Gun 28 M20 3.5 Rocket Launcher 16 M2 Machine Gun
BLT 2/26					12 M10 60mm Mortar
2d Bn, 26th Mar	37	1,160	3	61	8 M20 81mm Mortar
Mortar Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Mar	3	64	0	2	8 M40 106mm Recoilless Rifle
Battery B, 1st Bn, 13th Mar	10	99	0	2	6 M30 107mm Mortar
Platoon, Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn	1	37	0	0	6 M101A 105 Howitzer
Platoon, Co A, 5th Antitank Bn	1	21	0	0	5 M48 90mm Tank
Platoon, Co A, 5th Tank Bn	1	28	0	0	5 M50 Ontos
Platoon, Co A, 5th Recon Bn	1	21	0	0	2 M2 Flame Thrower
Platoon, Co A, 5th Engineer Bn	1	38	0	1	
Platoon, Co C, 5th Motor Transport Bn	1	31	0	0	
Platoon, Co A, 5th Shore Party Bn	1	45	0	1	36 M35 2½ Cargo Truck
Clear Platoon, Co D, 5th Medical Bn	0	5	3	20	10 LVTP-5
Det, Hq Bn, 5th MarDiv	1	8	0	0	1 LVTP-6
Det, Hq Co, 26th Mar	0	6	0	0	9 M422 1/4T Mite
Det, Communication Supt Co, 9th MAB	0	0	0	0	8 M274 1/2T Mule
Det, 15th Dental Co	0	0	1	1	5 M37 3/4T Cargo Truck 2 M49 Tank Truck
HMM-362	55	205	1	3	2 M-54 Cargo Truck 1 M38 1/2T Utility Truck 1 M170 Ambulance
(Aircraft: 24 UH-34D)					
Totals	123	1,814	8	92	

*SLF Alpha, January 1969

under the operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force or its subordinate units. Prior to 1969, any reinforced infantry battalion within III MAF was liable for assignment to the Special Landing Force for a six-month tour, but under the brigade leadership of Brigadier General John E. Williams in late 1968, and with the concurrence of FMFPac and III MAF, Regimental Landing Team 26 (26th Marines, with appropriate 5th Marine Division supporting units) was reconstituted, and from it the two forces drew their battalion landing teams throughout most of 1969. Like the infantry component, any medium helicopter squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing could be assigned to the SLF, but as a result of General William's reorganization, two squadrons, HMM-164 and HMM-362,

replaced in May by HMM-265, were permanently tasked to the 9th MAB for duty with the Marine landing force.⁵

When not ashore, the two SLFs were embarked on board ships of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Groups, Alpha (Task Group 76.4) and Bravo (Task Group 76.5). Each fleet amphibious ready group consisted of an amphibious assault ship (LPH), dock landing ship (LSD), and a tank landing ship (LST). Additional ships were employed with the ARG as the situation dictated: the AP, a high-speed transport used to carry underwater demolition teams and Marine reconnaissance units, and either the amphibious transport dock (LPD), the attack transport ship (APA), or the attack cargo ship (AKA)—all employed in trans-

porting additional supplies, troops, and landing craft.⁶

The year began with both Special Landing Forces, Alpha and Bravo, ashore. On 5 January, following the completion of Valiant Hunt, a search and clear operation begun in mid-December on Barrier Island, south of Hoi An, SLF Alpha (BLT 2/26 and HMM-362) under the command of Colonel John F. McMahon, Jr., was reembarked on board the *Okinawa* (LPH 3) and other ships of the ready group. Simultaneously, Colonel Robert R. Wilson's SLF Bravo, BLT 3/26 and HMM-164, which had replaced BLT 2/7 and HMM-165, boarded the *Tripoli* (LPH 10), *Ogden* (LPD 5), *Monticello* (LSD 35), and *Seminole* (AKA 104).

Within a week of terminating Valiant Hunt, both Special Landing Forces assembled off Quang Ngai Province in preparation for launching Operation Bold Mariner, slated to be the largest amphibious operation carried out since the Korean War. Under the command of Brigadier General Williams, in his dual role as Commanding General, 9th MAB and Commander,

Task Group 79, the brigade-size Marine landing force was to join with elements of the Americal Division in an assault on the Batangan Peninsula, 18 kilometers south of Chu Lai, in an effort to destroy the enemy stronghold and reestablish South Vietnamese control.* Encompassing approximately 48 square kilometers of flat fertile lowlands and rolling hills, the peninsula harbored elements of the *38th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment*, *48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion*, *P-31st Local Force Company*, and the *C-95th Sapper Company*. From their well-entrenched positions on the peninsula, the enemy units not only supported local village and hamlet infrastructures, but posed a continual threat to Quang Ngai City to the southwest.

The operation began on 12 January with an amphibious demonstration off Mo Duc, 40 kilometers

*The Batangan Peninsula was the site of Operation Piranha conducted by the 7th Marines in 1965 before being included in the 2d Korean Marine Brigade's TAOR in 1966, and later the Americal Division's area of responsibility.

VAdm William F. Bringle, right, Commander, Seventh Fleet, is introduced to Col Robert R. Wilson, commanding SLF Bravo on board the Tripoli. Observing the introduction is BGen John E. Williams, center, Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192555

The 26th Marines come ashore on the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province, initiating Bold Mariner, a joint operation with troops of the Army's Americal Division.

south of Chu Lai, in order to mask the intended operational area. At 0700 the following morning, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks' BLT 2/26 and Lieutenant Colonel J.W.P. Robertson's BLT 3/26 assaulted the northern portion of the peninsula by air and landing craft, as the Americal Division's Task Force Cooksey, composed of elements of 46th Infantry and 1st Cavalry, began a companion operation, Russell Beach, to seal off the area's southern boundary. Once ashore, the battalion landing teams pushed south and east, linking up with elements of the Army task force moving to the northeast. Within seven hours, the combined force, supported by organic artillery and guns of the battleship *New Jersey* offshore, began sweeping eastward, forcing the enemy toward the sea where avenues of escape were blocked by Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats, supported by other ships of the fleet.

Resistance was negligible as Marine, Army, and 2d ARVN Division units tightened the cordon around the peninsula. There were clashes over the next several days, consisting of brief exchanges with furtive groups of enemy or individuals attempting to flee under cover of darkness. Among the obstacles encountered were extensive networks of mines and boobytraps scattered throughout the area and an equally extensive complex of enemy earthworks, each of which had to be searched and then destroyed. In the course of clearing the mazes of tunnels, connecting trenches, caves, and shelters, numerous supply caches and training facilities were uncovered. During one such search on 19

January, Company F, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines captured 102 Vietnamese, 56 of whom were males of military age. Later interrogation revealed that they were members of the *C-95th Sapper Company* and represented the largest single enemy unit captured virtually intact up to that time.

Moving steadily eastward, the combined force encountered an ever-increasing number of civilians who eventually were evacuated to the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center, north of Quang Ngai City, where they were given food, shelter, and medical treatment, as necessary. There, U.S. forces, assisted by a platoon of National Police Field Forces, a Regional Force platoon, and three Armed Propaganda Teams, screened the detainees to determine possible affiliation with the Viet Cong. In all, the center processed more than 11,900 civilians during the month-long operation.

On 24 January, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines completed participation in the operation and returned to its amphibious shipping offshore for rehabilitation. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' landing team again moved ashore, joining the 7th Marines in Operation Linn River, north of Liberty Bridge. On 7 February, operational control of the landing team was passed to the 5th Marines and for the next five days Sparks' battalion participated in Operation Taylor Common within the same operational area until back-loaded on board ships of the ready group for another period of training and repair.

With the withdrawal of BLT 2/26 from the Batan-



Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)

Infantrymen of the 26th Marines force a suspected Viet Cong guerrilla from his hiding place in one of the many tunnel networks that lay beneath the enemy-infested peninsula.

gan Peninsula, operational control of Lieutenant Colonel Robertson's battalion shifted from Task Force 79 to III MAF. Working in close coordination with Army Task Force Cooksey, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines continued searching the peninsula. During the last days of the operation, the battalion observed large groups of enemy troops attempting to escape the ever-shrinking cordon. Employing air and artillery, the battalion engaged the enemy, who did not return fire although outnumbering Robertson's Marines on several occasions. On 7 February, the battalion began its withdrawal, leaving elements of the Americal Division to complete the task of searching the operational area.

Three days after completing Bold Mariner, Marines of BLT 3/26 entered Operation Taylor Common by way of a vertical envelopment, codenamed Defiant Measure. In order to allow the prepositioning of other Marine units prior to *Tet*, Robertson's battalion initially assumed responsibility for 100 kilometers of the Arizona Territory, but as the operation progressed, individual companies moved out of the operational area in search of enemy troops. On 20 March, the battalion landing team was replaced by the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and helilifted to An Hoa Combat Base for the period of rehabilitation. Three days later, operational control of the battalion, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Snelling, who had replaced Robertson on the 3d, was passed to the 7th Marines and on the 31st, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, along with units of Colonel Robert L. Nichols' regiment and the 51st ARVN Regiment, assaulted landing zones on Charlie Ridge and in Happy Valley, initiating operation Oklahoma Hills.*

After a week of training with its amphibious ready group, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines returned to Vietnamese waters as III MAF's mobile reserve force, liable to be committed during *Tet*. With the buildup of substantial enemy forces west of Da Nang, the battalion landing team, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George M. Edmondson, Jr., began Operation Eager Pursuit I on 1 March by way of an amphibious landing and helicopter assault into operational areas of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines and 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, northwest of Da Nang. The 10-day amphibious operation was followed by Eager Pursuit II, which continued until 27 March. Under the immediate control of the 5th Marines, Edmondson's battal-


ion, supported by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment, swept east from Liberty Bridge, across Go Noi Island and then back west, encountering a large number of minefields and boobytraps, but only limited resistance. Following a day of rehabilitation on board ship, the battalion again moved ashore on the 28th, assuming responsibility for the combined and modified operational areas of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines, west of Da Nang. Once firmly established in its new area, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines was replaced on 1 April by Lieutenant Colonel George C. Kliefoth's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines as SLF Alpha's battalion landing team.

April activities of the two landing teams were routine as both were in support of operations ashore: BLT 3/26 engaged in Operation Oklahoma Hills in the mountains west of Da Nang and BLT 1/26, in search operations near the villages of Kim Lien and Quang Nam, straddling Route 1 north of Da Nang. Both helicopter squadrons, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Trundy's HMM-164 and Lieutenant Colonel Jack E. Schlarp's HMM-362, when not training on board ship, were rotated alternately ashore to Phu Bai Airfield, where they were placed under the control of Marine Aircraft Group 36 in support of the 3d Marine Division.

In May, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines completed Oklahoma Hills and returned to Amphibious Ready Group Bravo for a period of rehabilitation and training on the 4th. Serving as amphibious reserve for III MAF, the BLT twice demonstrated its measure of readiness by being fully prepared to land all units within 24-hours notice and failing to do so only because of last moment cancellation of the operations. The first was to be directed against Hour Glass Island in Quang Ngai Province and the second in an area south of the Cua Viet River, west of Wunder Beach in Quang Tri. Despite preparations, both operations were cancelled within 15 hours of landing by III MAF.

Snelling's Marines remained on board ship until 10 June when they moved ashore in preparation for the relief in place of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, which in turn began embarking on board ships of the ready group. On the 12th, Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Marines departed Vietnam, bound for Okinawa, marking the first time since April 1967 that a battalion landing team's rehabilitation and training cycle would take place on the island. The tempo of the war had until then precluded the movement of BLTs to Okinawa, the most desirable location for refurbishing due to the presence of the 3d Force Service Regiment.

*For a detailed account of BLT 3/26's participation in Operations Taylor Common and Oklahoma Hills, see Chapters 5 and 6.



See Reference Map, Sections 18-63

The June deployment of BLT 2/26 marked the first out-of-country rehabilitation since BLT 2/7 was refurbished at Subic Bay in June 1968. During the intervening period, three battalion landing teams were refurbished at Da Nang: 2/26 in August 1968; 3/26 in January 1969; and 1/26 in April 1969. While the Subic Bay and in-country rehabilitations were accomplished successfully, problems such as crowded port and maintenance facilities, lack of suitable training areas, and long supply lines combined to render the refurbishment less effective than under the original concept calling for deployment to Okinawa.

Following tested methods, a team from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa conducted limited inspections of the battalion's organic equipment prior to embarkation, thereby allowing sufficient lead-time for the requisitioning of repair parts and other supplies. Upon arrival, the BLT had use of all 9th MAB repair facilities, in addition to higher echelon

maintenance support available from the 3d Force Service Regiment. A major contribution to the successful completion of the refurbishment was the "BLT Layette." Assembled and held by the regiment, the package contained a cross-section of supply items needed by Edmondson's Marines. Departing Okinawa on 26 June, the battalion landing team rejoined Amphibious Ready Group Bravo for movement to Subic Bay and a period of tactical training.

While the 3d Battalion and then the 2d underwent periods of training and refurbishment, Lieutenant Colonel Kliefoth's battalion participated in two major landings south of Da Nang. The first, Daring Rebel, was viewed as a complement to on-going 1st Marine Division operations designed to block the western and southwestern approaches to the Da Nang Vital Area. The amphibious objective area of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was to be the central portion of Barrier Island known to harbor elements of the 3d, 36th, and the battered 38th Viet Cong Regiments, 32 kilome-

On the flight deck of the Tripoli, a Marine CH-53 helicopter prepares to load elements of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines for an air assault into western Quang Nam Province.

Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)





Marine Corps Historical Collection

A group of suspected local Viet Cong are led to a combined interrogation point by elements of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines during the battalion's search of Barrier Island.

ters south of Da Nang, near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin provincial boundary. In conjunction with the battalion landing team, four companies of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade were to conduct search and clear operations to the northwest, while two battalions of the 51st and 54th ARVN Regiments supported the Marines with companion operation Vu Ninh 03 on the island near the Song Cau Dau, and the Americal Division conducted armored cavalry screening operations to the south and west. On Long Dong, a small island just northwest of Barrier Island, Regional and Popular forces were to provide security for a Combined Holding and Interrogation Center, operated by Vietnamese authorities, and to conduct local patrol operations. In addition, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels were to conduct coastal, river, and estuary patrols, blocking enemy escape routes as well as providing coordinated naval gunfire support for the forces ashore.

Before dawn on 5 May, Amphibious Ready Group Alpha converged offshore and made preparations to land BLT 1/26, employing air strikes and naval gunfire to neutralize the landing beach and primary helicopter landing zones. At 1005, Company A, in the first wave of landing craft, moved unopposed across Red Beach to spearhead the amphibious assault. Further inland, Company C met sporadic sniper fire as

its helicopters from HMM-362 entered Landing Zone Lion. Touchdown of Company D at Landing Zone Tiger was delayed an hour while air strikes completed the destruction of numerous enemy fortifications uncovered during the initial preparation of the landing zone. Once ashore, a fire support base and beach support areas were established near Red Beach as Kliefoth's Marines began search and clear operations to the northeast.

During the initial stages of the operation, as in Bold Mariner, an extensive psychological campaign was directed at the civilian population, alerting them of their impending relocation to the combined center for further screening, interrogation, classification, and eventual resettlement on the island. Aerial broadcasts, continually beamed over the entire area, instructed the civilians to move south along the beach toward the support area for transfer out of the combat zone, while leaflets amplified the instructions. The immediate effect was the relocation of over 1,300 civilians during the first two days of the operation. Ground action during the 17-day operation was limited to dislodging enemy troops and Viet Cong sympathizers from their hiding places. Throughout the endeavor, the combined force found the enemy to be extremely adept in conducting harassing attacks, planting boobytraps

and concealing himself in extensive, well-prepared bunker and tunnel complexes. Despite the use of organic artillery, air strikes, and fire from the rocket-firing ship *White River* (LFR 536), and destroyers *Mulinnix* (DD 944), *Frank E. Evans* (DD 754), *Noa* (DD 841), and *Douglas H. Fox* (DD 779) on a rotating basis, these enemy fortifications only yielded their hidden caches and prisoners when thoroughly searched or probed by long metal rods.

The enemy was caught napping twice during the operation when Marine units, which had swept from the southwest to the central portion of the island, boarded helicopters and returned to their original landing zones. As Colonel William C. Doty, Jr., commander of Special Landing Force Alpha, recounted: "I felt that when the enemy saw us turn our backs and move north they would come across the river behind us. We jumped right back to the area and got them."⁷

As a result of such tactics, the combined operations netted 303 Viet Cong killed, a majority of which resulted from the actions of the two ARVN battalions; another 328 taken prisoner; and 37 tons of rice, 4 tons of salt, and 131 weapons seized. In addition, over 7,000 civilians were eventually processed through the combined center and resettled on the island under Vietnamese control. "It had taken the enemy years to set up a good infrastructure," noted Colonel Doty, "by rooting out the VCI, we've hurt the enemy's cause much more than just taking prisoners. He has to start rebuilding over again if he wants to reassert himself in this area again."⁸

The second landing came three days after completion of Daring Rebel, when Kliefoth's battalion was helilifted ashore during Gallant Leader, trucked from Hill 55 to an area just north of Liberty Bridge, and then began an easterly sweep toward Dodge City. With the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines established blocking positions along the western edge of the area while the 1st Marines and ARVN Rangers, in Operation Pipestone Canyon, attacked south towards Go Noi Island. The battalion maintained these positions until 8 June when a tactical withdrawal was conducted to ships of the ready group in preparation for yet another landing on Barrier Island.

On the morning of 27 June, Special Landing Force Alpha, employing helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Gray, Jr.'s HMM-265, which had replaced HMM-362 in late May, as well as amphibian tractors and assault landing craft, put BLT 1/26 once again

ashore on wedge-shaped Barrier Island in Operation Bold Pursuit. Intelligence reports had indicated a rise in the number of enemy units in the Quang Tin portion of the island, apparently tasked with thwarting Vietnamese pacification efforts begun during Operation Daring Rebel in May. Enemy strength was estimated at 140 Viet Cong in main and local force units, 300 guerrillas, and elements of the *70th Main Force Battalion*, of unknown strength. The total number of enemy troops within supporting distance of the island was estimated at 1,200.

Landing at Blue Beach in the northern portion of the island, a kilometer south of the Quang Nam-Quang Tin provincial boundary, and at Landing Zones Cobra, Rattler, and Krait, Lieutenant Colonel Kliefoth's battalion began a southward purge of the island. Meanwhile, units of the Americal Division and Vietnamese Regional Forces established blocking positions on the western banks of the Song Truong Giang as a prelude to screening operations, and U.S. Navy Swift boats, augmented by Coast Guard and Vietnamese patrol craft, were stationed offshore to prevent an enemy escape by sea.

Encounters were sporadic as enemy troops again engaged in only occasional sniper fire and small-scale skirmishes, avoiding contact with the numerically superior forces of the landing team. As in Daring Rebel, Kliefoth's Marines uncovered numerous enemy fortifications and hiding places, which subsequently were destroyed by attached engineers. By the end of the 10-day operation on 6 July, 42 Viet Cong had been killed and 19 weapons seized. In addition, nine enemy troops were captured and 720 suspects detained for further interrogation and eventual classification by Vietnamese authorities.

Four days after reembarking on board shipping of the Amphibious Ready Group, BLT 1/26 assaulted into a small objective area within the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines operational area between the Song Vinh Diem and the South China Sea. Intelligence sources had placed elements of the *R-20th Local Force Battalion* and the *Q-92d Special Action Sapper Company*, in addition to scattered units of the *Q-82d* and *V-25th Local Force Battalion*, totaling more than 450 troops in the region. The presence of these major enemy units posed not only a direct threat to local allied installations guarding the southern approaches to the Da Nang Vital Area, but enhanced the possibility of rocket attacks against the Da Nang Airbase and Marble Mountain Air Facility.

Assisting Kliefoth's Marines were elements of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade positioned to the south and west; 1st Marines units to the north and northwest; and Company M, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, directly attached to the battalion landing team. As in previous operations, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard patrol vessels were to provide screening operations along coastal and inland waterways. Also, the Vietnamese National Police were tasked with screening and classifying all civilian detainees and infrastructure suspects apprehended during the operation.

The operation, codenamed Mighty Play, began on 10 July with a helicopter assault into three inland zones, secured by Company M, 1st Marines. Since an over-the-beach assault did not take place, all logistical needs of the landing team were met by helilifts directly to units in the field or unloaded at Da Nang and trucked to the fire support base of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and the logistical support area established near Route 538, south of Tra Khe (1). Once ashore, each of Kliefoth's companies operated in an area adjacent to its initial landing zone, providing thorough coverage of inhabited areas and suspected enemy routes in the region. The enemy made no stand, relying instead on heavy concentrations of mines and boobytraps to disrupt search and clear operations of the landing team. As a result, contact was extremely light as Marines moved through the heavily mined terrain, engaging only isolated groups of enemy soldiers. By the close of Operation Mighty Play on 20 July, 30 enemy troops had been killed, 10 weapons seized, and over 200 enemy structures destroyed.

As the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines assumed defensive responsibility for the operational area of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines on the termination of Mighty Play, Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Battalion, after undergoing a month of rehabilitation on Okinawa and training at Subic Bay in the Philippines, prepared to assault a coastal area southeast of Chu Lai in order to cordon and search a number of target hamlets for enemy forces believed to be operating within Binh Son District of Quang Ngai Province. Among the forces identified to be infesting the region were the *48th Local Force Battalion*, *T-20th*, *P-31st*, and *95th Local Force Companies*, and nearly 800 guerrillas and known members of the infrastructure. Within striking range of the objective area were elements of the *21st NVA Regiment*, *107th NVA Artillery Battalion*, and numerous local force companies, totaling more than 1,200 troops.

On 24 July, elements of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines landed across the beach near the village complex of Le Thuy, 14 kilometers southeast of Chu Lai, while the remainder, on board helicopters of HMM-164, assaulted three inland landing zones, closing off the area. Accompanied by local Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, the Marines then began a methodical search for enemy troops, supplies, and fortifications during daylight hours. After dark, more than two thirds of the battalion was deployed throughout the area in ambushes, listening posts, and killer teams. However, long distance night patrols were kept to a minimum because of the heavy saturation of the area with mines, boobytraps, and other surprise firing devices. Although numerous base areas and defensive positions were discovered and destroyed, the enemy, as in previous operations, harassed or fled rather than defend positions and risk his limited formations in close engagements with the Marines.

Operation Brave Armada was terminated on 7 August with negligible results, and Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Marines were withdrawn by helicopter to the *Valley Forge* (LPH 8) and *Vernon County* (LST 1161). Three days later, the battalion again moved ashore, relieving the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines of its operational area, west of Da Nang. Initially headquartered at the Rock Crusher near Dai La Pass, and then on Hill 10, BLT 2/26 was given the task of defending the Da Nang Anti-Infiltration Barrier, and for the next month Edmondson's Marines covered all avenues of approach, responding to intrusions with quick reaction forces and supporting arms.

Meanwhile, to the southeast, Battalion Landing Team 1/26, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James C. Goodin, backloaded on board ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha on 8 August, following two weeks securing vital military installations and patrolling within the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines area of operations. After a month of training and equipment repair, preparations were made for yet another strike at Barrier Island. The third operation in four months targeted at this traditional coastal enemy stronghold, Defiant Stand was fated to be the last special landing force combat assault into the South Vietnamese war zone. Although the two previous operations on the island had netted close to 400 enemy troops and eradicated much of the local Viet Cong Infrastructure, by July, the enemy had reinfiltated the island, and again threatened the coastal areas of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces.

The operation, the first to combine United States and Republic of Korea Marines in an amphibious assault during the war, was to involve two phases. The first called for the establishment of an angular block to isolate the northern end of the island, with 1st Battalion, 26th Marines holding the east-west leg and a Korean Marine battalion the other. During the second phase, maneuver elements were to attack within the cordoned area, searching out and destroying the trapped enemy.

On 7 September, the first phase of Defiant Stand began with Goodin's Marines assaulting into the central portion of Barrier Island. Despite rain and heavy cloud cover, which caused a 90-minute delay, Companies C and D, on board helicopters of HMM-265, were inserted into two landing zones along the east bank of the Song Truong Giang, while the remainder of the battalion moved ashore by landing craft. As A-4s of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the guns of the destroyer *Taussig* (DD 746) covered the landing, airborne loudspeakers urged civilians to move southward to a number of predesignated safe areas. Concurrently,

units of the 1st Marine Division to the north and west, Americal Division to the south and southwest, and 2d Korean Marine Brigade to the north, began local screening operations to seal off the island. Closer in, U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Vietnamese Navy patrol craft again covered the coastline and surrounding rivers against any enemy attempt to escape. The initial assaults of BLT 1/26 met little opposition and the Marines pushed northward, evoking scattered firefights with small bands of enemy attempting to reach river crossings and other escape routes. By the 12th, the Marine landing team had established a series of blocking positions across the north-central portion of the island, isolating the northern sector in preparation for the Korean assault.

After landing Goodin's Marines, troop and cargo ships of the Amphibious Ready Group moved up the coast and, on the 9th, embarked the 2d and 5th Battalions, 2d Korean Marine Brigade in preparation for the operation's second phase. For the next three days, the Korean Marines received amphibious assault refresher training, culminating in a landing rehearsal

Barrier Island villagers are escorted to a collection point while the 26th Marines, with Army armored cavalymen, Korean Marines, and ARVN troops, again search the island.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



on the 11th. The following morning, the 1,100-man Korean contingent landed by helicopter and amphibious assault craft on the northern tip of the island. The initial assault was unopposed, but as the Koreans attacked south toward U.S. Marine blocking positions, they encountered increased resistance from groups of enemy trapped in the ever-closing cordon. With the enemy's escape routes barred, Korean Marines searched the caves and tunnels which honeycombed the area, accounting for most of the 293 Viet Cong killed and 121 weapons seized until both Marine contingents merged on 18 September.

With the end of Operation Defiant Stand, Goodin's Marines assumed responsibility for the operational area held by Battalion Landing Team 2/26 and, on 20 October, command was passed from the 9th MAB to the 1st Marine Division and BLT 1/26 reverted to 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. As Goodin's Marines moved ashore, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, configured as a BLT, went on board ships of the Amphibious Ready Group for several weeks of training, but in mid-October it too was returned to shore and on the 27th reverted to 2d Battalion, 26th Marines.

The Fleet's Contingency Force

Upon the completion of the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (Keystone Cardinal), and the redesignation, transfer from 9th MAB to III MAF, and consolidation of the battalions of the 26th Marines, elements composing the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Forces were to be drawn from the units of I MEF,

headquartered on Okinawa. Since the Fleet's two landing forces now were to be formed from the redeployed units of the 3d Marine Division, they could no longer be introduced into Vietnam without specific authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prevailing opinion at CinCPac was that an "enemy offensive of major proportions would have to be launched before imminent reintroduction [of the SLFs into Vietnam] would even be considered." Notwithstanding, the Special Landing Force was to be fully prepared for such a recommitment should circumstances warrant, and in recognition of such a possibility, CinCPac directed that the landing forces and amphibious ready groups maintain a 120-hour reaction posture for possible deployment to Vietnam in addition to maintaining the normal seven-day readiness posture envisioned under existing Pacific Command contingency plans.⁹

In early November, newly designated BLT 1/9 and HMM-164 embarked on board Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, followed in December by BLT 2/9 and HMM-165, which boarded ships of ARG Alpha. The pattern of SLF operations during the remainder of the year consisted of periods of normal upkeep, maintenance, and training at Subic Bay in the Philippines and periods at sea. When at sea, each landing force operated along the littoral of South Vietnam, from the Cau May Peninsula to the DMZ, remaining well outside the 12-mile limit, but constantly ready for possible recommitment to Vietnam or to any other amphibious objective in the Western Pacific.¹⁰

The Advisory Effort and Other Activities

*Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps—1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff—Embassy Guard Marines*

Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

While III MAF combat and support units garnered most of the laurels during the year, over 700 Marines scattered from the Delta to the DMZ, worked behind the scenes in less noticed but equally challenging positions. These Marines provided support not only to MACV Headquarters; the American Embassy; Marine units, both Korean and American; and U.S. Army units in the field through a detachment of 1st ANGLICO, but also to elements of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Marines attached to the 525-man United States Army Advisory Group in I Corps provided needed liaison between units of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions and adjacent American forces, and also coordinated the use of allied tactical and support assets. Those with the Marine Advisory Unit provided the same assistance to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

At the beginning of 1969, the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), commanded by Senior Marine Advisor Colonel Leroy V. Corbett and assisted by Lieutenant Colonel James T. Breckinridge, had a Marine strength of 47 officers and nine enlisted men. Attached was one Navy medical officer and one petty officer. Marines assigned to the MAU represented the full spectrum of the combat arms, and combat and service support. Advisory personnel assisted most of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) staff sections, and normally two advisors were assigned to each Marine infantry battalion—one advisor usually remained with the battalion command group while the other assisted the forward companies.


U.S. Marine advisors supported the Vietnamese Marine Corps from its creation in October 1954 out of various Vietnamese commando companies and river patrol forces that had fought in the north. Following the Geneva Accords that split Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, these units were reorganized in the south and formed into a Vietnamese Marine infantry force. The Marine Advisory Unit, initially a division within the Navy Section of the United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, acted as the link between the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the American command.

Originally formed as a component of the Vietnamese Navy, the small Vietnamese Marine Corps consisted of a landing battalion, river patrol company, river group, ranger group, and a field support group. Its main task was to conduct amphibious and riverine operations. From 1954 to 1969, the Corps expanded from a strength of 1,137 officers and men to approximately 9,300. During the same period, it grew from a single battalion to a light division, composed of six 800-man infantry battalions and five combat and combat service support units, and also achieved separate service status. With the expansion in strength, the Corps was given responsibility for conducting independent and joint ground operations with ARVN and Free World Forces, and for the conduct of riverborne operations along the coastal lowlands and throughout the Mekong Delta. As an element of the country's General Reserve Forces, battalions could be deployed to any of the four corps areas and the Capital Military District. During the 1968 *Tet* Offensive, for example, Vietnamese Marines not only assisted in the defense of Saigon, but in retaking the Hue Citadel.

Relying on U.S. Marine advisors from the beginning, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, as a result, mirrored its sister service in organization, recruitment, and training. Recruited as volunteers, with appeals similar to those used by the U.S. Marine Corps, enlistees were sent to the VNMC Training Command, located northwest of Thu Duc in III Corps, near Saigon. Accommodating about 2,000 trainees, the command provided basic recruit and advanced individual training, as well as a number of specialized courses for both officers and NCOs. Officers were appointed from the National Military Academy, the two-year infantry school for reserve officers, or the 12-week officers' course for exemplary NCOs. In addition to normal training, a select number of officers and enlisted men attended courses at Marine Corps schools in the United States and on Okinawa.

A select group of closely screened and thoroughly trained Marines, advisors viewed their mission as one of improving the expertise of the Vietnamese Marine tactical unit commander in conducting amphibious, riverine, helicopter assault, and ground operations,

MARINE ADVISORY UNIT, 1969





Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtGen Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, continually stressed the close relationship between U.S. Marine advisors and Vietnamese Marines both on and off the battlefield.

and establishing a sound administrative and logistical organization within the VNMC.*¹ In combined operations with American forces, the advisor directed close air support and helicopter medical evacuations, and served as liaison officer between the two units. Advisors also monitored the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) which supported Vietnamese Marines. Drawing upon the fund, American Marine advisors furnished the VNMC with materiel and equipment not commonly available to other South Vietnamese forces.

Off the battlefield, Marine advisors worked to improve the health and well-being of Vietnamese Marines and their families, resulting not only in enhanced morale, but in unit esprit de corps. Donating many hours to civic action projects, U.S. advisors participated in projects that focused on dependent housing, upgrading of camp installations, and the establishment of health care facilities. The relationship between ad-

sors and Vietnamese Marines was close. They were, noted Vietnamese Marine Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, "our friends":

U.S. Marine advisors never tried to command the Vietnamese Marine unit. They always stayed as a friend, they advise us, they help us, and they try to understand our problems—try to see the difficulty, and try to give us support, and try to fight things with many other agencies to give more support for the Vietnamese Marines—materially Many Marine advisors worked outside their military field, you see; they tried to go to many places, asking for many things to bring back and help the Marine dependents and Marine children But one thing, they never tried to dictate to us or to command us. Discussing—yes. Sometimes very hard discussion, but after that we remained very friendly The U.S. Marine advisors is the only one to share the food with the Vietnamese Marines in the field. They don't carry food for themselves; they don't carry the water for themselves. They shared the rice; they shared what we had in the field, together with my Marines. They do not make any distinction between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Vietnamese Marines.²

As units of the country's General Reserve, Vietnamese Marine battalions were liable to be committed anywhere throughout South Vietnam. Under the direct operational control of the Chairman of the Joint General Staff, General Cau Van Vien, and not General Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, as a cohesive division, was used "piecemeal," according Colonel Corbett. "Every time there is a crisis," noted the Senior Marine Advisor, "every one hollers for one or two of these Marine battalions. If things get hot in the Rung Sat Special Zone, Admiral Zumwalt wants one or two of these Marine battalions, at the same time [Major] General [Julian J.] Ewell [Commanding General, 9th U.S. Infantry Division] wants them in the Delta, at the same time III Corps insists on having them around Tay Ninh or around Bien Hoa."³

Operating with its U.S. Marine advisors, the VNMC continued to conduct battalion-size operations during 1969 in its assigned areas of operations. The year began slowly with the six Marine battalions operating under ARVN and American forces in III and IV Corps. But with the approach of the *Tet* holidays, activity picked up. In early February, while under the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 3d Battalion, in searches near the Cambodian border, came upon one of the largest arms and ammunition caches of the war. Using over forty CH-47 lifts, the tons of 122mm rockets, rifles, grenades, and assorted ammunition were transferred from the elaborate enemy complex in the Parrot's Beak to the brigade support area near An Loc. Throughout the 40 days with the 2d

*Once selected, advisors attended either the Marine Advisors Course at Quantico, or the U.S. Army's Unit Sector Advisor Training Course at the John F. Kennedy Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Brigade, the 3d Battalion conducted numerous searches, and on several occasions was called upon to reinforce heavily engaged ARVN and U.S. forces.⁴

In late February, while under the Long Bien Special Zone, near the Bien Hoa Military Complex, the 5th Battalion engaged elements of the *K.3 Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th NVA Division* intent on attacking the town, III Corps Headquarters, and the airbase. At 0300 on the 26th, the Marines met the enemy battalion three and one half kilometers east of the airfield, near the village of Ho Nai. In fierce fighting that lasted the day, and was so close that artillery could not be used, the battalion killed over 130 enemy troops and captured 20, including the battalion commander and his executive officer. For this action, the battalion was awarded the U.S. Navy Unit Commendation.

On 1 April, the artillery element of the division was reorganized. The 1st Artillery Battalion was formed from Batteries A, B, and C; Batteries D, E, and F formed the nucleus around which a second battalion was created. A third artillery battalion would be autho-

rized and formed in November and a seventh infantry battalion would be authorized the following month.

While elements of Brigade A continued to operate in III Corps during April and May, Brigade B's three infantry battalions conducted a series of amphibious, riverine, and reconnaissance-in-force operations under the control of the 21st ARVN Division and then U.S. Navy River Assault Squadron 15 and the Vietnamese Navy's River Assault Group. From the Nam Can Forest area of the Cau Mau Peninsula, the brigade moved into the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province of IV Corps and then into the northern U Minh Forest with moderate results. The two brigades, at the end of May, exchanged areas of operation as Brigade A moved into IV Corps and Brigade B was placed under the operational control of the Long Bien Special Zone in Bien Hoa Province.

Throughout June, July, and August, Brigade A conducted a series of reconnaissance-in-force operations in the northeastern portion of enemy Base Area 483 in Chuong Thien Province, south of Can Tho. Work-

Marine advisor 1stLt Fred H. McWaters calls for a medical evacuation helicopter. The advisors' task was not only to assist, but also to request and control allied air support.

Courtesy of Capt Joseph W. Pratte (Ret.)





Courtesy of Capt Joseph W. Pratte (Ret.)

Vietnamese Marines carry several enemy rockets captured during operations in III Corps. As a reserve force, the Marines could be committed anywhere within the country.

ing closely with territorial forces, the brigade reopened Route 12 and conducted extensive pacification operations throughout its assigned area until the end of August when it was placed in general reserve status. During the same period, Brigade B continued search and clear operations in Bien Hoa Province until the beginning of September when it was placed under Task Force 211, controlled directly by the Joint General Staff, and tasked with continuing the search of Base Area 483 and the U Minh Forest in IV Corps.*

Both brigades continued operations in their assigned areas until mid-November, when yet another exchange was made. On the 12th, Brigade A terminated its stand-by status and departed Saigon to relieve Brigade B in the U Minh Forest of IV Corps. During the relief, the command post of the brigade came under heavy enemy 82mm mortar fire. Twenty-six rounds landed with pinpoint accuracy on the CP, causing 18

casualties. Among the wounded was Captain Richard L. Porter, U.S. Marine advisor to the artillery battalion.

During the remainder of 1969, Vietnamese Marines and their advisors continued operations in both III and IV Corps, and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Unlike the rest of the year, contact was heavy as elements of both brigades encountered sizable enemy units in fortified positions, while dealing with increased sniper fire and incidents of boobytraps and mines, which took a heavy toll on Marines. Despite the losses, the division continued to meet its recruiting objective of 700 per month and by the end of the year exceeded its new authorized strength of 11,400.

Summing up his tour as Senior Marine Advisor, Colonel Corbett expressed the general feeling of all Marine advisors as to the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the individual Marines who composed it:

Some battalions are exceptionally good, one is mediocre, but most of them are very good. Depends on the officers they have with them at the time. Based on casualties, leave, and so forth, if they have the leadership there, they do the job. There is no difference in a Vietnamese Marine and a

*On 7 July, Colonel William M. Van Zuyen relieved Colonel Corbett and assumed command of the MAU. His assistant was now Lieutenant Colonel Tom D. Parsons, who had joined the MAU on 2 May and relieved Lieutenant Colonel James T. Breckinridge.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Surrounded by communications equipment in the brigade's command post, ANGLICO Marines coordinate American air and naval gunfire in support of the Korean Marines.

U.S. Marine. When ably led and properly supported, he will do what he is told to do, when he is told to do it, and he will do it in a topnotch manner. I have no great concern about the Vietnamese Marine Corps' combat effectiveness. It is the support of them and the manner in which they are employed which concerns me. They are a most cost-effective unit. I would be most happy to serve with them anytime, and I have served with them. I have never felt insecure with them and I don't feel any of the advisors, other than myself, who have served with them, has ever felt for one moment that they were insecure.⁵

In essence, Colonel Corbett later noted, "if properly deployed and supported they could do the job. I believe that the events surrounding the VNMC deployment to I Corps before the downfall of everything supports my analysis of their capability in 1969."⁶

*1st Air and Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company (ANGLICO)*

As American involvement in the Vietnam War grew and troop strength rose, a requirement for naval gunfire support developed. In response, Sub-Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) was activated and ordered to South Vietnam in 1965. The primary mission of ANGLICO was to support the ground elements of an amphibious force by providing

the necessary control and liaison agencies that would request, direct, and control U.S. Navy support in the form of naval gunfire and Marine and naval air.

From the beginning most of the fighting in Vietnam centered on the populated coastal lowlands, and naval gunfire became a useful and flexible means of fire support. Unlike air support, naval gunfire support was available around the clock, being relatively unaffected by weather or visibility. In addition, it offered a wide variety of ordnance, from 16-inch shell fire to rockets which could rapidly saturate any point or area target.

In January 1969, ANGLICO detachments were spread throughout South Vietnam. Naval gunfire liaison and spot teams were assigned to U.S. Army, Marine, and Korean Marine units in each of the four corps tactical zones and to the U.S. Naval Advisory Group in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the 1st Australian Task Unit at Baria. ANGLICO aerial observer teams were also assigned surveillance missions of the Vung Tau Shipping Channel.⁷ Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frederick K. Purdum, replaced in August by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Simpson, Sub-Unit

One had a strength in January of 19 Marine and 13 Navy officers, and 176 Marine and two Navy enlisted men.

Within the cruiser-destroyer group of the Seventh Fleet, a designated task unit provided MACV with naval gunfire support. Composition of the unit varied as ships moved to or from differing operational commitments, but the command element remained relatively constant, either the destroyer squadron or division commander. Based on gunfire support priorities set by MACV for each of the corps tactical zones, the task unit commander published periodic ship availability reports. These reports reflected the ships assigned to each zone and period of assignment.

At least 48 hours prior to the arrival of the support ship or ships, the corps senior U.S. military commander, with the advice of the naval gunfire liaison officer, assigned the ships to specific target areas and furnished spotter team identification and necessary radio frequencies. As the ship reported on station the ANGLICO spotter supporting the designated ground combat unit briefed the ship on friendly positions, scheme of maneuver, general enemy situation, rules of engagement, navigational aids, anticipated gunfire employment, and the number and location of friendly aircraft. Throughout the operation, continual communication was maintained among the ship, the spotter, and the liaison team.

Naval gunfire support employed during 1969 varied from 40mm cannon fire of the Swift patrol boats (PCFs) and Coast Guard cutters to the 16-inch shells of the battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62). The mainstay of the fire support was the destroyer with its 5-inch guns. In shallow beach areas, particularly in I Corps, in-shore fire support ships (LFRs) equipped with 5-inch multiple rocket launchers were used to bombard close-in targets.

The highpoint of ANGLICO's employment during the year was its support of the Korean Marines during Special Landing Force Operation Defiant Stand in September. Participating in their first amphibious assault since the Korean War, the Korean Marine Brigade, with elements of the 1st Marines, assaulted Barrier Island, south of Hoi An. Planning and coordinating naval gunfire, air, and helicopter support for the Korean forces was carried out by the assigned ANGLICO support team.⁸

With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, ANGLICO teams took over the responsibility for naval gunfire control along the DMZ, assuming manage-

ment of the installations at Alpha-1 and Alpha-2. Using the TPS-25 radar in combination with naval gunfire, ANGLICO teams were able to locate and quickly interdict enemy personnel moving within the southern half of the zone. Eighty percent of the targets that were taken under fire during darkness were fired by naval gunfire instead of artillery. The reason for this, as Lieutenant Colonel Simpson explained, was due to the unique position ANGLICO had in obtaining clearances:

We set up a clearance station with the 1st ARVN Division Forward at Charlie-1. What I did was to put three enlisted personnel in there, and they were able to sit in there with the ARVN and as soon as the target would show up on the TPS-25 radar they would check with the ARVN to get it cleared. At the same time down at Quang Tri, we had a naval gunfire liaison officer who was clearing the target through U.S. channels. So at this time, we had the two simultaneous clearances going on. Where the artillery would go back to Quang Tri, get it cleared at Quang Tri, go back to Dong Ha, which was the CP for the 1st ARVN Division Forward, try to get it cleared, then go back down the channel, where we were getting simultaneous clearance and then we would go ahead and fire on the target.⁹

ANGLICO's strength by December had risen to 198 enlisted men and 32 officers. During the final month of the year the naval liaison teams directed 2,407 missions, firing 23,049 rounds. In addition, they controlled 107 fixed-wing and 1,716 helicopter sorties, 114 medical evacuations, and the delivery of 2,702,950 pounds of supplies.

U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff

The Marine Corps provided 77 officers and 53 enlisted men for the MACV staff in Saigon at the beginning of 1969. Another 15 officers and 12 enlisted Marines served with various MACV field components. The senior Marine officer on the staff was Brigadier General John N. McLaughlin, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, who had relieved Brigadier General John R. Chaisson in mid-1968, and who, in turn, would be replaced by Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka. Other Marine billets on the staff covered a broad spectrum of assignments, ranging from comptroller, to membership on specialized study groups, to duty with the public information section.

Marine participation on the MACV staff and in the various field components had a dual function. It not only helped make Marine views on important questions readily available to the staff, but allowed MACV Marines to clarify Saigon's decisions for fellow Marines in I Corps. Moreover, as General McLaughlin later noted: "I had a close relationship with General Cushman

and later General Nickerson. I was not their representative at MACV, obviously, and for obvious reasons; but I think I was helpful and was as helpful as I could be. And of course I enjoyed a similar arrangement with I Field Force and II Field Force, and with the U.S. Army command down in the Delta."¹⁰

Participation by Marines on the MACV staff had yet another effect; it allowed them to gain a broader view of the war. "From Saigon," McLaughlin reported, "I saw that there was more to the war than I Corps or III MAF." Continuing, he noted:

As you will recall, most of the fighting prior to *Tet* was with the large-scale NVA units that had been up in I Corps, and III MAF had borne the brunt of a lot of this. And I think there was an unspoken attitude up there that this was the war, in I Corps. Well I found that this was not the case. And of course later on when the NVA gave up, to a certain extent, their large-scale attempts to infiltrate through the DMZ, and we saw the appearance of NVA divisions that had fought up in I Corps down in the highlands in II Corps and even over in western III Corps. As the war shifted, and it did necessarily when the NVA started bringing large formations down to II and III Corps, there was less pressure from main force NVA units up in I Corps . . . I'm not saying this as criticism of anybody. It's a natural reaction. Everybody is responsible for his own area, and naturally he's concerned with his own war.¹¹

From his associations with other senior members of the staff and allied representatives, Brigadier General McLaughlin came away with the shared belief that Marines, like their Army, Navy, and Air Force counterparts, had done their job. "General Abrams . . . was appreciative of the fighting characteristics of the Marines in Vietnam," noted McLaughlin. "I would say that he treated the Marines and Marine units, Marine divisions, as well as he treated anybody in the country. I think that's about the most you can expect. I

think he admired the good things we did. I think perhaps he didn't admire some of the things that we didn't do."¹²

Embassy Guard Marines

The Marines of Company E, Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) were assigned security guard duty at the American Embassy in Saigon throughout 1969. Led by Captain Roger M. Jaroch and then by Captain Robert P. Lacoursiere and Major Harry J. Shane, the five officers and 155 enlisted men were tasked with safeguarding classified material and protecting U.S. Embassy personnel and property, the mission performed by Marines attached to all embassies throughout the world.

Unlike 1968 when Marine guards fought off an enemy attack on the embassy during the *Tet* Offensive, 1969 was a quiet year. In July, the routine sentry duty was broken by the visit to the embassy of President and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Early the following month, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, accompanied by the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Joseph E. Daily, paid a visit to the Ambassador. While enroute, they were given a brief tour of the embassy, during which the Commandant took note of the number of trophies the company had won for athletic activities. For the most part, Marines at the embassy were free from terrorist activities during the year. However, embassy routine was violently interrupted on 5 March when an attempt was made on the life of Tran Van Huong, Premier of South Vietnam, 50 yards from the compound. No one on the embassy grounds was hurt in the assassination attempt. Four persons were captured and later charged in the incident.

CHAPTER 19

1969: An Overview

At the 15 January meeting of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, reported on the situation in Vietnam as he found it during a recent inspection visit. The situation, he said, was good. He likened it to a pioneer who settles in the wilderness and begins the arduous task of cultivating a crop. In the fall, after being ravaged by Indian raids, weather, and vermin, the crop was ready for harvest. Like the pioneer, who had to decide whether to remain or move on, the time had come for America to decide. Nineteen-sixty-nine, he concluded, "would be the year of decision," as indeed it was.¹

Sandwiched between the massive *Tet* Offensive of 1968 and the deescalation of American involvement in the war that took place during the early 1970s, 1969 marked a major change and watershed in United States policy for the Vietnam War. Following a thorough review, the Nixon Administration adopted a policy of seeking to end United States involvement either through negotiations or, failing that, turning the combat role over to the South Vietnamese. It was this decision that began the Vietnamization of the war in the summer of 1969 and that would soon greatly reduce and then end the Marine Corps' combat role in South Vietnam.

The redeployment of the 9th Marines in July began this process of disengagement and replacement. Rooted in the Marine advisory effort of the 1950s, Marine air and ground forces increased rapidly with the deployment of the first helicopter squadrons in 1962. By the beginning of 1969, III Marine Amphibious Force, encompassing Marine, Army, and Navy components, had become the largest combat unit in Marine Corps history.

Throughout this build-up, Marines on the battlefield faced two different challenges: the first from guerrillas—an enemy almost impossible to identify, who rarely stood and fought, and who would rather fade away to return at a time and place of his own choosing—and the second from disciplined NVA soldiers who sought out Marines and maneuvered to meet them in more conventional engagements. In exchanges ranging from small encounters with a few Viet Cong

in a lowland hedgerow to a North Vietnamese Army battalion occupying a fortified position in triple-canopied jungle, Marine units time and again defeated the enemy—1969 was no different.

Working in close harmony with the South Vietnamese Army, III MAF and the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces took full advantage of the momentum achieved during 1968 to continue the unrelenting attack on the enemy's combat organization and guerrilla infrastructure. Prominent among III MAF's combat operations were those aimed at destroying the enemy's staging and assembly areas and lines of communications. In northern I Corps, the 9th Marines' Operation Dewey Canyon wreaked havoc on a major enemy command and logistic network in the Da Krong Valley, crippling the enemy's supply effort and future aggressive plans in I Corps for a year. Despite the reluctance of NVA units to engage in decisive combat within the northern two provinces, 3d Marine Division operations along the DMZ; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division actions in the coastal lowlands; and 101st Airborne Division incursions into the A Shau Valley, did trigger occasional sharp exchanges, which cost the enemy heavily in both troops and equipment.

To the south, the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions conducted a series of major operations to rid Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces of a substantial enemy presence directed against populated areas of Da Nang and Quang Ngai. Driving into such long-time enemy strongholds as Base Area 112, Happy Valley, Charlie Ridge, Dodge City, Go Noi Island, and the Que Son Mountains, the year-long campaign by the 1st Marine Division laid waste to a large number of enemy base camps and storage areas, denying the enemy opportunity to marshal forces for any significant offensive in Quang Nam. In the heavily populated areas of the three provinces, the two divisions' unremitting counterguerrilla effort, although undramatic, achieved steady success over the local Viet Cong infrastructure. From the DMZ in the north to Duc Pho in the south, III MAF combat operations during the year cost the enemy over 30,000 killed or captured, a loss equivalent to nearly three divisions. Marines losses were 2,259 killed and 16,567 wounded.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

Within the secure environment provided by III MAF, a Vietnamese farmer in the hamlet of An Ngai Tay checks his new vegetable crop with little fear that it might be confiscated.

Prominently influencing I Corps combat operations, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, reinforced by helicopter squadrons from the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force, maintained the constant air support necessary to implement and sustain III MAF's battle plan. Measured statistically, the Marine in-country air campaign encompassed 64,900 fixed-wing and 548,000 helicopter sorties, delivering over 100,000 tons of ordnance and some 895,000 troops and 115,000 tons of supplies. However, a truer measure of success was the effectiveness of the air-ground team, which was exploited to the fullest extent during the high-mobility mountain operations carried out by the 3d Marine Division early in the year—campaigns which combined the intrinsic capabilities of infantry maneuver, helicopter mobility, and coordinated air and artillery fire support to neutralize the hostile enemy threat to northern I Corps.

Complementing the combat efforts and achievements of United States forces were those of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. As a result of the increased number of combined operations and training, and the

concomitant rise in its effectiveness, the 1st ARVN Division assumed an ever-increased role in the defense of the northern five provinces of Vietnam. Upon the departure of the 3d Marine Division, General Lam's troops took over the defense of the Republic's northern boundary. Exhibiting the apparent benefits of better weapons and stronger leadership, the combat skills of Regional and Popular Force units also seemingly increased during the year, evoking new confidence among the rural citizenry whom they were tasked to defend.

Substantial progress was the hallmark of population security and Revolutionary Development plans during 1969. Unhampered by an enemy offensive as in 1968, the III MAF-supported South Vietnamese effort made substantial progress toward the reestablishment of governmental and economic conditions necessary for the return of a stable environment for both urban and rural inhabitants of the corps tactical zone.

Three separate, but mutually supporting, corps-wide pacification and development programs made

headway during the year—a success largely attributable to the efforts of both South Vietnamese Government officials and III MAF working together to accomplish the programs' goals. The rise in population security, which climbed from 69 to 93 percent during the year, provided optimum conditions for civil and economic recovery. While the program to establish or reestablish popularly elected governments and officials at the hamlet- and village-level exhibited moderate gain, the campaign to reduce enemy forces through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) and Phoenix-Phung Hoang programs greatly exceeded expectations.

Directly related to the effectiveness of the allied military screen provided the more populated areas of the coastal plains was revolutionary development. Ranging from multi-battalion military operations to the actions of the People's Self-Defense Forces, allied and South Vietnamese forces attempted to erect a secure barrier behind which nation building and economic development could root and flourish. An integral aspect of this effort since its inception in 1965, the Combined Action Program continued to expand in 1969, reaching an authorized strength of 114 platoons in August. Its successful history of working with

local forces led to the initiation in October of the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, whereby infantry companies of the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions joined with territorial forces in direct support of population security.

Overall, 1969 was a year of achievement, featuring consolidation and exploitation of successes gained from combat and pacification activities alike. Despite the reduction of Marine troop strength in I Corps, the 55,000 remaining Marines would continue the full range of military and pacification tasks in the coming year. A further dwindling of the Marine presence in I Corps Tactical Zone and the transfer of most of III MAF's responsibilities to the Army's XXIV Corps would take place in 1970. Within Quang Nam Province, their primary area of responsibility, Marines would continue to develop and apply combat and counterinsurgency techniques to the fullest extent to protect Da Nang, root out enemy guerrillas and infrastructure from the countryside, and prevent enemy main forces from disrupting pacification, while encouraging Vietnamization and conducting a systematic and orderly withdrawal—a difficult task.

Notes

PART I The Continuing War

CHAPTER 1 PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January through December 1969, hereafter cited as FMFPac, MarOpsV with month and year; III MAF Command Chronology (ComdC), Jan69; and ICTZ/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, hereafter ICTZ CombCP, 69. All documentary material cited, unless otherwise noted, is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.

I Corps Order of Battle

1. First Quarter Written Summary, ICTZ CombCP, 69, dtd 20Apr69.
2. Gen Robert H. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
3. App. A (Order of Battle), III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, 29Dec68-4Jan69.
4. CGIIIMAF ltr to COMUSMACV, dtd 27Jan69 (MACV Historical Document Collection, Reel 1, hereafter MACV HistDocColl, with reel number).

Strategy: A Reevaluation of Priorities

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretariat, General Staff, HQ, USMACV, Command History, 1968, hereafter MACV Comd Hist 1968; MilHistBr, Office of the Secretariat, General Staff, HQ, USMACV, Command History, 1969, hereafter MACV Comd Hist 1969; and JGS/USMACV Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB-144, 30Sep68.

5. CinCPac msg to MACV, dtd 9Jan69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 54).
6. Captured enemy document quoted in Gen Creighton W. Abrams msg to Adm John S. McCain, Jr., dtd 3May69 (Abrams Papers, Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.).
7. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Pentagon Military Briefing, 22Nov67.
8. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Speech before the Annual Meeting, Army Officers Association, Cleveland, Ohio, 18Nov68.
9. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 13Oct68.
10. Memo, MACV Commander's Conference, dtd 11Jan69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 11).

I Corps Planning

11. Anx A (Intelligence), ICTZ CombCP, 69, pp. 1-2.
12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 9.
14. Anx I (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas), ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 1.
15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Ibid., p. 1.
17. Anx B (Military Support for Pacification), ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 2.
18. ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 6.

CHAPTER 2 MOUNTAIN WARFARE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69, and 3dMarDiv, ComdCs, Jan-Feb69.

Northern I Corps

1. MajGen Raymond G. Davis and 1stLt Harold W. Brazier, "Defeat of the 320th," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar69, pp. 23-30.

Off Balance

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; TF Bravo ComdCs, Feb69; 2/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3dTankBn ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1stAmtracBn ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Dec68-Feb69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; Captain R. B. MacKenzie, "Intelligence Starts at the Top," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul73, pp. 40-44; and Colonel M. J. Sexton, "Sapper Attack," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep69, pp. 28-31.

2. Gen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 17-18 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis intvw.
3. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
4. Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis Comments.
5. Davis intvw, p. 20.
6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. MajGen Raymond G. Davis and Lt James L. Jones, Jr., "Employing the Recon Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May69, pp. 40-45.
8. Davis Comments.
9. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
10. Ibid.
11. LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins intvw, 16-18Feb69, No. 3915 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Ibid.
13. 1stLt Larry L. Eastland intvw, 16-18Feb69, No. 3915 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
14. Capt James E. Knight, Jr. intvw, 10-12May69, No. 4091 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

15. GySgt John E. Timmermeyer intvw, 10-12May69, No. 4091 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Capt Albert H. Hill intvw, 14-16May69, No. 4096 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, Comments on draft ms, 31Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

From the Cua Viet, South

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Operational Report/Lessons Learned (ORLL), Feb and May69; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ORLL, Feb and May69; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) AAR, Napoleon Saline II and Marshall Mountain, dtd 8Apr69.

18. Davis Comments.

CHAPTER 3 THE SPRING OFFENSIVE PREEMPTED

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/12 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 8Apr69, hereafter 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; MajGen Robert H. Barrow, "Operation Dewey Canyon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov81, pp. 84-89; and 1stLt Gordon M. Davis, "Dewey Canyon: All Weather Classic," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul69, pp. 32-40.

Strike into the Da Krong

1. III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, dtd 7Jan69, pp. 1-3.
2. VMA(AW)-242 ComdC, Jan69.
3. Annex A (Order of Battle), III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, dtd 7Jan69, pp. A5-A9.
4. 3dMarDiv msg to CG TF Hotel, dtd 14Jan69, in 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jan69.
5. CG TF Hotel msg to CO, 9th and 12th Mar, dtd 15Jan69, in *ibid*.
6. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

A Phased Operation

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69.

7. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
8. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
9. "CO's Planning Guidance, Dawson River South-Upper Da Krong Valley," undtd, in 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69.
10. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
11. OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.; Frag Order 4-69, dtd 31Jan69, in *ibid*.
12. Anx H (Air) to OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.; Anx D (Fire Support) to OpO 2-69, Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.
13. Davis Comments.
14. Anx E (Administration and Logistics) to OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in 9thMar ComdC, Jan69.

Phase I

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; and 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 5May69.

15. LtCol Wesley L. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 15Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Capt David F. Winecoff intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. Maj Charles G. Bryan intvw, 8Mar-8Apr69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Backyard Cleanup

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; 2/9 ComdC, Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 25Mar69; 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon dtd 5May69.

18. LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr., intvw, 18Mar-14Apr69, No. 4063 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
19. 2dLt Walter J. Wood intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
21. Capt Daniel A. Hitzelberger intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. *Ibid*.
23. LtCol George C. Fox intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
24. Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2 ComdC, Feb69.

CHAPTER 4 THE RAID INTO LAOS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; 1/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 17Apr69; 2/9 ComdC, Feb69; 3/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 25Mar69; 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 5May69; and, MajGen Robert H. Barrow, "Operation Dewey Canyon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov81, pp. 84-89; LtCol Dave Winecoff, USMC (Ret), "Night Ambush!," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan84, pp. 47-52..

Across the Da Krong

1. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

The NVA Retaliates

2. Maj Joseph B. Knotts intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 2dLt Milton J. Teixeira intvw, 18Mar-14Apr69, No. 4063 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. 2/3 ComdC, Feb69.

Ambush Along 922

5. 1/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 17Apr69.
6. CGXXIV Corps msg to COMUSMACV, J-3, dtd 30Jan69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.

7. COSOG, msg to MACV, J-3, dtd 31Jan69, in *ibid*.
8. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 3Feb69, in *ibid*.
9. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 12Feb69, in *ibid*.
10. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
11. Capt David F. Winecoff intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Winecoff intvw.
12. *Ibid*.
13. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
14. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 20Feb69, in *ibid*.
15. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
17. Winecoff intvw.
18. *Ibid*.
19. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
20. Winecoff intvw.
21. *Ibid*.
22. *Ibid*.
23. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
24. *Ibid*.
25. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, in *ibid*.
26. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 22Feb69, in *ibid*.
27. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon.
28. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
29. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 24Feb69, in *ibid*.
30. Ambassador Sullivan msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 1Mar69, in *ibid*.

Heavy Fighting

31. Capt Wesley L. Fox intvw, 19-28Apr69, No. 4086 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); LtCol Wesley L. Fox, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. *Ibid*.
33. GySgt Russell A. Latona intvw, n.d., No 4912 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
34. Maj Joseph B. Knotts intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Back Into Laos

35. Winecoff intvw.
36. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
37. Winecoff intvw.

Persistent Problems

38. Maj Charles G. Bryan intvw, 18Mar-8Apr69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
39. 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 8Apr69.

Phased Retraction

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40. CGXXIV Corps to COMUSMACV, dtd 6Mar69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.

Laos: Repercussions

41. COMUSMACV msg to Ambassador Sullivan, dtd 6Mar69, in *ibid*.
42. "Hilltops in Laos Seized by Marines," *New York Times*, 9Mar69.
43. "Laird Foresees a Troop Cut by U.S. in Vietnam," *New York Times*, 11Mar69.
44. *Ibid*.
45. "Laird's Statement on U.S. Incursion Disturbs Laotians," *New York Times*, 13Mar69.
46. "Secret 1969 Foray Into Laos Reported," *New York Times*, 12Aug73; see also "Officer Began Laos Forays, Marines Say," *Washington Post*, 13Aug73.

CHAPTER 5 THE QUANG TRI BORDER AREAS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Mar-Jun69, and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Jun69.

No Change in Tactics

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2. LtGen William K. Jones, Comments on draft ms, 30Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. MajGen Raymond G. Davis FMFPac debrief, 15Apr69, p. 332 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

The DMZ Front

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 4th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; and 4th Mar AAR Opn Purple Martin, dtd 4Jul69.

4. 1stLt John P. Kiley intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 2dLt Rick W. Prevost intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Maj Raymond D. Walters intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. 1stLt John P. Kiley intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
8. Maj Raymond D. Walters intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Maj George X. McKenna intvw, 16-18May69, No. 4094 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Brigade Mauls 27th

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, dtd 30May69; and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69.

The 9th Battles the 36th

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-May69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 1/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 2/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69.

The Vietnam Salient

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar Div ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3d Mar ARR, Opn Maine Crag, dtd 2Jun69; 1/3 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/3 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/3 ComdCs, Apr-May69; and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ARR, Opn Maine Crag, dtd 5May69.

10. Col Paul D. Lafond intvw, 25Jun69, No. 4335 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. LtCol James J. McMonagle intvw, 16May69, No. 4124 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Col Paul D. Lafond intvw, 11May69, No. 4095 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. Ibid.

Apache Snow

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Apache Snow, dtd 20Jun69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Cameron Falls, dtd 4Jul69; 1/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69; and 3/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69.

16. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 9Jun69, No. 4336 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. 22d Military History Detachment, "Narrative: Operation Apache Snow," n.d.
18. Ibid.
19. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 6Jun69, No. 4355 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. LtCol Oral R. Swigart, Jr., intvw, 11Jul69, No. 4392 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. Ibid.
22. 1stLt Patrick P. Oates intvw, 11Jul69, No. 4391 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. LtCol Robert L. Modjeski, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Central DMZ Battles

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 3d Mar ARR, Opn Virginia Ridge, n.d.; 1/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 3/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 4th Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 4th Mar ARR, Opn Herkimer Mountain, dtd 21Aug69; 1/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69; and 3/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69.

24. Maj Donald J. Myers intvw, 15Aug69, No. 4468 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Capt William J. Quigley intvw, 6Sep69, No. 4415 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
26. Maj Charles W. Cobb intvw, 5Aug69, No. 4466 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
27. Ibid.
28. Col William F. Goggin intvw, 4Aug69, No. 4464 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Eastern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLLs, May and Aug69, and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, May69.

PART II

Southern I Corps Battleground

CHAPTER 6

DESTRUCTION OF BASE AREA 112

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Mar69; III MAF ComdCs, Dec68-Mar69; and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar69.

Defense of Da Nang

1. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. 1stMarDiv OpO 301-YR, dtd 9Feb69 in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb69.
3. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

Attack into 112

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: III MAF Periodic Intelligence Reports, 5Jan69-2Feb69; TF Yankee ComdCs, Dec68-Feb69; TF Yankee AAR, Opn Taylor Common, dtd 20Mar69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 1/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; and 11th Mar ComdCs, Dec68-Mar69.

4. MACV Comd Hist, 1969.
5. LtCol John A. Dowd intvw, 17Mar69, No. 4042 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Col James B. Ord, Jr., intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., intvw, 17Oct77, p. 35 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Dwyer intvw; MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Dwyer Comments.
8. Dwyer Comments.
9. Dwyer intvw, pp. 37-38.
10. Ibid., p. 40; Dwyer Comments.
11. Davis Comments.
12. Capt Roger K. Peterson intvw, Feb69, No. 4045 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. Ibid.
14. LCpl Rick L. Wackle intvw, 20Feb69, No. 4011 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. 1stLt Ronald E. Pruiett intvw, 19Feb69, No. 4010 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Col Harry E. Atkinson, Comments on draft ms, 24Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr. intvw, n.d., No. 3914 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. Ibid.
19. Col Edwin H. Finlayson, Comments on draft ms, 25Nov69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

"A Little Urban Renewal"

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/7 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69.

20. Capt Thomas M. Cooper intvw, 6Feb69, No. 4007 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. 2dLt Wyman E. Shuler III intvw, 6Feb69, No. 4007 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, Comments on draft ms, 1Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Fred T. Fagan, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 9Jan87 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Capt Paul K. Van Riper, "Riot Control Agents in Offensive Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr72, pp. 18, 22.

Americal's TAOI

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Feb69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10May69; and Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69.

CHAPTER 7 THE BATTLE FOR QUANG NAM CONTINUES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Mar-May69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-May69.

Rockets Equal Operations

1. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 25May73, p. 2 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Simpson intvw.
2. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 2Feb84 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Simpson intvw, pp. 3-7; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Simpson Comments.

Operation Oklahoma Hills

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 7th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 7th Mar AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, n.d.; 1/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/7 AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, dtd 7Jun69; 2/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Apr-May69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69.

4. 1stMarDiv, Nui-Nang-Nui-Ba Na-Charlie Ridge Special Study, dtd 1Jan-5Mar69.
5. Col Robert L. Nichols intvw, 3-5Jun69, No. 4371 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Nichols intvw.
6. Col James B. Ord, Jr., intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. Ibid.
8. Capt Paul K. Van Riper intvw, 2May69, No. 4109 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

9. Nichols intvw.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. LtGen Robert L. Nichols, Comments on draft ms, 23Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. Nichols intvw.
14. 7th Mar AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, n.d.

5th Marines and the Arizona

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 5th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 5May69; 1/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 26Apr69; 2/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 27Apr69; 3/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 23Apr69; Capt Wayne A. Babb, "The Bridge: A Study in Defense," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jun71, pp. 16-23, hereafter Babb, "The Bridge"; and LtCol Charles K. Breslauer, "Battle of the Northern Arizona: Combined Arms at Their Best," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan77, pp. 47-55.

15. LtCol Richard F. Daley, Comments on draft ms, 8Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Daley Comments.
16. Babb, "The Bridge," p. 21.
17. Daley Comments.
18. Col Thomas E. Bulger, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bulger Comments.
19. Col William J. Zaro, Comments on draft ms, 16Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Zaro Comments.
20. 5th Mar AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 5May69.
21. Zaro Comments.
22. 1stLt Victor V. Ashford intvw, 3-5Jun69, No. 4319 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Ibid.
24. Zaro Comments.

Securing the Southern and Northern Approaches

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 26th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69.

25. Simpson intvw, pp. 27-28.
26. BGen Charles S. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 19Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Robertson Comments.
27. Simpson Comments.
28. Robertson Comments.
29. Bulger Comments.
30. Col Wendell P. C. Morgenthaler, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
31. Robertson Comments.

Americal Battleground

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Di-

vision ORLL, dtd 10May69, and Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Aug69.

32. Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69, p. 7.

PART III The Third's Final Months

CHAPTER 8 REDEPLOYMENT: THE FIRST PHASE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: CinCPac, Comd Hist, 1969; MACV, Comd Hist, 1969; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; and HMM-165 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

Keystone Eagle

1. MACV Talking Paper, T-Day Planning, n.d. (MACV HistDoc-Coll, Reel 3).
2. III MAF/1st ARVN Corps, Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB-144, dtd 26Dec68.
3. *New York Times*, 1Jan69.
4. LtGen John N. McLaughlin, Comments on draft ms, 25Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service), Richard M. Nixon, 1969, pp. 215, 300, hereafter *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
7. COMUSMACV msg to CJCS, dtd 24Apr69 (Abrams Papers, Army Center of Military History).
8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Apr69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File, dtd 4Apr-25Jul69.
9. LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr. intvw, Jul69, No. 5022 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
10. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 15Apr69, in FMFPac, "Force Reduction Planning" File.
11. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 2May69, in *ibid.*
12. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7May69, in *ibid.*
13. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Jun69, in *ibid.*
14. Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 392.
15. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 12Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Jun69; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jun69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File.

"A Turning Point"

16. LtGen William K. Jones intvw, 13Apr73, p. 57 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Jones intvw.
17. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 11Sep69, No. 4481 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. III MAF Oplan 182-69, dtd 15Jun69.
19. LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., intvw, Jul69, No. 5022 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Sea Tiger*, 25Jul69.

22. Col Edward F. Danowitz, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

23. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MAW, dtd 27Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Jul69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File.

CHAPTER 9 "A STRANGE WAR INDEED"

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Nov69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Nov69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun-Sep69, 1/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69; 2/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69; and 3/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69.

Company Patrol Operations

1. 3dMarDiv, LOI 1-69, dtd 29Jul69, p. 4, in 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul69.
2. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69, No. 4411 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.

Idaho Canyon

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul-Sep69, and 3d Mar AAR, Opn Idaho Canyon, n.d.

3. 1stLt Terry L. Engle intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. 1stLt Richmond D. O'Neill intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
10. 1stLt James P. Rigoulot intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Rigoulot intvw.
11. Capt David M. Jordon intvw, 10Oct69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. *Ibid.*
13. Rigoulot intvw.

"A Significant Step"

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdC, Sep69; 1/3 ComdC, Sep69; 2/3 ComdC, Sep69; and 3/3 ComdC, Sep69.

14. Clark Clifford, "A Vietnam Reappraisal," *Foreign Affairs*, Jul69, pp. 601-622.
15. *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969, p. 472.
16. *New York Times*, 31Jul69; *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969, pp. 585-586.
17. *New York Times*, 13Sep69, 15Sep69.
18. *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969, p. 718.
19. MGen Wilbur F. Simlik intvw, 14Oct77 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 4-5, hereafter Simlik intvw.
20. *Ibid.*

21. Ibid.
22. Jones intvw, pp. 57-58.
23. Simlik intvw, pp. 5-6.
24. Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Simlik intvw, p. 16.
26. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

Specter of Anarchy

27. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.
28. 3dMarDiv memo to CGFMFPac, dtd 26May69 in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
29. LtCol Gary D. Solis ltr to LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr., USMC (Ret), dtd 16Mar87.
30. Jones intvw, pp. 40, 83.
31. 3dMarDiv, Standing Operating Procedure for Apprehension of Individuals Involved in Acts of Violence Towards Members of this Command, dtd 4Jul69 in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
32. 3dMarDiv Fact Sheet, Third Marine Division Program to Eliminate Actions of Violence, n.d., in *ibid*.
33. III MAF Fact Sheet, I Corps Tactical Zone Watch Committee, dtd 7Aug69, in *ibid*.
34. CMC to ALMAR, dtd 2Sep69 (Negro Marines, ALMAR 65 Subject File, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
35. Jones intvw, pp. 83-85; Majs A. S. Painter, G. S. Pierre, and H. C. Sweet, Jr., rept, subj: Race Relations in the United States Marine Corps, dtd Jun70 (Negro Marines—Race Relations, Subject File, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
36. Ibid.
37. MACV Policy Summary Sheet, Use of Marijuana by U.S. Servicemen in Vietnam, dtd 29Mar68 (MACV HistDocColl); CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 10Sep67.
38. Col Peter J. Mulroney intvw, 17Jul69, No. 4384 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mulroney intvw.
39. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.
40. Mulroney intvw.
41. Ibid.

CHAPTER 10 “A DIFFICULT PHASE”

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Nov69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Nov69; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 1/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 2/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; and 3/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69.

Maintaining a Protective Barrier

1. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), FragO 1 to OpO 4-69 (William's Glade), dtd 14Jul69, in 1/4 ComdCs, Jul69.
2. Capt Henry W. Buse III intvw, 40Oct69, No. 4644 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Ibid.
4. SSgt William Reese intvw, 15Sep-19Oct69, No. 4516 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Maj James J. O'Meara intvw, 15Sep-19Oct69, No. 4516 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Ibid.
7. Col Gilbert R. Hershey intvw, 11Feb70, No. 4815 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

8. 1stLt William H. Stubblefield intvw, 9Oct69, No. 4519 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Ibid.

“You Shouldered Us”

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 4th Mar ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 1/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 2/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 3/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Sep-Oct69.

10. 2dLt Danny G. Dennison intvw, 11Oct69, No. 4517 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. Ibid.
12. *Sea Tiger*, 14Nov69.
13. LtGen William K. Jones, Comments on draft ms, 30Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
14. *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969, pp. 906-907.
15. Ibid., pp. 1026-1027.

The Brigade Takes Over

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Aug69; 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Nov69; 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Feb70; 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, Nov69; and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, Feb70.

16. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 15Jan69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 2Dec69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

PART IV Quang Nam: The Year's Final Battles

CHAPTER 11 GO NOI AND THE ARIZONA

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun-Dec69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

Vital Area Security

Pipestone Canyon: The Destruction of Go Noi Island

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/5 ComdCs, May-Jun69; BLT 1/26 ComdCs, May-Jun69; and 1st Mar AAR, Opn Pipestone Canyon, n.d.

1. Col James B. Ord, Jr. intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Col Charles S. Robertson intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4400 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 1st Mar OpO 001-69 (Pipestone Canyon), dtd May69, in 1st Mar ComdC, May 69.
4. LtCol Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr., intvw, 8Jul69, No. 4398 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 1stLt Robert L. Leonard intvw, 25Jul69, No. 4403 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Maj James W. Dion, Comments on

- "Vietnam Anthology" ms, 12Apr78 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. 1stLt Robert M. Wallace intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4405 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
 7. Col Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr., Comments on draft ms, (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
 8. Capt Frank H. Adams intvw, 8Jul69, No. 4398 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
 9. Memo CO 2/1 to CO 5th Mar, dtd 6Aug69 in MajGen Harold G. Glasgow, Comments on draft ms, 3Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
 10. BGen Charles S. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 19Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

1st Marines: Protecting the Southern Flank

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

11. Col Herbert L. Wilkerson intvw, 13Jul70, No. 4892 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Col Godfrey S. Delcuze, Comments on draft ms, 28Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

The Arizona

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 5th Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 5th Mar AAR, Opn Durham Peak, n.d.

13. Zaro Comments.
14. Col William E. Riley, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 3Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. CO Comment, 5thMar ComdC, Jul69.
16. 2dLt Robert L. Lavery intvw, 9Aug69, No. 4498 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. Ibid.
18. Zaro Comments.
19. Maj Gaetano Marino intvw, 9Aug69, No. 4498 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Col John M. Terry, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. Col Noble L. Beck, Comments on draft ms, 13Nov86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. 5th Mar OpO 62-69, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct69.

CHAPTER 12

DA NANG AND THE QUE SON VALLEY

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun-Dec69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

The 7th Marines

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 7th Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

1. MajGen Ormond R. Simpson memo to CGIII MAF, dtd 25Mar69 (1stMarDiv Admin File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); III MAF Fact Sheet, Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System, dtd 2Aug69, in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
2. 1stLt Raymond A. Hord intvw, 14Aug69, No. 4507 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Maj Peter S. Beck intvw, n.d., No. 4495 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. LtCol Marvin H. Luger intvw, n.d., No. 4495 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, Comments on draft ms, 31Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. LtCol Ray Kummerow, Comments on draft ms, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-71," 25Apr83 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
14. LCpl Jose F. Jimenez Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); 2dLt Richard L. Jaehne Award Citation (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. PFC Dennis D. Davis Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
17. Col Ray Kummerow, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
19. PFC Ralph E. Dias Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.

26th Marines:

Protecting the Northern Flank

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 26th Mar ComdCs, May-Dec69; 1/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

21. Col Ralph A. Heywood, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Battleground

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10May69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Nov69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Nov69; and Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Feb70.

22. Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69, p. 9.
23. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Results

24. These figures are compiled from the monthly summaries in 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.
25. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 8Sep81 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

PART V Supporting the Troops

CHAPTER 13 MARINE AIR OPERATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-15 ComdCs, Oct-Dec69; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69.

1st MAW Organization and Deployment

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69, and 1stMAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

1. MACV, ComdHist, 1969, "Air Operations"; HQMC, Status of Forces, dtd 2Jan69.
2. HQMC, Status of Forces, "Distribution of Aircraft, FMFPac," dtd 9Jan69.
3. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 96.
4. MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr., ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 23Dec69 (McCutcheon Papers, 1969 Correspondence, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 1st MAW (Rear) ComdC, 7Nov-31Dec69.

Single Management: Relations with the Seventh Air Force

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: "Single Management" File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.

6. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Mar68, in "Single Management" File.
7. Ibid.
8. Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., intvw, n.d. (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 70-71.
9. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
10. Ibid., p. 72.
11. MajGen Charles J. Quilter intvw, 12Jul69, No. 4362 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Quilter intvw; Col Virgil D. Olson intvw, 11Sep69, No. 4477 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), MajGen William G. Thrash intvw, 2Jul70, No. 4850 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Quilter intvw.
13. BGen Homer S. Hill intvw, 15May69, No. 4122 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hill intvw.
14. Quilter intvw.

Upgrading of Aviation Assets

15. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), p. 134, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation."

I Corps Fixed-Wing Support

16. 1stLt Earl C. Smith intvw, n.d., No. 4765 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith intvw.

17. Hill intvw.

The Interdiction Campaign

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Comd Hist, 1969, "Air Operations," pp. 200-223.

18. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 142.
19. Maj Patrick J. McCarthy intvw, n.d., No. 4780 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Smith intvw.
20. Ibid.
21. Capt Lawrence J. Karch intvw, n.d., No. 4765 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Karch intvw.
22. 1stLt John D. Halleran intvw, n.d., No. 4782 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Karch intvw.
24. Maj James E. Buckley intvw, n.d., No. 4146 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Buckley intvw; 1stLt Michael L. Richardson intvw, n.d., No. 4749 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Buckley intvw.
26. Quilter intvw.
27. Hill intvw.

Air Control

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 138-139.

28. Col Robert D. Slay intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4265 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
29. Ibid.
30. Hill intvw.
31. Capt Thomas L. Hall intvw, n.d., No. 4766 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Helicopter Operations

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 143-154; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69.

33. Hill intvw.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

Improving Helicopter Support

36. Col Leonard L. Orr, Comments on draft ms, 4Sep69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
37. MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, HQMC Briefing, 8Aug69, No. 6010 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
38. III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command and Control of Marine Corps Helicopter Assets in III MAF, 17May69.
39. Ibid.
40. Quilter intvw.
41. MajGen Carl A. Youngdale intvw, 6Mar81 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 441-442.

42. CMC ltr to all general officers, Green Letter 17-69, dtd 4Nov69.

Air Defense

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st LAAM Bn ComdCs, Jan-Aug69.

Accomplishments and Costs

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

CHAPTER 14 ARTILLERY AND SURVEILLANCE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 2/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 4/11 ComdCs, Jan-Sep69; 1/13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 1/12 ComdCs, Jan-Sep69; 2/12 ComdCs, Jan-Aug69; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 4/12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1st FAG ComdCs, Jan-Jul69, Nov-Dec69; and 11th Mar, Resume of Artillery Operations, 1 December 1968 to 30 November 1969, dtd 3Dec69, in 1stMarDiv Admin File, hereafter 11th Mar, Arty Ops.

Artillery Operations

1. Col Peter J. Mulroney intvw, 17Jul69, No. 4384 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mulroney intvw.
2. MCDEC, Artillery Reference Data, dtd Aug70, pp. 35-45.
3. 1stMarDiv OpO 301-YR, dtd 10Dec69.
4. Mulroney intvw; Col Wallace W. Crompton, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86, (Vietnam 69 Comment Files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Maj Robert V. Nicoli, "Fire Support Base Development," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep69, pp. 38-43; MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis intvw.
6. Davis intvw.
7. Ibid.
8. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 11th Mar, Arty Ops.
9. Col Don D. Ezell intvw, 8Apr70, No. 4837 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Ezell intvw.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid; FMFPac MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 37-39.
13. Ezell intvw.
14. Ibid.
15. Mulroney intvw.
16. 11th Mar, Arty Ops.
17. Mulroney intvw.
18. Col Joseph Sleger, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 1st Force

Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3d Force Recon Co ComdCs, Aug, Nov-Dec69. Extensive use was made of LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, CHC, USN, "Aarugha!, Report to Director, Historical Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, on the History of Specialized and Force Level Reconnaissance Activities and Units of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1974" (unpublished ms, 1981).

19. Col John S. Canton, Comments on draft ms, 3Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Canton Comments.
20. FMFPac to CMC, dtd 8Dec69, III MAF Misc Msg File, Oct-Dec69.
21. Davis intvw, p. 285.
22. Ibid., pp. 285-286.
23. 1stLt Wayne E. Rollings intvw, Jun69, No. 4074 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); "Caught With His Pants On," *Sea Tiger*, 16May69.
24. Debrief Rpt, dtd 131900Apr69 in 1st For Rec Co ComdC, Apr69; "Recon Patrol Eludes 150 NVA," *Sea Tiger*, May69.
25. Ibid.
26. Debrief Rpt, dtd 050500Jun69 in 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun69.
27. Debrief Rpt, dtd 020533Jun69 in 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun69.
28. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep69.
29. Maj John J. Guenther intvw, 11Aug69, No. 4483 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
30. Col Anthony J. Skotnicki intvw, 18Sep69, No. 4562 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Skotnicki intvw.
31. 1stMarDiv ComdC, May69.
32. 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Mar69.
33. COMUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 14May69 (MACV Hist-DocColl, Reel 46).
34. Canton Comments.
35. Skotnicki intvw.

CHAPTER 15 SUPPLYING III MAF

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69.

Force Logistic Command

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; FLSG-Alpha ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; FLSG-Bravo ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Col James B. Soper, "A View From FMFPac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1965-1971," *Naval Review* 1972, pp. 224-239.

1. FLSG-Bravo ComdC, Nov69.
2. Col Frank P. DeNormandie intvw, 10Nov69, No. 4684 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 1stMarDiv ComdC, May69.
4. MajGen Wilbur F. Simlik intvw, 14Oct77 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 26, hereafter Simlik intvw.
5. Col John L. Schwartz intvw, 22Oct69, No. 4564 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Col William D. Bassett, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. FLC ComdC, Apr69.
8. Col Samuel A. Hannah intvw, 7Jul69, No. 4256 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

9. FLC ComdCs, Apr-May69; Col Darwin B. Pond, Jr., intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4253 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: III MAF/I Corps Tactical Zone Common Service Support Responsibilities File, 3Jan69-1Feb70, hereafter cited as III MAF CSS File; U.S. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, Command History 1969, in Operational Archives Branch, NHD, hereafter USNSADN Comd Hist 1969; Cdr Frank C. Collins, Jr., USN, "Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps," *Naval Review* 1971, pp. 158-179, hereafter Collins, "Maritime Support"; U.S. Naval Support Activity/Facility, Da Nang, *Changes: A History*, 1970, hereafter *Changes, A History*.

10. Collins, "Maritime Support," pp. 158-159; USNSADN, Comd Hist 1969.
11. USNSADN, Comd Hist 1969.
12. LtGen Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 177-181.
13. Ibid., p. 184.
14. ComNavForV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Jun69, III MAF CSS File.
15. CGIIIMAF msg to ComNavForV, dtd 4Jun69, Ibid.
16. Simlik intvw, p. 17.
17. Ibid., p. 18.
18. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki intvw, 24Oct74 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 68-69; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft ms, 1Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
19. III MAF CSS File; Collins, "Maritime Support," p. 178; and *Changes: A History*.

Engineer Support

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 9th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

20. HQMC, Status of Forces, Jan69; MajGen Robert R. Ploger, *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Engineers, 1965-1970* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 148-155.
21. LtCol Adrian G. Traas, USA, Comments on draft ms, 29Aug86 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. Col Nicholas A. Canzona intvw, 4Mar70, No. 4796 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, May69.
24. FMFPac MarOpsV, Dec69.
25. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
26. 11th Engr Bn ComdC, Sep-Nov69.
27. Land-Clearing Company (Provisional) AAR, Go Noi Island, in 7th Engr Bn ComdC, Jul69.
28. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 25May73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 654.

Motor Transport

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 9th MT Bn

ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 11th MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Truck Company ComdCs, Jan-Dec69 in 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

29. LtCol Laurier J. Tremblay, Comments on draft ms, 11Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

30. 11th MT Bn ComdCs, Apr-Aug69.

Medical Support

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 1st Hospital Co ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

31. Col Eugene R. Brady, Comments on draft ms, 14Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Eugene R. Brady, "The Thread of a Concept," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May71, pp. 35-42.
32. Ibid., p. 40, 42.

Communications

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 5th Com Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th Com Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Maj Blaine D. King, "Force Comm in Vietnam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb72, pp. 35-38.

Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv OpO 25-69, dtd 23Sep69, and 3dMarDiv "Lessons Learned, 3d Marine Division Redeployment, June through December 1969," dtd 5Jan70.

33. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki intvw, 24Oct74 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 66-68.
34. Simlik intvw, pp. 22-23.
35. Ibid.
36. Jones intvw, p. 57.
37. Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
38. Simlik intvw, p. 16.
39. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
40. Jones intvw, pp. 65-66.

PART VI Unique Contributions

CHAPTER 16 PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

The National Perspective

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Com-

mand History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; and MACV, Hamlet Evaluation System Handbook, Jun69.

1. Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Prime Minister, Central Pacification and Development Council, "Basic Directive on the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan," p. 3 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

Pacification Planning In I Corps

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; and I Corps/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) 1969, dtd 26Dec68.

2. Col George C. Knapp intvw, 2May69, No. 4088 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Knapp intvw.
3. III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.
4. Ibid.; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

Line Unit Pacification

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

5. Knapp intvw.
6. Maj John J. Guenther intvw, 11Aug69. No. 4483 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. 1stMarDiv AAR, Opn Pipestone Canyon.
8. Ibid.
9. MACCORDS, Monthly Reports-Kit Carson Scout Program, Jan-Dec69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

Civic Action

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

10. I Corps/III MAF CCP, 1969, p. B-3-2.
11. Ibid., p. B-3-9.
12. 3dMarDiv G-5, History of Civic Action Projects in Quang Tri During 1969, n.d.
13. FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.
14. 3dMarDiv, Civil Affairs & PsyOp Newsletter, Jan, Mar, May69.

The Grass Roots Campaign

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 2dCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3dCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 4thCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

15. CAF Fact Sheet, dtd 31Mar70.
16. Ibid., p. 1.
17. 1stCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 2dCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 3dCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan69; and, Col Charles R. Burroughs CAP Briefing, Jun69, No. 6506 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Burroughs briefing.
18. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 103, hereafter Nickerson intvw.

19. Burroughs briefing.
20. CAF Fact Sheet, p. 2.
21. Ibid.; LtCol Earl R. Hunter, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86, 14Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Burroughs briefing.
22. Cpl Michael E. Gordy intvw, 5Mar69, No. 3913 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. 4th CAG OpO, Mobilization of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1, dtd 1Apr69 in 2d CAG ComdC, Apr69.
24. CAF Fact Sheet, Encl 7, "A Discussion of the Mobile CAP Concept."
25. Human Sciences Research, Inc., Interim Technical Report, "Marine Combined Action Capabilities: Training For Future Contingencies," Apx C, p. 61.
26. Ibid., p. 16.
27. Alexander Firfer intvw, 26Jul76, No. 6323 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Firfer intvw.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft ms, 1Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
30. 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Nov-Dec69; Nickerson intvw, pp. 101-102.

Results

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, 1969, Oct-Dec69; and III MAF ComdCs, Nov-Dec69.

31. Col Theodore E. Metzger, Comments on draft ms, 25Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. Firfer intvw.
33. Ibid.

CHAPTER 17

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 9th MAB ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1/26 ComdCs, Feb-Nov69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Jun, Aug-Nov69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

The Strategic Reserve

1. Col John Lowman, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 22Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Col Clyde W. Hunter intvw, 10Jul69, No. 4363 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Col William C. Doty, Jr., intvw, 23Sep69, No. 4482 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. Col Robert R. Wilson intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4263 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Organization and Operations

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Eager Pursuit; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Daring Rebel; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Bold Pursuit; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Mighty Play; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Defiant Stand; TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.5 AAR, Opn Defi-

ant Measure; 1/26 ComdCs, Feb-Nov69; 1/26 AAR, Opn Daring Rebel; 1/26 AAR, Opn Bold Pursuit; 1/26 AAR, Opn Mighty Play; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Jun, Aug-Nov69; 2/26 AAR, Opn Bold Mariner; 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 3/26 AAR, Opn Bold Mariner-Russell Beach; 3/26 AAR, Opn Defiant Measure-Taylor Common; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; HMM-362 ComdCs, Jan-Jun69; and HMM-265 ComdCs, Jun-Nov69.

5. BGen John E. Williams intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4262 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. HQMC, Final Report of Study of Special Landing Force Operations, dtd 30Mar70.
7. *Sea Tiger*, 30May69.
8. Ibid.

The Fleet's Contingency Force

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th MAB ComdCs, Oct-Nov69; TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Nov-Dec69; and TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Oct-Dec69.

9. CTF 76 msg to CTG 76.4, dtd 3Dec69 in COMSEVENTHFLT Amphib Opns File, Dec69, (Operational Archives Branch, NHC, Washington, D.C.); COMSEVENTHFLT msg to CTF 76 and CTF 79, dtd 5Dec69, in *ibid*.
10. BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr., intvw, 21Nov69, No. 4643 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

CHAPTER 18 THE ADVISORY EFFORT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69.

Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Senior Marine Advisor, "Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954-1973," dtd 22Mar73; Senior Marine Advisor, Monthly Historical Summaries, Jan-Dec69; and Col James T. Breckinridge intvw, 2May69, No. 4060 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), and supporting documents (S908633).

1. Senior Marine Advisor, "Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954-1973," encl 2, pp. 1-2.
2. LtGen Le Nguyen Khang intvw, 30Sep75 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 72-73.

3. Col Leroy V. Corbett intvw, Aug69, No. 5031 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Corbett intvw.
4. LtCol David G. Henderson, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Corbett intvw.
6. Col Leroy V. Corbett, Comments on draft ms, 12Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and LtCol Thomas H. Simpson intvw, 24Sep70, No. 4960 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

7. LtCol Thomas H. Simpson intvw, 24Sep70, No. 4960 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: LtGen John N. McLaughlin intvw, 18Oct78 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 16-38.

10. LtGen John N. McLaughlin intvw, 18Oct78 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 25.
11. Ibid, p. 19.
12. Ibid, p. 38.

Embassy Guard Marines

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Company E, Security Guard Battalion (Saigon) ComdCs, 1969.

CHAPTER 19 1969: AN OVERVIEW

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69, and III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

1. Memo for the Record, JCS Meeting, 15Jan69, dtd 17Jan69, Chapman Papers, MCHC.

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List January-December 1969

III MAF Headquarters, 1Jan-31Dec69*			Col Clifford J. Peabody	21Sep-31Dec69
CG LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1Jan-26Mar69		G-6 Col Bill E. Horner	1Jan-14Sep69
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	27Mar-31Dec69		Col Sam A. Dressin	15Sep-27Nov69
DepCG MajGen Carl A. Youngdale	1Jan-11Jul69		LtCol Richard S. Barry	28Nov-31Dec69
MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr.	12Jul-31Dec69		AC/S Combined Action Program	
DepCG Air MajGen Charles J. Quilter	1Jan-10Jul69		Col Edward F. Danowitz	1Jan-31Mar69
MajGen William G. Thrash	11Jul-31Dec69		Col Charles R. Burroughs	1Apr-Oct69
C/S BGen George E. Dooley	1Jan-22Dec69		Col Theodore E. Metzger	Oct-31Dec69
BGen Leo J. Dulacki	23Dec-31Dec69		1st Combined Action Group (1st CAG)	
DepC/S Col Michael Mosteller	1Jan-18Feb69		CO LtCol Earl R. Hunter	1Jan-24Apr69
Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer	19Feb-27Nov69		LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan	25Apr-23Oct69
Col Sam A. Dressin	28Nov-31Dec69		LtCol David F. Seiler	24Oct-31Dec69
DepC/S Plans BGen Warren K. Bennett, USA	1Jan-29May69		2d Combined Action Group (2d CAG)	
BGen William A. Burke, USA	30May-27Nov69		CO LtCol Edward L. Lewis, Jr.	1Jan-19Oct69
Col Milton M. Cook, Jr.	28Nov-3Dec69		LtCol Don R. Christensen	20Oct-31Dec69
Col James A. Sloan	4Dec-31Dec69		3d Combined Action Group (3d CAG)	
G-1 Col Maurice Rose	1Jan-26Mar69		CO LtCol Robert D. Whitesell	1Jan-24Feb69
Col William J. Howatt	27Mar-20Jun69		LtCol Roi E. Andrews	25Feb-24Jul69
Col George W. Callen	21Jun-21Sep69		LtCol John B. Michaud	24Jul-31Dec69
Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr.	22Sep-31Dec69		4th Combined Action Group (4th CAG)	
G-2 Col Ray N. Joens	1Jan-4Feb69		CO LtCol John E. Greenwood	1Jan-27Feb69
Col John S. Canton	5Feb-19Dec69		LtCol Daniel J. Ford	28Feb-14Aug69
Col Edward W. Dzialo	20Dec-31Dec69		Maj Robert M. Cooper	15Aug-7Sep69
G-3 BGen Carl W. Hoffman	1Jan-17Feb69		LtCol John J. Keenah	8Sep-31Dec69
BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	18Feb-25Jun69		5th/7th Communication Battalion, 15Apr-20Oct69*	
BGen Leo J. Dulacki	26Jun-22Dec69		CO LtCol Charles L. Brady	15Apr-14Sep69
BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.	23Dec-31Dec69		Maj Donald F. Selby	15Sep-30Sep69
Dep G-3 Col Marion C. Dalby	1Jan-17Apr69		LtCol Dale E. Shatzer	10Oct-12Oct69
Col Robert H. Barrow	18Apr-19Jul69		Maj Richard G. Schwarz	13Oct-20Oct69
Col Roy L. Reed	20Jul-27Nov69		*7th Comm Bn departed RVN on 20Oct69.	
Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer	28Nov-31Dec69		1st Marine Division	
G-4 Col Lawrence C. Norton	1Jan-19Jul69		CG MajGen Ormond R. Simpson	1Jan-14Dec69
Col Oliver R. Davis	20Jul-20Oct69		MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler	15Dec-31Dec69
Col Robert J. Barbour	3Oct-11Nov69		ADC BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	1Jan-14Feb69
Col Wilbur F. Simlik	12Nov-31Dec69		BGen Samuel Jaskilka	15Feb-15Aug69
G-5 Col Howard A. Westphall	1Jan-18Apr69		BGen Charles S. Robertson	16Aug-31Dec69
Col Gilbert R. Hershey	19Apr-27Jul69		ADC (TAD III MAF) BGen Carl W. Hoffman	1Jan-14Feb69
Col Theodore E. Metzger	28Jul-20Sep69			

**Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period when a unit was in Vietnam. Only permanent Marine organizations of battalion/squadron-size or larger are listed; exceptions are Task Force Bravo, Task Force Hotel, Task Force Yankee, and Force Logistic Command and its components. The following listing reflects administrative rather than operational organization.*

BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	15Feb-24Jun69	LtCol Harold G. Glasgow	5Feb-8Aug69
BGen Leo J. Dulacki	25Jun-25Dec69	LtCol William V. H. White	9Aug-31Dec69
C/S Col Samuel A. Hannah	1Jan-7Feb69		
Col Harry E. Dickinson	8Feb-8Aug69	3d Battalion, 1st Marines	
Col Charles E. Walker	9Aug-31Dec69	LtCol Thomas E. Bulger	1Jan-6Jul69
G-1 Col George E. Lawrence	1Jan-6Sep69	LtCol Thomas P. Ganey	7Jul-31Dec69
LtCol James E. Harrell	7Sep-11Dec69		
Col Robert E. Barde	12Dec-31Dec69	5th Marines	
G-2 Col Anthony J. Skotnicki	1Jan-14Sep69	CO Col James B. Ord, Jr.	1Jan-22Mar69
Col Edward A. Wilcox	15Sep-31Dec69	Col William J. Zaro	23Mar-16Aug69
G-3 Col Adolph G. Schwenk	1Jan-8Mar69	Col Noble L. Beck	17Aug-31Dec69
Col Jo M. Van Meter	9Mar-22Mar69		
Col James B. Ord, Jr.	23Mar-31Oct69	1st Battalion, 5th Marines	
Col Floyd H. Waldrop	1Nov-31Dec69	CO LtCol Richard F. Daley	1Jan-26Apr69
G-4 Col James E. Wilson, Jr.	1Jan-12Mar69	LtCol William E. Riley, Jr.	27Apr-30Aug69
Col John L. Schwartz	13Mar-14Oct69	Maj Patrick E. O'Toole	31Aug-22Sep69
Col Nicholas A. Canzona	15Oct-31Dec69	LtCol Joseph K. Griffis, Jr.	23Sep-31Dec69
G-5 Col Harry F. Painter	1Jan-15Aug69	2d Battalion, 5th Marines	
Col William J. Zaro	16Aug-12Dec69	CO LtCol James W. Stemple	1Jan-13Mar69
LtCol Vincent A. Albers, Jr.	13Dec-31Dec69	LtCol James H. Higgins	14Mar-18Aug69
		Maj Robert E. Loeh	19Aug-25Aug69
		LtCol James T. Bowen	26Aug-31Dec69
Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division		3d Battalion, 5th Marines	
CO Col William S. Fagan	1Jan-27Mar69	CO LtCol Harry E. Atkinson	1Jan-29Jun69
Col Nicholas A. Canzona	28Mar-30Sep69	LtCol John M. Terry, Jr.	30Jun-8Dec69
Col William C. Patton	1Oct-31Dec69	LtCol Johan S. Gestson	9Dec-31Dec69
Task Force Yankee, 1Jan-8Mar69*			
CO BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	1Jan-14Feb69	7th Marines	
BGen Samuel S. Jaskilka	15Feb-8Mar69	CO Col Herbert L. Beckington	1Jan-7Feb69
C/S Col Robert L. Nichols	1Jan-16Jan69	Col Robert L. Nichols	8Feb-9Jul69
Col William J. Zaro	17Jan-8Mar69	Col Gildo S. Codispoti	10Jul-31Dec69
G-1 Capt Richard W. Schulz	1Jan-8Mar69		
G-2 LtCol John A. Dowd	1Jan-8Mar69	1st Battalion, 7th Marines	
G-3 LtCol Raymond P. Coffman, Jr.	1Jan-8Mar69	CO LtCol William F. Bethel	1Jan-22Mar69
G-4 Maj Kenneth P. Knueble	1Jan-6Mar69	LtCol John A. Dowd	23Mar-13Aug69
Capt Nicola M. Pereira, Jr.	7Mar-8Mar69	LtCol Frank A. Clark	14Aug-31Dec69
<i>*Deactivated with termination of Operation Taylor Common on 8Mar69.</i>		2d Battalion, 7th Marines	
1st Marines		CO LtCol Neil A. Nelson	1Jan-21Feb69
CO Col Robert G. Lauffer	1Jan-24Feb69	LtCol Jan P. Vandersluis	22Feb-27Feb69
Col Charles S. Robertson	25Feb-30May69	LtCol Neil A. Nelson	28Feb-28Apr69
Col Charles E. Walker	31May-13Jun69	LtCol Marvin H. Lugger	29Apr-28Aug69
Col Charles S. Robertson	14Jun-16Aug69	LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins	29Aug-21Oct69
Col Herbert L. Wilkerson	17Aug-31Dec69	LtCol Arthur E. Folsom	21Oct-31Dec69
1st Battalion, 1st Marines		3d Battalion, 7th Marines	
CO LtCol Alphonse A. Laporte, Jr.	1Jan-28Mar69	CO LtCol Francis X. Quinn	1Jan-22Mar69
LtCol Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr.	29Mar-8Oct69	LtCol James O. Allison	23Mar-17Aug69
LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze	9Oct-31Dec69	LtCol Ray G. Kummerow	18Aug-31Dec69
2d Battalion, 1st Marines		26th Marines, 7Nov-31Dec69	
CO LtCol John E. Poindexter	1Jan-4Feb69	CO Col Ralph A. Heywood	7Nov-12Dec69
		LtCol James E. Harrell	13Dec-31Dec69

1st Battalion, 26th Marines			
CO LtCol James C. Goodin	7Nov-31Dec69	LtCol Dale E. Young	11Mar-7Jul69
		LtCol Robert B. March	8Jul-8Sep69
2d Battalion, 26th Marines		LtCol Larry R. Butler	9Sep-12Nov69
CO LtCol William C. Drumright	7Nov-31Dec69	Maj Joseph J. Louder	13Nov-31Dec69
3d Battalion, 26th Marines			
CO LtCol William A. Simpson	7Nov-26Dec69	1st Motor Transport Battalion	
LtCol John J. Unterkofler	27Dec-31Dec69	CO Maj Robert G. Reilly	1Jan-3Jan69
		LtCol Billy E. Wilson	4Jan-30Sep69
11th Marines		Maj Donald C. Pease	1Oct-1Dec69
CO Col Harry E. Dickinson	1Jan-7Feb69	LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff	2Dec-31Dec69
Col Samuel A. Hannah	8Feb-2Jul69		
Col Carl E. Walker	3Jul-8Aug69	1st Engineer Battalion	
LtCol Corbin J. Johnson	9Aug-31Aug69	CO LtCol Donald H. Hildebrand	1Jan-25Mar69
Col Don D. Ezell	1Sep-31Dec69	LtCol John F. Mader	26Mar-31Jul69
		LtCol Roland E. Smith	31Jul-16Nov69
		LtCol Walter M. Winoski	17Nov-31Dec69
1st Battalion, 11th Marines			
CO LtCol John A. Hamilton	1Jan-11Mar69	1st Shore Party Battalion	
LtCol Francis Andriiunas	12Mar-21Aug69	CO LtCol Donald L. Anderson	1Jan-9Sep69
LtCol John D. Shoup	22Aug-31Dec69	Maj John E. Duck	10Sep-4Oct69
		LtCol Richard F. Armstrong	5Oct-31Dec69
2d Battalion, 11th Marines			
CO LtCol Robert D. Jameson	1Jan-20Apr69	3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion	
LtCol Kenneth L. Smith	21Apr-1Oct69	CO LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan	1Jan-28Feb69
LtCol Vonda Weaver	2Oct-31Dec69	Maj James W. Rahill	1Mar-5Mar69
		Maj King D. Thatenhurst, Sr.	6Mar-12Sep69
3d Battalion, 11th Marines		Maj James W. Rahill	13Sep-31Oct69
CO LtCol Richard P. Johnson	1Jan-28Feb69	LtCol David G. Mehargue	1Nov-31Dec69
Maj Andrew F. Bauer	1Mar-14Mar69		
LtCol Raymond B. Ingrand	15Mar-20Oct69	1st Medical Battalion	
LtCol Karl N. Mueller	21Oct-31Dec69	CO Capt James V. Sharp, MC, USN	1Jan-20Feb69
		Capt James W. Lea, MC, USN	21Feb-31Dec69
4th Battalion, 11th Marines			
CO Maj Bobby J. Ready	1Jan-1Jun69	7th Communication Battalion, 1Jan-15Apr69*	
Maj Eric H. Wieler	2Jun-14Jun69	CO LtCol Charles L. Brady	1Jan-15Apr69
LtCol John H. Strandquist	15Jun-16Oct69	<i>*Unit transferred to III MAF and combined with 5th Comm Bn.</i>	
LtCol James F. Burke, Jr.	17Oct-31Dec69		
1st Field Artillery Group*			
CO LtCol Raymond B. Ingrand	1Jan-15Mar69	11th Motor Transport Battalion	
Maj Edward E. Johnson	16Mar-27Mar69	CO LtCol John A. Kinniburgh	1Jan-12Sep69
1stLt Joseph H. Molen	28Mar-13Jul69	Maj Michael J. Zachodni	13Sep-17Sep69
		LtCol William R. Kephart	18Sep-31Dec69
<i>*Reduced to cadre strength on 1Apr69 and departed RVN on 13Jul69 with RLTF-9.</i>			
1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 7Nov-31Dec69		7th Engineer Battalion	
CO LtCol Donald H. Strain	7Nov-31Dec69	CO LtCol Themistocles T. Annas	1Jan-18Aug69
		LtCol William G. Bates	19Aug-31Dec69
1st Reconnaissance Battalion			
CO LtCol Larry P. Charon	1Jan-8Feb69	9th Engineer Battalion	
LtCol Richard D. Mickelson	9Feb-7Oct69	CO LtCol Darrell U. Davidson	1Jan-20Mar69
LtCol John J. Grace	8Oct-31Dec69	LtCol Billy F. Visage	21Mar-31Aug69
		LtCol Edward K. Maxwell	1Sep-31Dec69
1st Tank Battalion			
CO LtCol Maurice C. Ashley, Jr.	1Jan-10Mar69	3d Marine Division, 1Jan-7Nov69	
		CG MajGen Raymond G. Davis	1Jan-14Apr69
		MajGen William K. Jones	15Apr-6Jul69

BGen Regan Fuller (Acting)	6Jul-12Jul69	3d Marines*	
MajGen William K. Jones	13Jul-7Nov69	CO Col Michael M. Spark	1Jan-15Jan69
ADC BGen Frank E. Garretson	1Jan-22Apr69	Col Paul D. Lafond	16Jan-27Jun69
BGen Regan Fuller	23Apr-6Jul69	Col Wilbur F. Simlik	28Jun-6Oct69
BGen Regan Fuller	13Jul-7Nov69	*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.	
ADC BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr.	1Jan-9Jun69	1st Battalion, 3d Marines*	
C/S Col Martin J. Sexton	1Jan-29Aug69	CO LtCol Richard B. Twohey	1Jan-2Feb69
Col Robert P. Wray	30Aug-7Nov69	LtCol John S. Kyle	3Feb-10May69
G-1 Col Louis R. Daze	1Jan-26Feb69	LtCol David G. Herron	11May-21Sep69
LtCol Edward D. Gelzer, Jr.	26Feb-29Apr69	*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.	
Col Marshall A. Webb, Jr.	30Apr-3Oct69	2d Battalion, 3d Marines*	
LtCol William S. Daniels	4Oct-7Nov69	CO LtCol James J. McMonagle	1Jan-2Aug69
G-2 Col Thomas P. O'Callaghan	1Jan-29Jun69	LtCol William S. Daniels	3Aug-21Sep69
LtCol Charles R. Stephenson II	30Jun-7Nov69	*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.	
G-3 Col Paul D. Lafond	1Jan-16Jan69	3d Battalion, 3d Marines*	
Col Francis R. Kraince	17Jan-17Jul69	CO LtCol Richard C. Schulze	1Jan-19Aug69
Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr.	18Jul-28Aug69	LtCol Ernest E. Evans, Jr.	20Aug-13Sep69
Col William E. Barrineau	29Aug-7Nov69	LtCol David F. Seiler	14Sep-21Sep69
G-4 Col Frank R. Denormandie	1Jan-7Nov69	*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 7Oct69.	
G-5 Col William E. Kerrigan	1Jan-7Nov69	4th Marines*	
Headquarters Battalion		CO Col William F. Goggin	1Jan-9Aug69
CO Marshall A. Webb, Jr.	1Jan-30Apr69	Col Gilbert R. Hershey	10Aug-20Nov69
LtCol Stewart B. McCarty, Jr.	1May-25Aug69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Nov69.	
Maj Robert T. Carney	26Aug-5Sep69	1st Battalion, 4th Marines*	
Maj Keith L. Christensen	6Sep-9Sep69	CO LtCol George T. Sargent, Jr.	1Jan-21Mar69
LtCol Charles F. King, Jr.	10Sep-7Nov69	LtCol Clair E. Willcox	22Mar-5Aug69
Task Force Bravo, 1Jan-18Feb69*		LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis	6Aug-22Oct69
CO Col Truman W. Clark	1Jan-18Feb69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 22Oct69.	
XO LtCol Byron T. Chen	1Jan-18Feb69	2d Battalion, 4th Marines*	
S-1 GySgt Robert D. Smith	1Jan-18Feb69	CO LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins	1Jan-6Sep69
S-2 Maj George L. Shelley III	1Jan-18Feb69	LtCol William C. Britt	7May-6Sep69
S-3 Maj Harry L. Bauknight	1Jan-18Feb69	LtCol Donald J. Garrett	7Sep-9Nov69
S-4 1stLt Steven L. Cox	1Jan-18Feb69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 9Nov69.	
*Unit deactivated as operational control passed to 3d Marine Division on 18Feb69.			
Task Force Hotel, 1Jan-8Jul69*		3d Battalion, 4th Marines*	
CO BGen Frank E. Garretson	1Jan-31Mar69	CO LtCol William A. Donald	1Jan-10May69
BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr.	1Apr-21May69	Maj Raymond D. Walters	6May-10May69
MGen Clifford B. Drake	21May-22May69	LtCol James W. Wood	10May-20Nov69
BGen Regan Fuller	22May-8Jul69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Nov69.	
C/S Col Robert D. Slay	1May-6Jun69	9th Marines*	
Col Warren L. MacQuarrie	7Jun-8Jul69	CO Col Robert H. Barrow	1Jan-8Apr69
G-1 Capt William K. Hoyt, Jr.	1May-15Jun69	Col Edward F. Danowitz	9Apr-13Aug69
2dLt Blaine E. Moyer	16Jun-8Jul69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 13Aug69.	
G-2 Capt Robert B. Mackenzie	1May-27Jun69	1st Battalion, 9th Marines*	
Maj Larry R. Ogle	28Jun-8Jul69	CO LtCol George W. Smith	1Jan-30Mar69
G-3 LtCol George W. Smith	1May-8Jul69	LtCol Thomas J. Culkin	31Mar-14Jul69
G-4 Maj Donald C. Bickel	1May-8Jul69	*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 14Jul69.	
*With the decision to withdraw the 9th Marines, TF Hotel was deactivated on 8Jul69. Names of personnel serving on staff through 30Apr69 are unavailable.			

2d Battalion, 9th Marines*

CO LtCol George C. Fox	1Jan-4Mar69
Maj Patrick G. Collins (Acting)	5Mar-18Mar69
LtCol George C. Fox	19Mar-22Jun69
Maj Robert L. Modjeski	23Jun-1Aug69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 1Aug69.*

3d Battalion, 9th Marines*

CO LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr.	1Jan-16Apr69
LtCol Oral R. Swigart, Jr.	17Apr-22Jun
LtCol Donald E. Wood	23Jun-13Aug69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 13Aug69.*

12th Marines*

CO Col Peter J. Mulroney	1Jan-11Jul69
Col Wallace W. Crompton	12Jul-9Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 9Nov69.*

1st Battalion, 12th Marines*

CO LtCol Ermil L. Whisman	1Jan-15Jan69
LtCol Roddey B. Moss	16Jan-7Jun69
LtCol Morgan W. West	8Jun-2Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 2Oct69.*

2d Battalion, 12th Marines*

CO LtCol Joseph R. Scoppa, Jr.	1Jan-30Mar69
LtCol Calhoun J. Killeen	31Mar-31Jul69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 31Jul69.*

3d Battalion, 12th Marines*

CO LtCol Eugene D. Foxworth, Jr.	1Jan-31Apr69
Maj Robert E. Gibson	1May-2Jul69
Maj Harry H. Bair	3Aug-18Aug69
LtCol David R. McMillan, Jr.	19Aug-5Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 5Nov69.*

4th Battalion, 12th Marines*

CO LtCol Earl W. Bailey	1Jan-3May69
LtCol Joseph R. Scoppa, Jr.	4May-11Jul69
Maj Thomas L. Edwards	12Jul-31Jul69
LtCol Alfred J. Croft, Jr.	1Aug-29Sep69
Maj Harry H. Bair	30Sep-19Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 19Nov69.*

3d Reconnaissance Battalion*

CO LtCol Aydlette H. Perry, Jr.	1Jan-29May69
LtCol Richard R. Burritt	30May-24Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 24Nov69.*

3d Tank Battalion*

CO LtCol George E. Hayward	1Jan-31Jan69
LtCol Joseph Sleger, Jr.	1Feb-15Jul69
Maj Raymond G. Kennedy, Sr.	16Jul-16Sep69
LtCol William S. Rump	17Sep-23Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Oct69.*

3d Motor Transport Battalion*

CO Maj George W. Ward	1Jan-16Feb69
Maj Joseph F. Lavin	17Feb-8Jul69
Maj Raymond S. Davis, Jr.	9Jul-20Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Oct69.*

3d Engineer Battalion*

CO LtCol Walter L. Persac	1Jan-15Apr69
LtCol John R. Lilley II	16Apr-3Aug69
LtCol Raymond C. Damm	4Aug-6Sep69
LtCol James W. Medis	7Sep-23Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Oct69.*

3d Shore Party Battalion*

CO Maj Edwin J. Godfrey	1Jan-7Mar69
Maj Joseph B. Knotts	8Mar-16Aug69
LtCol Eugene E. Paro, Jr.	17Aug-10Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 10Nov69.*

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion*

CO LtCol Walter W. Darnewood, Jr.	1Jan-30Mar69
Maj David R. Stefansson	31Mar-5Jun69
Maj William A. Grubbs III	6Jun-15Jun69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 15Jun69.*

3d Medical Battalion*

CO Cdr Barton K. Slemmons, MC, USN	1Jan-24Jul69
Capt Jacob V. Brown, MC, USN	25Jul-24Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 24Nov69.*

9th Motor Transport Battalion*

CO LtCol Laurier J. Tremblay	1Jan-22Oct69
Maj Larry D. Derryberry	23Oct-4Nov69

**Unit departed for Okinawa, 4Nov69.*

11th Engineer Battalion*

CO LtCol Robert C. Evans	1Jan-6Sep69
Maj Dale R. Thibault	7Sep-21Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 21Nov69.*

Force Logistic Command

CO BGen James A. Feeley, Jr.	1Dec68-6Nov69
BGen Mauro J. Padalino	7Nov-31Dec69

Headquarters and Service Battalion,**1st Force Service Regiment**

CO LtCol Edward Lukas	1Jan-19Aug69
LtCol John H. Miller	20Aug-1Dec69
LtCol Lewis R. Webb	2Dec-31Dec69

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO LtCol Edward G. Usher	1Jan-31May69
Col William W. Storm III	1Jun-5Nov69
Col Robert W. Calvert	6Nov-31Dec69

Maintenance Battalion,**1st Force Service Regiment**

CO LtCol Edward W. Critchett	1Jan-16Oct69
LtCol Edward C. Morris	17Oct-31Dec69

3d Service Battalion (Rein)**/Force Logistic Support Group Alpha***

CO Col Horton E. Roeder	1Jan-13May69
LtCol William D. Bassett, Jr.	14May-18Aug69
LtCol Ward R. Reiss	19Aug-28Oct69
LtCol William J. Beer	29Oct-7Nov69

**Unit redeployed to Okinawa and replaced by Sub-Unit 1, FLSG "B" (Rear).*

1st Service Battalion (Rein)**/Force Logistic Support Group Bravo**

CO Col Harold L. Parsons	1Jan-6Sep69
Col Donald E. Morin	7Sep-31Dec69

1st Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol James D. Bailey	1Jan-8Nov69
LtCol Speros D. Thomaidis	9Nov-31Dec69

3d Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol Willard E. Cheatham	1Jan-14Oct69
LtCol Charles Fimian	15Oct-31Dec69

5th Communication Battalion*

CO LtCol Jack D. Hines	1Jan-15Apr69
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**Unit transferred to III MAF on 15Apr69 and merged with 7th Communication Battalion.*

7th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Jerome W. Brown	1Jan-27Aug69
Maj G. B. Tucker	28Aug-19Oct69
LtCol Richard L. Prather	20Oct-31Dec69

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

CG MajGen Charles J. Quilter	1Jan-10Jul69
MajGen William G. Thrash	11Jul-31Dec69
AWC BGen Henry W. Hise	1Jan-28Feb69
Vacant	1Mar-10Jun69
BGen William G. Johnson	11Jun-6Nov69
AWC BGen Homer S. Hill	1Jan-15May69
BGen Ralph H. Spanjer	16May-31Dec69
C/S Col Virgil D. Olson	1Jan-6Sep69
Col Robert W. Teller	7Sep-31Dec69
G-1 Col Edward A. Parnell	1Jan-4Mar69
Col Rex A. Deasy	5Mar-30Jun69
Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr.	1Jul-31Dec69
G-2 LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr.	1Jan-23Feb69
Col John J. Doherty	24Feb-11Jul69
Col Leonard L. Orr	12Jul-19Sep69
Col James R. Weaver	20Sep-31Dec69

G-3 Col Edwin H. Finlayson	1Jan-10Jun69
Col Robert L. Lamar	11Jun-31Dec69
G-4 Col Steve Furimsky, Jr.	1Jan-5Mar69
Col Norman W. Gourley	6Mar-6Aug69
LtCol Neil F. Defenbaugh	7Aug-11Aug69
LtCol Edward E. Smith	12Aug-15Aug69
Col William C. McGraw, Jr.	16Aug-31Dec69

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1**(MWHG-1)**

CO Col Thomas H. Nichols, Jr.	1Jan-26Feb69
LtCol Dennis W. Wright	27Feb-18Mar69
Col John R. Gill	19Mar-18Jul69
LtCol William Shanks, Jr.	19Jul-10Nov69
Col Laurence J. Stien	11Nov-31Dec69

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18**(H&HS-18)**

CO LtCol John R. Dopler	1Jan-11Jul69
Capt George P. Turner, Jr.	12Jul-3Aug69
LtCol Paul E. Shea	4Aug-5Oct69
Maj Herbert E. Hoppmeyer, Jr.	6Oct-31Dec69

Marine Air Support Squadron 2**(MASS-2)**

CO Maj Edward J. Dahy III	1Jan-10Jan69
LtCol Robert A. Fuller	11Jan-5Aug69
Maj Marvin L. Crowdis	6Aug-14Aug69
Maj Ronald G. Richardson	15Aug-31Oct69
Maj Jerry D. Oden	1Nov-23Nov69

Marine Air Support Squadron 3**(MASS-3)**

CO LtCol William J. Sullivan	1Jan-3Mar69
LtCol William H. Jackson, Jr.	4Mar-11Sep69
LtCol John H. Dubois	12Sep-31Dec69

Marine Air Control Squadron 4**(MACS-4)**

CO LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman	1Jan-9Mar69
LtCol Edward S. John	10Mar-12Aug69
LtCol Robert E. McCamey II	13Aug-30Dec69
Maj Robert W. Molyneux, Jr.	31Dec69

Marine Wing Support Group 17**(MWSG-17)**

CO Col Richard S. Rash	1Jan-5Mar69
LtCol Harry U. Carpenter	6Mar-10Aug69
Col Richard A. Savage	11Aug-31Dec69

Marine Air Control Group 18**(MACG-18)**

CO Col Edward S. Fris	1Jan-16Jul69
Col Stanley G. Dunnwiddie, Jr.	17Jul-31Dec69

**1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion
(1st LAAM)***

CO LtCol John W. Drury 1Jan-7Jul69
Maj Edward L. House, Jr. 8Jul-16Aug69

**Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 16Aug69.*

**Marine Aircraft Group 11
(MAG-11)**

CO Col Robert D. Slay 1Jan-13Mar69
Col Steve Furminsky, Jr. 14Mar-12Aug69
Col John B. Heffernan 13Aug-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11
(H&MS-11)**

CO LtCol Robert M. Stowers 14May-29Aug69
LtCol Guy O. Badger 14May-29Aug69
LtCol Richard F. Hebert 30Aug-31Dec69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 11
(MABS-11)**

CO LtCol Preston P. Margues, Jr. 1Jan-15May69
LtCol George W. Glauser 16May-21Oct69
LtCol Paul A. Manning 22Oct-31Dec69

**Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1
(VMCJ-1)**

CO LtCol Bobby R. Hall 1Jan-16May69
LtCol Preston P. Marques, Jr. 17May-13Oct69
LtCol Bob W. Farley 14Oct-31Dec69

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 225
(VMA[AW]-225)***

CO LtCol Ronald L. Townsend 5Feb-21Jun69
LtCol Donald L. Harvey 22Jun-28Nov69
Maj Peter M. Busch 29Nov-31Dec69

**From MAG-14, 5Feb69.*

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 242
(VMA[AW]-242)**

CO LtCol Fred C. Rilling, Jr. 1Jan-14Jan69
LtCol Adnah K. Frain 15Jan-1Jul69
LtCol Thomas L. Griffin, Jr. 2Jul-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334
(VMFA-334)***

CO LtCol James R. Sherman 1Jan-24Jan69

**To MAG-13, 24Jan69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542
(VMFA-542)**

CO LtCol Henry R. Vitali 1Jan-24Feb69
LtCol Ray N. Stewart 25Feb-10Aug69
LtCol Keith A. Smith 11Aug-31Dec69

Marine Aircraft Group 12

CO Col Rex A. Deasy 1Jan-28Feb69

Col Thomas H. Nichols, Jr. 1Mar-28Sep69
Col Paul B. Henley 29Sep-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12
(H&MS-12)**

CO LtCol Clifford D. Warfield 1Jan-9Apr69
LtCol John J. McCarthy 10Apr-18Sep69
LtCol Joseph J. Went 19Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 12
(MABS-12)**

CO Maj Lawrence Furstenberg 1Jan-30Apr69
LtCol John J. Cahill 1May-13Dec69
LtCol George J. Ertlmeier 14Dec-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121
(VMFA-121)***

CO Maj David A. Lerps 1Jan-14Feb69

**Redesignated VMA(AW)-121 on 14Feb69 and assigned to 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211
(VMFA-211)**

CO LtCol John R. Waterstreet 1Jan-15Mar69
LtCol Edward T. Graham, Jr. 16Mar-5Sep69
LtCol Louis Gasparine, Jr. 6Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 223
(VMFA-223)**

CO Maj Leonard T. Preston, Jr. 1Jan-10Apr69
LtCol Merrill S. Newbill 11Apr-27Sep69
LtCol James W. Lazzo 28Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 311
(VMFA-311)**

CO LtCol Charles O. Hiatt 1Jan-30Apr69
LtCol David A. Kelly 1May-24Nov69
Maj Arthur R. Hickle 25Nov-31Dec

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533
(VMA[AW]-533)***

CO LtCol Paul K. German, Jr. 1Jan-28Feb69
LtCol George H. Shutt, Jr. 1Mar-30Sep69
LtCol Frank G. Castillo, Jr. 1Oct-7Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Japan, 7Oct69.*

Marine Aircraft Group 13

CO Col Norman W. Gourley 1Jan-5Mar69
Col Richard S. Rash 6Mar-14Sep69
Col Thomas E. Murphree 15Sep-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13
(H&MS-13)**

CO Maj Edgar A. House 1Jan-14Jan69
LtCol Billy M. Adrian 15Jan-13Jun69

LtCol Lawrence J. Willis 14Jun-9Oct69
 Maj James D. Moody 10Oct-16Nov69
 LtCol Douglas L. Snead 17Nov-28Dec69
 Maj Frank J. Horak, Jr. 29Dec-31Dec69

Marine Air Base Squadron 13
(MABS-13)

CO LtCol Charles V. Smillie, Jr. 1Jan-23Apr69
 LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr. 24Apr-11Jun69
 LtCol Norbert F. Schnippel, Jr. 12Jun-4Jul69
 LtCol Alfred N. Drago 5Jul-5Oct69
 LtCol Richard D. Revie 6Oct-31Dec69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115
(VMEA-115)

CO LtCol Robert R. Norton 1Jan-1Jul69
 LtCol Edwin C. Paige, Jr. 2Jul-31Dec69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122
(VMEA-122)*

CO LtCol John K. Cochran 5Sep-31Dec69

**From MAG-15, 5Sep69.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232
(VMEA-232)*

CO LtCol Walter P. Hutchins 21Mar-11Aug69
 LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen 12Aug-7Sep69

**Unit arrived RVN from CONUS, 21Mar69; departed RVN for Japan, 7Sep69.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314
(VMEA-314)

CO LtCol Frank E. Petersen, Jr. 1Jan-23Feb69
 LtCol Thomas R. Morgan 24Feb-8Mar69
 LtCol John W. Black 9Mar-25Jun69
 LtCol Charles G. Frederick 26Jun-1Dec69
 LtCol Thomas J. Kelly 2Dec-31Dec69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323
(VMEA-323)*

CO LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr. 1Jan-25Mar69

**Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 25Mar69.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334
(VMEA-334)*

CO LtCol James R. Sherman 24Jan-12Feb69
 LtCol Samuel E. D'Angelo III 13Feb-1Jul69
 LtCol John R. Braddon 2Jul-30Aug69

**Unit departed RVN for Japan, 30Aug69.*

Marine Aircraft Group 16

CO Col Warren L. MacQuarrie 1Jan-12Mar69
 LtCol Floyd K. Fulton, Jr. 13Mar-30Sep69
 Col James P. Bruce 1Oct-31Dec69

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16
(H&MS-16)

CO LtCol Charles W. Gobat 1Jan-25May69
 LtCol James W. Laseter 26May-19Aug69
 LtCol Richard A. Bancroft 20Aug-22Dec69
 Maj Malcolm T. Hornsby, Jr. 23Dec-31Dec69

Marine Air Base Squadron 16
(MABS-16)

CO LtCol William Cunningham 1Jan-9May69
 Maj John C. Archbold 10May-7Jun69
 LtCol Joseph R. Donaldson 8Jun-30Sep69
 LtCol John W. Coffman 1Oct-19Dec69
 Maj Peter C. Scaglione, Jr. 20Dec-31Dec69

Marine Observation Squadron 2
(VMO-2)

CO LtCol Thomas J. Dumont 1Jan-19Mar69
 LtCol Clark S. Morris 20Mar-16Jul69
 LtCol Stanley A. Challgren 17Jul-31Dec69

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167
(HML-167)

CO LtCol Thomas F. Miller 1Jan-12Feb69
 LtCol Jack W. Conard 13Feb-19Aug69
 LtCol James W. Laseter 20Aug-7Nov69
 LtCol John E. Weber, Jr. 8Nov-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364
(HMM-364)

CO LtCol Merlin V. Statzer 1Jan-2Feb69
 LtCol Eugene R. Brady 3Feb-22Aug69
 LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh 23Aug-31Dec69

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463
(HMH-463)

CO LtCol Roger W. Peard, Jr. 1Jan-6Mar69
 LtCol Raymond M. Ryan 7Mar-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165
(HMM-165)*

CO LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr. 1Jan-24Feb69
 LtCol Thomas E. Raines 25Feb-13Aug69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 14Aug69.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263
(HMM-263)

CO LtCol Robert E. Hofstetter 1Jan-13May69
 LtCol William Cunningham 14May-29Sep69
 LtCol Walter R. Ledbetter, Jr. 30Sep-31Dec69

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
(HMH-361)

CO LtCol Kermit W. Andrus 26Sep-15Dec69
 LtCol Charles A. Block 16Dec-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161
(HMM-161)

CO Maj Richard W. Carr 16Oct-14Dec69
LtCol Bennie H. Mann, Jr. 15Dec-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262
(HMM-262)

CO Maj Donald J. Meskan 16Oct-19Dec69
LtCol Richard A. Bancroft 20Dec-31Dec69

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367
(HML-367)

CO LtCol Warren G. Cretney 16Oct-31Dec69

Marine Aircraft Group 36*

CO Col Bruce J. Matheson 1Jan-15May69
LtCol Herbert J. Blaha 16May-9Jul69
Col Noah C. New 10Jul-16Oct69
Col Owen V. Gallentine 17Oct-7Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Nov69.*

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36
(H&MS-36)*

CO LtCol James B. Bell 1Jan-12Sep69
Maj Chester L. Whipple 13Sep-23Sep69
Maj Charles A. Carey 24Sep-15Oct69
LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 16Oct-27Nov69
Maj Joseph F. Golden 28Nov-7Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Nov69.*

Marine Air Base Squadron 36
(MABS-36)*

CO LtCol Dennis W. Wright 1Jan-9Feb69
LtCol Rondell K. Wood 10Feb-15May69
LtCol Ronald E. Nelson 16May-5Sep69
Maj Edwin W. Lockard 6Sep-23Nov69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Nov69.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265
(HMM-265)*

CO LtCol Ralph Thuesen 1Jan-15May69
LtCol Robert L. Gray, Jr. 16May-7Jun69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Jun69.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362
(HMM-362)*

CO LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 25May-21Aug69
**To FMFLant, 21Aug69.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363
(HMM-363)*

CO LtCol Timothy J. Cronin, Jr. 1Jan-21Jan69
**Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 21Jan69.*

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367
(HML-367)*

CO LtCol Richard L. Robinson 1Jan-19Feb69
LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 20Feb-14Oct69
LtCol Warren G. Cretney 15Oct-16Oct69

**To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462
(HMH-462)*

CO LtCol Ronald E. Nelson 1Jan-15May69
LtCol Rondell K. Wood 16May-13Oct69
Maj Peter F. Lottsfeldt 14Oct-20Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Oct69.*

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361
(HMH-361)*

CO LtCol Kermit W. Andrus 1Aug-26Sep69
**To MAG-16, 26Sep69.*

Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39
(PMAG-39)

CO Col Walter Sienko 1Jan-6Mar69
Col Edward A. Parnell 7Mar-31Jul69
Col Owen V. Gallentine* 1Aug-15Oct69

**Assumed command of MAG-36 and staff merged with MAG-36.*

Provisional Headquarters and Maintenance
Squadron 39 (PH&MS-39)*

CO LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 1Jan-18Feb69
Maj Joseph L. Felter 19Feb-11Apr69
LtCol Warren G. Cretney 12Apr-10Oct69
Maj Joseph F. Golden 11Oct-31Oct69

**Unit merged with MAG-36.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161
(HMM-161)*

CO LtCol David L. Elam 1Jan-19Jul69
Maj Richard W. Carr 20Jul-15Oct69

**To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262
(HMM-262)*

CO LtCol Albert N. Allen 1Jan-23Mar69
LtCol James A. Wells, Jr. 24Mar-8Jul69
Maj Donald J. Meskan 9Jul-15Oct69

**To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

Marine Observation Squadron 6
(VMO-6)*

CO Maj Hans A. Zander 1Jan-1Apr69
LtCol Billy D. Bouldin 2Apr-16Jun69
Maj Albert K. Charlton 17Jun-12Oct69

**Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 12Oct69.*

Marine Forces, Western Pacific

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade/Task Force 79, 1Jan-7Nov69*
 CO BGen John E. Williams 1Jan-12Jun69
 BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr. 13Jun-7Nov69
 C/S Col John Lowman, Jr. 1Jan-22Jul69
 Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 23Jul-13Sep69
 Col H. Speed Wilson 14Sep-7Nov69
 G-1 Maj William H. Groesbeck 1Jan-20Feb69
 Capt Raymond H. Ambrose 21Feb-4Mar69
 LtCol Keith L. Lynn 5Mar-28Sep69
 Maj Russell E. Dolan 29Sep-7Nov69
 G-2 LtCol Aubrey L. Lumpkin 1Jan-26Jan69
 LtCol Conrad A. Jorgenson 27Jan-19Apr69
 1stLt Everett J. Boyser, Jr. 20Apr-13Jun69
 Maj Jack D. Boline 14Jun-14Oct69
 2dLt Ernest E. Johnson 15Oct-19Oct69
 Maj Paul B. Tubach 20Oct-7Nov69
 G-3 LtCol George C. Kliefoth 1Jan-16Feb69
 Col Clyde W. Hunter 17Feb-9Jul69
 LtCol William M. Kull 10Jul-6Aug69
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 7Aug-12Sep69
 Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 13Sep-7Nov69
 G-4 LtCol Stewart B. McCarty, Jr. 1Jan-15Apr69
 LtCol Raymond McArthur 16Apr-19Aug69
 Col John H. Keith, Jr. 20Aug-7Nov69

**Deactivated on 7 November 1969 and subordinate units transferred to 3d Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear).*

26th Marines*

CO Col Clyde W. Hunter 1Jan-13Feb69
 Col Ray N. Joens 14Feb-13Jun69
 Col Ralph A. Heywood 14Jun-7Nov69

**To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

1st Battalion, 26th Marines*

CO LtCol Charles H. Knowles 1Jan-28Feb69
 LtCol George C. Kliefoth 1Mar-27Jul69
 LtCol James C. Goodin 28Jul-7Nov69

**To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

2d Battalion, 26th Marines*

CO LtCol William F. Sparks 1Jan-27Feb69
 LtCol George M. Edmondson, Jr. 28Feb-9Sep69
 LtCol William C. Drumright 10Sep-7Nov69

**To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

3d Battalion, 26th Marines*

CO LtCol J. W. P. Robertson 1Jan-3Mar69
 LtCol Edward W. Snelling 4Mar-15Sep69
 LtCol William A. Simpson 15Sep-7Nov69

**To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

1st Battalion, 13th Marines*

CO LtCol John B. Cantieny 1Jan-27Jun69
 LtCol David E. Gragan 28Jun-5Sep69
 LtCol Donald H. Strain 6Sep-7Nov69

**To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

**Special Landing Force Alpha
(SLF Alpha)/CTG 79.4**

CO Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 1Jan-5Apr69
 Col William C. Doty, Jr. 6Apr-17Sep69
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 18Sep-7Nov69

**Special Landing Force Bravo
(SLF Bravo)/CTG 79.5**

CO Col Robert R. Wilson 1Jan-28Feb69
 Col Albert E. Coffeen 1Mar-25Jun69
 LtCol Harold B. Wilson 26Jun-3Jul69
 Col Albert E. Coffeen 4Jul-17Oct69
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 18Oct-7Nov69

Provisional Service Battalion/TG 79.8

CO Col William C. Doty, Jr. 1Jan-29Mar69
 Maj Raymond C. Kargol 29Mar-12Apr69
 Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 12Apr-22Jun69
 Col John M. Keeley 23Jun-7Nov69

9th Marines

CO Col Edward F. Danowitz 13Aug-7Sep69
 Col Jo M. Van Meter 8Sep-7Nov69

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Thomas J. Culklin 14Jul-14Aug69
 Maj Joe L. Goodwin 15Aug-5Sep69
 LtCol Donald J. McAdams 6Sep-7Nov69

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Robert L. Modjeski 1Aug-18Oct69
 Maj Charles G. Bryan 19Oct-27Oct69
 LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen 28Oct-7Nov69

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Donald E. Wood 13Aug-7Nov69

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Calhoun J. Killen 1Aug-15Sep69
 Maj Rodney H. Ledet 16Sep-19Oct69
 LtCol Joe D. Prater 20Oct-7Nov69

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO Maj William A. Grubbs III 15Jun-30Sep69
 Maj Cliff E. Delano 1Oct-7Nov69

Marine Aircraft Group 15**(MAG-15)/TG 79.3***

CO Col Clement T. Corcoran 1Jan-6May69
 Col Joseph A. Mitchell 7May-7Nov69

**Control passed from 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) on 7 November 1969.*

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15**(H&MS-15)**

CO LtCol Kenneth M. Scott 1Jan-21Apr69
 LtCol Conrad A. Jorgenson 22Apr-3Oct69
 Maj Lloyd K. Warn 4Oct-7Nov69

Marine Air Base Squadron 15**(MABS-15)**

CO LtCol Dock H. Pegues 1Jan-4Sep69
 LtCol Raymond McArthur 5Sep-7Nov69

Marine Air Control Squadron 8**(MACS-8)**

CO Maj Dirk C. Bierhaalder 1Jan-31Mar69
 LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman 1Apr-12Sep69
 LtCol George G. Long 13Sep-7Nov69

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152**(VMGR-152)**

CO LtCol Frank R. Smoke 1Jan-31Aug69
 LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 1Sep-7Nov69

Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533**(VMA[AW]-533)**

CO LtCol Frank P. Costello, Jr. 7Oct-7Nov69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122**(VMFA-122)***

CO LtCol Lawrence J. Willis 1Jan-30Apr69
 LtCol John K. Cochran 1May-5Sep69

**To MAG-13, 5Sep69.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232**(VMFA-232)**

CO LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen 7Sep-7Nov69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334**(VMFA-334)**

CO LtCol John R. Braddon 30Aug-7Nov69

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462**(HMH-462)**

CO Maj Peter F. Lottsfeldt 20Oct-7Nov69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164**(HMM-164)**

CO LtCol Richard T. Trundy 1Jan-7Nov69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165**(HMM-165)**

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 14Aug-7Nov69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265**(HMM-265)**

CO LtCol Robert L. Gray, Jr. 7Jun-7Nov69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362**(HMM-362)***

CO LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 1Jan-25May69

**To MAG-36, 25May69.*

Marine Observation Squadron 6**(VMO-6)**

CO Maj Albert K. Charlton 12Oct-7Nov69

I Marine Expeditionary Force**Task Force 79 7Nov-31Dec69**

CO MGen William K. Jones 7Nov-31Dec69
 C/S Col H. Speed Wilson 7Nov-16Nov69
 Col Charles J. Bailey, Jr. 17Nov-31Dec69
 G-1 Maj Russell E. Dolan 7Nov-31Dec69
 G-2 Col Charles R. Stephenson II 7Nov-3Dec69
 LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis 4Dec-31Dec69
 G-3 Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 7Nov-15Nov69
 Col H. Speed Wilson 16Nov-31Dec69
 G-4 Col John H. Keith, Jr. 7Nov-31Dec69

Special Landing Force Alpha**(SLF Alpha)/CTG 79.4**

CO Col Harold B. Wilson 7Nov-19Nov69
 Col George G. Chambers, Jr. 20Nov-31Dec69

Battalion Landing Team 2/9

CO LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen 7Nov-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165**(HMM-165)**

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 7Nov-23Nov69
 LtCol David H. Mitchell 24Nov-31Dec69

Special Landing Force Bravo**(SLF Bravo)/CTG 79.5**

CO Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 7Nov-31Dec69

Battalion Landing Team 1/9

CO LtCol Donald J. McAdams 7Nov-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164**(HMM-164)**

CO Maj Robert D. Fowner 7Nov-26Dec69
 Maj Edward L. Kuykendall 27Dec-31Dec69

3d Marine Division, 7Nov-31Dec69

CG MajGen William K. Jones 7Nov-31Dec69

ADC BGen Regan Fuller	7Nov-16Nov69	3d Reconnaissance Battalion	
BGen Leonard E. Fribourg	17Nov-31Dec69	CO LtCol Richard R. Burritt	7Nov-14Dec69
C/S Col Robert P. Wray	7Nov-31Dec69	Maj Russell I. Kramer	15Dec-31Dec69
G-1 LtCol William S. Daniels	7Nov-31Dec69	3d Tank Battalion	
G-2 Col Charles R. Stephenson II	7Nov-8Nov69	CO LtCol William S. Rump	7Nov-14Dec69
Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr.	9Nov-31Dec69	LtCol Robert W. Martin, Jr.	15Dec-31Dec69
G-3 Col William E. Barrineau	7Nov-3Dec69	3d Motor Transport Battalion	
Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr.	4Dec-31Dec69	CO Maj Raymond S. Davis, Jr.	7Nov-31Dec69
G-4 Col Frank R. Denormandie	7Nov-8Nov69	3d Engineer Battalion	
Headquarters Battalion		CO LtCol James W. Medis	7Nov-31Dec69
CO LtCol Charles F. King, Jr.	7Nov-31Dec69	3d Shore Party Battalion	
4th Marines		CO LtCol Eugene E. Paro, Jr.	7Nov-31Dec69
CO Col Gilbert R. Hershey	7Nov-3Dec69	3d Medical Battalion	
Col William E. Barrineau	4Dec-31Dec69	CO Capt Jacob V. Brown, MC, USN	7Nov-31Dec69
1st Battalion, 4th Marines		9th Motor Transport Battalion	
CO LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis	7Nov-27Nov69	CO Maj Larry D. Derryberry	7Nov-31Dec69
LtCol William C. Holmberg	28Nov-31Dec	7th Communication Battalion	
2d Battalion, 4th Marines		CO Maj Richard G. Schwarz	7Nov-4Dec69
CO LtCol Donald J. Garrett	7Nov-31Dec69	Maj Albert E. Harwood	5Dec-31Dec69
3d Battalion, 4th Marines		1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion	
CO LtCol James W. Wood	7Nov-5Dec69	CO Maj Cliff E. Delano	7Nov-14Nov69
LtCol James P. Kehoe	6Dec-31Dec69	Maj Joseph H. Alexander	15Nov-11Dec69
9th Marines		LtCol Allan W. Lamb	12Dec-31Dec69
CO Col Jo M. Van Meter	7Nov-3Dec69	1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), 7Nov-31Dec69*	
Col Robert J. Thomas	4Dec-31Dec69	CO BGen William G. Johnson	7Nov-31Dec69
1st Battalion, 9th Marines*		C/S Col Eddie E. Percy	7Nov-14Dec69
CO LtCol Donald J. McAdams	7Nov-31Dec69	Col Roy L. Reed	15Dec-31Dec69
<i>*OPCON To TF 79.5.</i>		G-1 Maj Walter J. Klimek	7Nov-31Dec69
2d Battalion, 9th Marines		G-2 Maj Fred G. Newcomb	25Nov-31Dec69
CO LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen	7Nov-31Dec69	G-3 Col Robert L. Fulton	7Nov-1Dec69
3d Battalion, 9th Marines		Maj James W. Pearson	2Dec-22Dec69
CO LtCol Donald E. Wood	7Nov-9Dec69	Col Albert R. Pytko	23Dec-31Dec69
Maj Billy E. Pafford	10Dec-12Dec69	G-4 LtCol Edward E. Smith	7Nov-17Nov69
LtCol Herbert M. Hart	13Dec-31Dec69	Col Robert J. Barbour	18Nov-31Dec69
12th Marines		G-5 Col Leonard L. Orr	7Nov-31Dec69
CO Col Wallace W. Crompton	7Nov-31Dec69	<i>*Assumed MAG-36, 23Nov69.</i>	
2d Battalion, 12th Marines		Marine Aircraft Group 15	
CO LtCol Fred W. St. Clair	7Nov-31Dec69	CO Col Joseph A. Mitchell	7Nov-14Dec69
3d Battalion, 12th Marines		Col Eddie E. Percy	15Dec-31Dec69
CO LtCol David R. McMillan, Jr.	7Nov-31Dec69	Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15	
4th Battalion, 12th Marines		(H&MS-15)	
CO Maj Harry H. Bair	7Nov-31Dec69	CO Maj Lloyd K. Warn	7Nov-31Dec69
		Marine Air Base Squadron 15	
		(MABS-15)	
		CO LtCol Raymond McArthur	7Nov-12Dec69
		Maj Robert C. Baughman	13Dec-31Dec69

Marine Air Control Squadron 8*
(MACS-8)

CO LtCol George G. Long 7Nov-30Nov69
*Passed to MACG-18 (Rear), activated on 27Nov69.

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232
(VMFA-232)

CO LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen 7Nov-31Dec69

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334
(VMFA-334)

CO LtCol John R. Braddon 7Nov-31Dec69

Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533
(VMA[AW]-533)

CO LtCol Frank P. Costello, Jr. 7Nov-5Dec69
LtCol Donald L. Harvey 6Nov-31Dec69

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152
(VMGR-152)*

CO LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 7Nov-18Nov69
*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462
(HMH-462)*

CO LtCol Peter F. Lottsfeldt 7Nov-18Nov69
*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164
(HMM-164)*

CO LtCol Richard T. Trundy 7Nov-18Nov69
*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165
(HMM-165)*

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 7Nov-18Nov69
*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

Marine Observation Squadron 6
(VMO-6)*

CO LtCol Albert K. Charlton 7Nov-18Nov69
*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

Marine Aircraft Group 36
(MAG-36), 16Nov-31Dec69

CO Col Owen V. Gallentine 16Nov-31Dec69

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36
(H&MS-36), 7Nov-31Dec69

CO LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 7Nov-27Dec69
Maj Joseph F. Golden 28Dec-31Dec69

Marine Air Base Squadron 36
(MABS-36), 30Nov-31Dec69

CO Maj Edwin W. Lockard 30Nov-31Dec69

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462
(HMH-462)

CO LtCol Peter F. Lottsfeldt 19Nov-31Dec69

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164
(HMM-164)*

CO Maj Robert D. Fowner 19Nov-25Dec69
Maj Edward L. Kuyendall 26Dec-31Dec69
*OPCON To TF 79.5.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165
(HMM-165)*

CO LtCol David H. Mitchell 19Nov-31Dec69
*OPCON To TF 79.4.

Marine Observation Squadron 6
(VMO-6)

CO LtCol Albert K. Charlton 19Nov-30Nov69
Maj Jack A. Brandon 1Dec-31Dec69

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152
(VMGR-152)

CO LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 19Nov-31Dec69

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After Action Report.
- ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U.S. Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- AC-119—Fairchild Hiller, C-119 military transport aircraft modified into a gunship with side-firing 7.62mm miniguns.
- ADC—Assistant Division Commander.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is ICC.
- AH-1G—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for close air support.
- AK47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
- ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.
- AIO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters.
- ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
- AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observe or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artillery fire or obtain military information.
- AO—Area of Operations.
- AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.
- APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.
- APD—Airborne Personnel Detector.
- APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadre who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convince South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious Ready Group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.
- ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.
- B40 rocket—Communist rocket-propelled grenade.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BA—Base Area.
- Barrel Roll—Codename for air operations over Laos.
- Bde—Brigade.
- BGen—Brigadier General.
- BLT—Battalion Landing Team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Btry—Battery.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CACO—Combined Action Company.
- CAF—Combined Action Force.
- CAG—Combined Action Group.
- CAP—Combined Action Platoon, see Combined Action Program.
- Capt—Captain.
- CCP—Combined Campaign Plan.
- Cdr—Commander.
- CG—Commanding General.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-47—Boeing Vertol Chinook, the Army medium-transport helicopter.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- Chieu Hoi*—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attract Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause.
- CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.

- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
 CIT—Counter Intelligence Team.
 Claymore—A U.S. directional antipersonnel mine.
 CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
 CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
 CO—Commanding Officer.
 Co—Company.
 COB—Combat Operations Base.
 COC—Combat Operations Center.
 Col—Colonel.
 Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village.
 ComdC—Command Chronology.
 ComdHist—Command History.
 ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific.
 ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam.
 COMUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
 CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S.-Vietnamese pacification efforts.
 COSVN—*Central Office of South Vietnam*, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- CP—Command Post.
 CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating the pacification plan.
 CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.
 C/S—Chief of Staff.
 CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.
 CUPP—Combined Unit Pacification Program, a variation of the combined action concept and involving the integration of a Marine line company with a Popular Force or Regional Force unit.
- DAIS—Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System.
 DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.
 D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.
 DD—Navy destroyer.
 Det—Detachment.
 Div—Division.
 DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.
 DOD—Department of Defense.
 DSA—District Senior Advisor.
 Dtd—Dated.
- EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.
 ECM—Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.
 EF-10B—An ECM-modified version of the Navy F-3D Skyknight, a twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage.
 Engr—Engineer.
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.
 F-4J—McDonnell Phantom II with air-to-air capabilities.
 FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).
 FDC—Fire Direction Center.
 FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.
 FLC—Force Logistic Command.
 FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group.
 FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit.
 FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
 FO—Forward Observer.
Front 4—A Communist headquarters subordinate to *MR-5* and responsible for Quang Nam Province.
 FSB—Fire Support Base.
 FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.
 FSR—Force Service Regiment.
 Fwd—Forward.
 FWMF—Free World Military Force.
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, operations; G-4, logistics; and G-5, civil affairs.
 Gen—General.
 Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.
 Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.
 Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.
 GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- H&I fires—Harassing and Interdiction fires.
 H&MS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
 H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.
 HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.
 HE—High Explosive.
 HES—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.
 H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.
 HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.
 HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.
Hoi Chanb—A Viet Cong or North Vietnamese defector under the *Chieu Hoi* amnesty program.
 Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U.S.-built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire of one round every two minutes.
 Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.
 Howitzer, 155mm, M114A towed and M109 self-propelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of three rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heav-

- ier self-propelled M109 was largely road-bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.
- HQ or Hq—Headquarters.
- Howtar—A 4.2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pack howitzer frame.
- "Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.
- I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which included the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
- I MAF—I Marine Amphibious Force.
- I MEF—I Marine Expeditionary Force.
- Intel—Intelligence.
- Intvw—Interview.
- IOD—Integrated Observation Device.
- ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team.
- JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).
- JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- KIA—Killed in Action.
- Kingfisher operations—Heliborne combat patrols for quick reaction operations.
- Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
- L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.
- LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion.
- LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.
- LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.
- LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship. See AKA.
- LOC—Lines of Communication.
- LOI—Letter of Instruction.
- LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.
- LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.
- LSA—Logistic Support Area.
- LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.
- LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.
- Lt—Lieutenant.
- LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel.
- LtGen—Lieutenant General.
- Ltr—Letter.
- IVTP or IVP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and/or transport personnel.
- LZ—Landing Zone.
- MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.
- Machine gun, .50-caliber—U.S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
- Machine gun, M60—U.S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.
- MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.
- MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF—Marine Amphibious Force.
- MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.
- Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local guerrilla groups.
- Maj—Major.
- MajGen—Major General.
- MarDiv—Marine Division.
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines.
- MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.
- MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; not to be confused with a Marine Amphibious Unit.
- MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.
- MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station.
- MCO—Marine Corps Order.
- MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program.
- MedEvac—Medical Evacuation.
- MIA—Missing'in Action.
- MilHistBr—Military History Branch.
- MO—Mount Out.
- MOA—Mount Out Augmentation.
- Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S.-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
- Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
- Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.
- Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
- Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600

pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR-5—political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in *MR-5* did not report to *COSVN*.

Ms—Manuscript.

Msg—Message.

NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment.

NAG—Naval Advisory Group.

NAS—Naval Air Station.

NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.

NGLO—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.

NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees).

NPFF—National Police Field Force.

NSA—Naval Support Activity.

NSC—National Security Council.

NSDC—Northern Sector Defense Command.

Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.

Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group, probably of Chinese origin.

NVA—North Vietnamese Army, often used colloquially to refer to a North Vietnamese soldier.

O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.

Ontos—U.S.-built, lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.

OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.

OpO—Operation Order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.

OP—Outpost or observation point.

OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

OpSum—Operational Summary.

ORLL—Operations Report/Lessons Learned.

OV-10A—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine aircraft specifically designed for light armed reconnaissance missions.

PAVN—*Peoples Army of Vietnam* (North Vietnam). This acronym was dropped in favor of *NVA*.

PDC—Pacification and Development Councils.

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.

Phoenix program—A covert U.S. and South Vietnamese program aimed at the eradication of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam.

PIIC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.

PRC-25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles.

Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.

PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.

PSA—Province Senior Advisor.

PSDF—Peoples Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organized by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968.

QDSZ—Quang Da Special Zone.

R&R—Rest and Recreation.

Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S.-built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.

Regt—Regiment.

Rein—Reinforced.

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.

Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.

RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs three pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

RLT—Regimental Landing Team.

ROK—Republic of Korea.

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.

Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.

ROE—Rules of Engagement.

RPG—Rocket Propelled Grenade.

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

RZ—Reconnaissance Zone.

S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2, intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4, logistics; and S-5, civil affairs.

SAM—Surface to Air Missile.

SecDef—Secretary of Defense.

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Fleet—The U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.

SFD—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap.

SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement through ground vibrations.

SLF—Special Landing Force.

SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.

SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried out cross-border operations.

Song—Vietnamese for “river.”

SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.

Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.

SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command.

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.

TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support.

TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.

TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all en-route air traffic and air defense operations.

Tank, M48—U.S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine gun; has maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all en-route air traffic and air defense operations.

TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest.

TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TE—Table of Equipment.

TF—Task Force.

TG—Task Group.

TO—Table of Organization.

TO&E—Table of Organization and Equipment.

Trung-si—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant.

TU—Task Unit.

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice.

UH-1E Bell “Huey”—A single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.

USA—U.S. Army.

USAAG—U.S. Army Advisory Group.

USAF—U.S. Air Force.

USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.

USARV—U.S. Army, Vietnam.

USASupComDaNang—U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang.

USIA—U.S. Information Agency.

USMC—U.S. Marine Corps.

USN—U.S. Navy.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning “Vietnamese Communists.”

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.

VCI—Viet Cong Infrastructure.

VCLF—Viet Cong Local Force.

VMA—Marine attack squadron (in naval aviation, the “V” designates “heavier than air” as opposed to craft that are “lighter than air”).

VMF(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.

VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron.

VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.

WestPac—Western Pacific.

WIA—Wounded in Action.

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

January-December 1969

- 1 January South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu suggested that the ARVN was "ready to replace part of the allied forces" in 1969.
- 5 January President-elect Richard M. Nixon named Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to succeed Ambassador W. Averell Harriman as chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks. He also appointed Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to continue at his post in Saigon.
- 20 January Richard M. Nixon inaugurated President of the United States.
- 22 January Operation Dewey Canyon began in the Da Krong Valley of Quang Tri Province with the lift of elements of Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines and supporting artillery from Vandegrift Combat Base into the area.
- 31 January U.S. military strength in South Vietnam numbered 539,800, of which 81,000 were Marines.
- 16 February Allied forces observed a 24-hour ceasefire during *Tet*. Despite the ceasefire, VC/NVA forces committed 203 truce violations, which resulted in the loss of six killed and 94 wounded in I Corps.
- 23 February Communist forces launched a major offensive throughout South Vietnam, one day following the expiration of the seven-day Viet Cong proclaimed truce for *Tet*.
- 25 February Fire Support Bases Neville and Russell came under heavy enemy ground and mortar attacks, resulting in the loss of 30 and the wounding of 79 Marines.
- 27 February During Operation Dewey Canyon, men of the 9th Marines uncovered the largest single haul of enemy arms and ammunition in the war to date.
- 28 February The 3d Marine Division ended Operations Scotland II and Kentucky. During Scotland II, more than 3,300 enemy troops were killed, while friendly casualties were 463 killed. Operation Kentucky resulted in over 3,900 enemy and 520 U.S. casualties.
- 2 March Village and hamlet elections were held throughout South Vietnam. In I Corps, the percentage of the population voting ranged from 82 percent in Quang Nam Province to 92 percent in Quang Tri. The enemy made no attempt to disrupt the voting.
- 3 March The Marine Corps received its first CH-53D assault helicopter. The helicopter, intended to replace the CH-53A, introduced into Vietnam in late 1966, could transport four tons of cargo or 38 combat troops.
- 7 March Allied intelligence estimates of enemy strength place 40,000 NVA and between 60,000 and 70,000 VC in I Corps Tactical Zone, a majority of which were said to be in the northern provinces.
- 9 March 1st Marine Division Operation Taylor Common ended in Quang Nam Province. The operation, which began on 7 December 1968, accounted for close to 1,400 enemy killed and 610 captured.
- 16 March The U.S. battleship *New Jersey* departed the coast of Vietnam.

- 26 March Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., replaced Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.
- 30 March III MAF engineers completed the construction of Liberty Bridge, which spanned the Song Thu Bon, south of Da Nang.
- 3 April COMUSMACV confirmed that more Americans had been killed in Vietnam than in the Korean War. Vietnam had cost 33,641 lives since January 1961, compared to 33,629 lost in Korea.
- 7 April A Joint Coordinating Council was established by CG III MAF and CG ICTZ to monitor, coordinate, and support pacification and development programs within ICTZ.
- 10 April The first four AH-1G "Cobra" gunships arrived at Da Nang to begin air operations with Marine Observation Squadron 2.
- 15 April Major General William K. Jones replaced Major General Raymond G. Davis as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
- 17 April Marine firepower increased with the introduction of the first 175mm guns, scheduled to replace the 155mm guns of the 1st, 3d, and 5th 155mm Gun Batteries.
- 23 April More than 250 student leaders from colleges throughout the United States made a public statement that they would refuse induction into the armed forces so long as the war continued in Vietnam.
- 27 April A grass fire spread to the Navy/Marine Ammo Supply Point 1 at Da Nang, resulting in its complete destruction.
- 3 May Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said the United States could begin troop withdrawals if any of the following three basic conditions were met: agreement of mutual withdrawals; sufficient improvement of South Vietnamese forces; and a substantial reduction of VC/NVA activity in South Vietnam.
- 6 May III Marine Amphibious Force, composed of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistic Command, and the Army's XXIV Corps, Americal Division, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), began its fifth year in Vietnam.
- 8 May The Vietnamese Communists issued a 10-point proposal for peace, the most important new element of which was an attempt to limit United States participation in negotiations to the subject of a unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam.
- 10 May Operation Apache Snow began in the southern Da Krong and northern A Shau Valleys and involved the 9th Marines and elements of the 101st Airborne Division. During the operation, which ended on 7 June, troops of the 101st assaulted and captured heavily fortified Dong Ap Bia, or as it later became known, "Hamburger Hill."
- 12 May The VC/NVA struck throughout South Vietnam with the largest number of attacks since *Tet* 1968.
- 29 May The 7th Marines multi-battalion Operation Oklahoma Hills ended. Enemy losses during the two-month operation were placed at 596, while friendly losses numbered 53 killed and 487 wounded.
- 8 June President Nixon announced that 25,000 troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of August.

- 14 June Marine, Korean, and South Vietnamese troops began Operation Pipestone Canyon, south of Da Nang. Before ending in November, the enemy would lose close to 500 troops.
- 13 June Secretary of Defense Laird announced that the 9th Marines, in addition to Army and Navy units, would be withdrawn beginning in mid-July.
- 15 June The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion began deployment from Vietnam to Okinawa.
- 11 July Major General Charles J. Quilter was relieved by Major General William G. Thrash as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 14 July Battalion Landing Team 1/9 sailed from Da Nang for Okinawa on board ships of the Seventh Fleet, initiating Phase I of President Nixon's 25,000-troop withdrawal plan.
- 20 July Racial riots at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, resulted in the death of one Marine and serious injury to another.
- August The Combined Action Program reached its authorized strength of 114 platoons.
- 13 August Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 departed Vietnam for Okinawa under the announced 25,000-man troop reduction. The squadron was the first major unit of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to depart Vietnam.
- 14 August The 9th Regimental Landing Team completed its redeployment from Vietnam with the departure of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.
- 18 August The last UH-34D "Sea Horse" Squadron, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362, departed Vietnam to be redesignated Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 after receiving CH-53 aircraft. The squadron was the first unit of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to serve in Vietnam, arriving in April 1962.
- September Three disturbances took place over alleged mistreatment of prisoners at the Camp Pendleton brig. Three guards were disciplined for using excessive force in quelling disruptive prisoners.
- 3 September Marine Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., authorized "Afro" haircuts and the use of the upraised fist as a greeting among black Marines.
- 3 September North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh died.
- 16 September President Nixon announced another troop withdrawal. Of a total reduction of 40,500, more than 18,400 would be Marines, most of whom would come from the 3d Marine Division.
- 21 September Secretary of Defense Laird announced the deactivation of the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California. The 26th Marines, still in Vietnam, would not be deactivated with the remainder of the division.
- 29 September The Marine Corps announced a cutback of 20,300 in total strength. It was felt that a reduction in recruiting would reduce the size of the Corps without any rollback of temporary officer promotions or any reversion of temporary officers to enlisted status before 1 July 1970.
- 15 October Throughout the United States, Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations were held.
- 7 November The 9th Marine Amphibious Force was deactivated; I Marine Ex-

- peditionary Force was created as an amphibious ready force in the Western Pacific; and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) was activated in Japan. CG, I MEF was to exercise operational control of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear).
- 13-15 November Critics of the war in Vietnam demonstrated in Washington with a march from Arlington Cemetery to the Capitol.
- 19 November The Nixon Administration's military draft lottery bill was passed by Congress.
- 20 November Marine Air Group 36 completed its move from Phu Bai to Futema, Okinawa, where it assumed control of the helicopter and observation squadrons which had been redeployed from Vietnam.
- 26 November The 5th Marine Division was deactivated and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade came into existence.
- 1 December The first drawing of the draft lottery was conducted; those 19-year-olds whose birthdate was 14 September and whose last name began with "J" would be the first called.
- 15 December Major General Edwin B. Wheeler relieved Major General Ormond R. Simpson as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.
- 15 December With the completion of Phase II redeployment, Marine authorized strength in the Republic of Vietnam stood at 55,300.
- 15 December President Nixon announced that the third round of American troop withdrawals from Vietnam was to be completed by 15 April 1970.
- 31 December Marine actual strength in South Vietnam stood at 54,559 at the end of 1969.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations

1969

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL RICHARD A. ANDERSON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Assistant Team Leader with Company E, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division, in connection with combat operations against an armed enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. While conducting a patrol during the early morning hours of 24 August 1969, Lance Corporal Anderson's reconnaissance team came under a heavy volume of automatic weapons and machine gun fire from a numerically superior and well-concealed enemy force. Although painfully wounded in both legs and knocked to the ground during the initial moments of the fierce fire fight, Lance Corporal Anderson assumed a prone position and continued to deliver intense suppressive fire in an attempt to repulse the attackers. Moments later he was wounded a second time by an enemy soldier who had approached to within eight feet of the team's position. Undaunted, he continued to pour a relentless stream of fire at the assaulting unit, even while a companion was treating his leg wounds. Observing an enemy grenade land between himself and the other Marine, Lance Corporal Anderson immediately rolled over and covered the lethal weapon with his body, absorbing the full effects of the detonation. By his indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and selfless devotion to duty, Lance Corporal Anderson was instrumental in saving several Marines from serious injury or possible death. His actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS OSCAR P. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Assistant Machine Gunner with Company E, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in connection with operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. During the early morning hours of 23 February 1969, Private First Class Austin's observation post was subjected to a fierce ground attack by a large North Vietnamese Army force supported by a heavy volume of hand grenades, satchel charges and small arms fire. Observing that one of his wounded companions had fallen unconscious in a position dangerously exposed to the hostile fire, Private First Class Austin unhesitatingly left the relative security of his fighting hole and, with complete disregard for his own safety, raced across the fire-swept terrain to assist the Marine to a covered location. As he neared the casualty, he observed an enemy grenade land nearby and, reacting instantly, leaped between the injured Marine and the lethal object, absorbing the effects of its detonation. As he ignored his painful injuries and turned to examine the wounded man, he saw a North Vietnamese Army soldier aiming a weapon at his unconscious companion. With full knowledge of the probable consequences and thinking only to protect the Marine, Private First Class Austin resolutely threw himself between the casualty and the hostile soldier and, in so doing, was mortally wounded. Private First Class Austin's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DANIEL D. BRUCE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Mortar Man with Headquarters and Service Company, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. Early on the morning of 1 March 1969, Private First Class Bruce was on watch in his night defensive position at Fire Support Base Tomahawk in Quang Nam Province when he heard movements ahead of him. An enemy explosive charge was thrown toward his position and he reacted instantly, catching the device and shouting to alert his companions. Realizing the danger to the adjacent position with its two occupants, Private First Class Bruce held the device to his body and attempted to carry it from the vicinity of the entrenched Marines. As he moved away, the charge detonated and he absorbed the full force of the explosion. Private First Class Bruce's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty saved the lives of three of his fellow Marines and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS BRUCE W. CARTER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Grenadier with Company H, Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 7 August 1969, Private First Class Carter's unit was maneuvering against the enemy during Operation Idaho Canyon and came under a heavy volume of fire from a numerically superior hostile force. The lead element soon became separated from the main body of the squad by a brush fire. Private First Class Carter and his fellow Marines were pinned down by vicious crossfire when, with complete disregard for his own safety, he stood in full view of the North Vietnamese Army soldiers to deliver a devastating volume of fire at their positions. The accuracy and aggressiveness of his attack caused several enemy casualties and forced the remainder of the soldiers to retreat from the immediate area. Shouting directions to the Marines around him, Private First Class Carter then commenced leading them from the path of the rapidly approaching brush fire when he observed a hostile grenade land between him and his companions. Fully aware of the probable consequences of his action but determined to protect the men following him, he unhesitatingly threw himself over the grenade, absorbing the full effects of its detonation with his own body. Private First Class Carter's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RONALD L. COKER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company M, Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 24 March 1969, while serving as Point Man for the Second Platoon, Private First Class Coker was leading his patrol when he encountered five enemy soldiers on a narrow jungle trail. Private First Class Coker's squad aggressively pursued them to a cave. As the squad neared the cave, it came under intense hostile fire, seriously wounding one Marine and forcing the others to take cover. Observing the wounded man lying exposed to continuous enemy fire, Private First Class Coker disregarded his own safety and moved across the fire-swept terrain toward his companion. Although wounded by enemy small arms fire, he continued to crawl across the hazardous area and skillfully threw a hand grenade into the enemy positions, suppressing the hostile fire sufficiently to enable him to reach the wounded man. As he began to drag his injured comrade towards safety, a grenade landed on the wounded Marine. Unhesitatingly, Private First Class Coker grasped it with both hands and turned away from his wounded companion, but before he could dispose of the grenade it exploded. Severely wounded, but undaunted, he refused to abandon his comrade. As he moved toward friendly lines, two more enemy grenades exploded near him, inflicting still further injuries. Concerned only for the safety of his comrade, Private First Class Coker, with supreme effort, continued to crawl and pull the wounded Marine with him. His heroic deeds inspired his fellow Marines to such aggressive action that the enemy fire was suppressed sufficiently to enable others to reach him and carry him to a relatively safe area where he succumbed to his extensive wounds. Private First Class Coker's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL THOMAS E. CREEK
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company I, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 13 February 1969, Lance Corporal Creek's squad was providing security for a convoy moving to resupply the Vandegrift Combat Base when an enemy command-detonated mine destroyed one of the vehicles and halted the convoy near the Cam Lo Resettlement Village. Almost immediately, the Marines came under a heavy volume of hostile mortar fire followed by intense small arms fire from a well-concealed enemy force. As his squad deployed to engage the enemy, Lance Corporal Creek quickly moved to a fighting position and aggressively engaged in the fire fight. Observing a position from which he could more effectively deliver fire against the hostile force he completely disregarded his own safety as he fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain and was seriously wounded by enemy fire. At the same time, an enemy grenade was thrown into the gully where he had fallen, landing between him and several companions. Fully realizing the inevitable results of his actions, Lance Corporal Creek rolled on the grenade and absorbed the full force of the explosion with his own body, thereby saving the lives of five of his fellow Marines. As a result of his heroic action, his men were inspired to such aggressive action that the enemy was defeated and the convoy was able to continue its vital mission. Lance Corporal Creek's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RALPH E. DIAS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, while serving as a Rifleman with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam on 12 November 1969. As a member of a reaction force which was pinned down by enemy fire while assisting a platoon in the same circumstance, Private First Class Dias, observing that both units were sustaining casualties, initiated an aggressive assault against an enemy machine gun bunker which was the principal source of hostile fire. Severely wounded by enemy snipers while charging across the open area, he pulled himself to the shelter of a nearby rock. Braving enemy fire for a second time, Private First Class Dias was again wounded. Unable to walk, he crawled fifteen meters to the protection of a rock located near his objective and, repeatedly exposing himself to intense hostile fire, unsuccessfully threw several hand grenades at the machine gun emplacement. Still determined to destroy the emplacement, Private First Class Dias again moved into the open and was wounded a third time by sniper fire. As he threw a last grenade which destroyed the enemy position, he was mortally wounded by another enemy round. Private First Class Dias' indomitable courage, dynamic initiative, and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CAPTAIN WESLEY L. FOX
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer of Company A, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against the enemy in the northern A Shau Valley, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 22 February 1969. Captain (then First Lieutenant) Fox's company came under intense fire from a large well-concealed enemy force. Captain Fox maneuvered to a position from which he could assess the situation and confer with his platoon leaders. As they departed to execute the plan he had devised, the enemy attacked and Captain Fox was wounded along with all of the other members of the command group, except the executive officer. Captain Fox continued to direct the activity of his company. Advancing through heavy enemy fire he personally neutralized one enemy position and calmly ordered an assault against the hostile emplacements. He then moved through the hazardous area coordinating aircraft support with the activities of his men. When his executive officer was mortally wounded, Captain Fox reorganized the company and directed the fire of his men as they hurled grenades against the enemy and drove the hostile forces into retreat. Wounded again in the final assault, Captain Fox refused medical attention, established a defensive posture, and supervised the preparation of casualties for medical evacuation. His indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger inspired his Marines to such aggressive actions that they overcame all enemy resistance and destroyed a large bunker complex. Captain Fox's heroic actions reflect great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and uphold the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ROBERT H. JENKINS, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gunner with Company C, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division in connection with operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Early on the morning of 5 March 1969, Private First Class Jenkins' twelve-man reconnaissance team was occupying a defensive position at Fire Support Base Argonne south of the Demilitarized Zone. Suddenly, the Marines were assaulted by a North Vietnamese Army platoon employing mortars, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. Reacting instantly, Private First Class Jenkins and another Marine quickly moved into a two-man fighting emplacement, and as they boldly delivered accurate machine gun fire against the enemy, a North Vietnamese soldier threw a hand grenade into the friendly emplacement. Fully realizing the inevitable results of his actions, Private First Class Jenkins quickly seized his comrade, and pushing the man to the ground, he leaped on top of the Marine to shield him from the explosion. Absorbing the full impact of the detonation, Private First Class Jenkins was seriously injured and subsequently succumbed to his wounds. His courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty saved a fellow Marine from serious injury or possible death and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JOSE F. JIMENEZ
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Fire Team Leader with Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on 28 August 1969. On that date Lance Corporal Jimenez's unit came under heavy attack by North Vietnamese Army soldiers concealed in well-camouflaged emplacements. Lance Corporal Jimenez reacted by seizing the initiative and plunging forward toward the enemy positions. He personally destroyed several enemy personnel and silenced an antiaircraft weapon. Shouting encouragement to his companions, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued his aggressive forward movement. He slowly maneuvered to within ten feet of hostile soldiers who were firing automatic weapons from a trench and, in the face of vicious enemy fire, destroyed the position. Although he was by now the target of concentrated fire from hostile gunners intent upon halting his assault, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued to press forward. As he moved to attack another enemy soldier, he was mortally wounded. Lance Corporal Jimenez's indomitable courage, aggressive fighting spirit and unfaltering devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL WILLIAM D. MORGAN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Squad Leader with Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in operations against the enemy in the Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. On 25 February 1969, while participating in Operation Dewey Canyon southeast of Vandegrift Combat Base, one of the squads of Corporal Morgan's platoon was temporarily pinned down and sustained several casualties while attacking a North Vietnamese Army force occupying a heavily-fortified bunker complex. Observing that two of the wounded Marines had fallen in a position dangerously exposed to the enemy fire and that all attempts to evacuate them were halted by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and rocket-propelled grenades, Corporal Morgan unhesitatingly maneuvered through the dense jungle undergrowth to a road that passed in front of a hostile emplacement which was the principal source of enemy fire. Fully aware of the possible consequences of his valiant action, but thinking only of the welfare of his injured companions, Corporal Morgan shouted words of encouragement to them as he initiated an aggressive assault against the hostile bunker. While charging across the open road, he was clearly visible to the hostile soldiers who turned their fire in his direction and mortally wounded him, but his diversionary tactic enabled the remainder of his squad to retrieve their casualties and overrun the North Vietnamese Army position. His heroic and determined actions saved the lives of two fellow Marines and were instrumental in the subsequent defeat of the enemy. Corporal Morgan's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL THOMAS P. NOONAN, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Fire Team Leader with Company G, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in operations against the enemy in Quang Tri Province in the Republic of Vietnam. On 5 February 1969, Company G was directed to move from a position which they had been holding southeast of the Vandegrift Combat Base in A Shau Valley to an alternate location. As the Marines commenced a slow and difficult descent down the side of the hill made extremely slippery by the heavy rains, the leading element came under a heavy fire from a North Vietnamese Army unit occupying well-concealed positions in the rocky terrain. Four men were wounded, and repeated attempts to recover them failed because of the intense hostile fire. Lance Corporal Noonan moved from his position of relative security and maneuvering down the treacherous slope to a location near the injured men, took cover behind some rocks. Shouting words of encouragement to the wounded men to restore their confidence, he dashed across the hazardous terrain and commenced dragging the most seriously wounded man away from the fire-swept area. Although wounded and knocked to the ground by an enemy round, Lance Corporal Noonan recovered rapidly and resumed dragging the man toward the marginal security of a rock. He was, however, mortally wounded before he could reach his destination. His heroic actions inspired his fellow Marines to such aggressiveness that they initiated a spirited assault which forced the enemy soldiers to withdraw. Lance Corporal Noonan's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JIMMY W. PHIPPS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Combat Engineer with Company B, First Engineer Battalion, First Marine Division in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 27 May 1969, Private First Class Phipps, was a member of a two-man combat engineer demolition team assigned to locate and destroy enemy artillery ordnance and concealed firing devices. After he had expended all of his explosives and blasting caps, Private First Class Phipps discovered a 175mm high explosive artillery round in a rice paddy. Suspecting that the enemy had attached the artillery round to a secondary explosive device, he warned other Marines in the area to move to covered positions and prepared to destroy the round with a hand grenade. As he was attaching the hand grenade to a stake beside the artillery round, the fuse of the enemy's secondary explosive device ignited. Realizing that his assistant and the platoon commander were both within a few meters of him and that the imminent explosion could kill all three men, Private First Class Phipps grasped the hand grenade to his chest and dived forward to cover the enemy's explosive and the artillery round with his body, thereby shielding his companions from the detonation while absorbing the full and tremendous impact with his own body. Private First Class Phipps' indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty saved the lives of two Marines and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL WILLIAM R. PROM
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company I, Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in action against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. While returning from a reconnaissance operation on 9 February 1969 during Operation Taylor Common, two platoons of Company I came under an intense automatic weapons fire and grenade attack from a well-concealed North Vietnamese Army force in fortified positions. The leading element of the platoon was isolated and several Marines were wounded. Lance Corporal Prom immediately assumed control of one of his machine guns and began to deliver return fire. Disregarding his own safety he advanced to a position from which he could more effectively deliver covering fire while first aid was administered to the wounded men. Realizing that the enemy would have to be destroyed before the injured Marines could be evacuated, Lance Corporal Prom again moved forward and delivered a heavy volume of fire with such accuracy that he was instrumental in routing the enemy, thus permitting his men to regroup and resume their march. Shortly thereafter, the platoon again came under heavy fire in which one man was critically wounded. Reacting instantly, Lance Corporal Prom moved forward to protect his injured comrade. Unable to continue his own fire because of severe wounds, he continued to advance to within a few yards of the enemy positions. There, standing in full view of the enemy, he accurately directed the fire of his support elements until he was mortally wounded. Inspired by his heroic actions, the Marines launched an assault that destroyed the enemy. Lance Corporal Prom's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL LESTER W. WEBER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in action against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 23 February 1969, the Second Platoon of Company M was dispatched to the Bo Ban area of Hieu Duc District in Quang Nam Province to assist a squad from another platoon which had become heavily engaged with a well-entrenched enemy battalion. While moving through a rice paddy covered with tall grass Lance Corporal Weber's platoon came under heavy attack from concealed hostile soldiers. He reacted by plunging into the tall grass, successfully attacking one enemy and forcing eleven others to break contact. Upon encountering a second North Vietnamese Army soldier he overwhelmed him in fierce hand-to-hand combat. Observing two other soldiers firing upon his comrades from behind a dike, Lance Corporal Weber ignored the frenzied firing of the enemy and racing across the hazardous area, dived into their position. He neutralized the position by wrestling weapons from the hands of the two soldiers and overcoming them. Although by now the target for concentrated fire from hostile riflemen, Lance Corporal Weber remained in a dangerously exposed position to shout words of encouragement to his emboldened companions. As he moved forward to attack a fifth enemy soldier, he was mortally wounded. Lance Corporal Weber's indomitable courage, aggressive fighting spirit and unwavering devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ALFRED M. WILSON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company M, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in action against hostile forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 3 March 1969, while returning from a reconnaissance in force mission in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Cunningham in Quang Tri Province, the First Platoon of Company M came under intense automatic weapons fire and a grenade attack from a well concealed enemy force. As the center of the column was pinned down, the leading squad moved to outflank the enemy. Private First Class Wilson, acting as Squad Leader of the rear squad, skillfully maneuvered his men to form a base of fire and act as a blocking force. In the ensuing fire fight, both his machine gunner and assistant machine gunner were seriously wounded and unable to operate their weapons. Realizing the urgent need to bring the weapon into operation again, Private First Class Wilson, followed by another Marine and with complete disregard for his own safety, fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain to recover the weapon. As they reached the machine gun, an enemy soldier stepped from behind a tree and threw a grenade toward the two Marines. Observing the grenade fall between himself and the other Marine, Private First Class Wilson, fully realizing the inevitable result of his actions, shouted to his companion and unhesitatingly threw himself on the grenade, absorbing the full force of the explosion with his own body. His heroic actions inspired his platoon members to maximum effort as they aggressively attacked and defeated the enemy. Private First Class Wilson's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Ret)	Col Leroy V. Corbett, USMC (Ret)
Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col Wallace W. Crompton, USMC (Ret)
Gen Raymond G. Davis, USMC (Ret)	Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC (Ret)
	Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)
	Col Louis R. Daze, USMC (Ret)
	Col Frank R. DeNormandie, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret)	Col Fred T. Fagan, Jr., USMC
LtGen William K. Jones, USMC (Ret)	Col Bob W. Farley, USMC (Ret)
LtGen John N. McLaughlin, USMC (Ret)	Col Edwin H. Finlayson, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col George C. Fox, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Robert L. Nichols, USMC (Ret)	Col Owen V. Gallentine, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col Samuel A. Hannah, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Adolph G. Schwenk, USMC (Ret)	Col Paul B. Henley, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret)	Col Gilbert R. Hershey, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Joseph J. Went, USMC	Col Ralph A. Heywood, USMC (Ret)
	Col William J. Howatt, USMC (Ret)
	Col Ray N. Joens, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Clifford B. Drake, USMC (Ret)	Col Ray Kummerow, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col Elliott R. Laine, Jr., USMC (Ret)
MajGen Harold G. Glasgow, USMC	Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Norman W. Gourley, USMC (Ret)	Col George E. Lawrence, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Homer S. Hill, USMC (Ret)	Col John Lowman, Jr., USMC (Ret)
MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC (Ret)	Col John F. McMahon, Jr., USMC (Ret)
MajGen Francis X. Quinn, USMC (Ret)	Col Bruce J. Matheson, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Herbert L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret)	Col Theodore E. Metzger, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret)	Col Richard D. Mickelson, USMC (Ret)
	Col Wendell P. C. Morgenthauer, Jr., USMC (Ret)
BGen Herbert J. Blaha, USMC (Ret)	Col Donald E. Morin, USMC (Ret)
BGen George E. Dooley, USMC (Ret)	Col Peter J. Mulroney, USMC (Ret)
BGen Frank E. Garretson, USMC (Ret)	Col Leonard L. Orr, USMC (Ret)
BGen Henry W. Hise, USMC (Ret)	Col Harry F. Painter, USMC (Ret)
BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, USMC (Ret)	Col Harold L. Parsons, USMC (Ret)
BGen Charles S. Robertson, USMC (Ret)	Col Clifford J. Peabody, USMC (Ret)
	Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer, USMC (Ret)
Col Harry E. Atkinson, USMC (Ret)	Col Roy L. Reed, USMC (Ret)
Col William D. Bassett, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col William E. Riley, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Noble L. Beck, USMC (Ret)	Col Horton E. Roeder, USMC (Ret)
Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr., USMC (Ret)	Col Richard A. Savage, USMC (Ret)
Col Eugene R. Brady, USMC (Ret)	Col John L. Schwartz, USMC (Ret)
Col James T. Breckinridge, USMC (Ret)	Col William Shanks, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col William C. Britt, USMC (Ret)	Col Walter Sienko, USMC (Ret)
Col Thomas E. Bulger, USMC (Ret)	Col Anthony J. Skotnicki, USMC (Ret)
Col Charles R. Burroughs, USMC (Ret)	Col Joseph Sleger, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col John S. Canton, USMC (Ret)	Col Edward W. Snelling, USMC (Ret)
Col Frank A. Clark, USMC (Ret)	

Col Charles R. Stephenson II, USMC (Ret)
 Col William W. Storm III, USMC (Ret)
 Col John M. Terry, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col Floyd H. Waldrop, USMC (Ret)
 Col Howard A. Westphall, USMC (Ret)
 Col H. Speed Wilson, USMC (Ret)
 Col Robert R. Wilson, USMC (Ret)
 Col William J. Zaro, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Roi E. Andrews, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Merrill M. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William F. Bethel, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Don R. Christensen, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Richard F. Daley, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Robert C. Evans, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Wesley L. Fox, USMC
 LtCol Donald J. Garrett, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Edward D. Gelzer, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol David G. Henderson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol David G. Harron, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Earl R. Hunter, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Raymond G. Kennedy, Sr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Charles H. Knowles, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Marvin H. Lugger, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Robert B. March, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Robert L. Modjeski, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Aydlette H. Perry, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol John E. Poindexter, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Thomas E. Raines, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Ward R. Reiss, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol David F. Seiler, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William F. Sparks, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Laurier J. Tremblay, USMC (Ret)

Capt Cyril L. Kammeier, USMC (Ret)
 Capt Joseph W. Pratte, USMC (Ret)

Sgt Gary S. Davis, USMC (Ret)

Army

Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)
 MajGen William A. Burke, USA (Ret)
 LtCol John W. Moser, USA (Ret)
 LtCol Adrian G. Traas, USA

Others

Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke
 Mr. Edward J. Marolda
 Mr. Bernard C. Nalty
 Ms. Barbara A. Rhenish
 Dr. Ronald H. Spector
 Dr. Wayne W. Thompson
 Mr. Willard J. Webb

Appendix F

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Reproduction of Status of Forces, 31 January 1969)

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
HEADQUARTERS																						
HQ, FMF, PAC																						
FMF, PAC (FWD)		74	1	24JUL68									74	1								
H&S BN, FMF, PAC	4	1673	50	15JAN69													1507	50			166	
CAMP S. D. BUTLER		810	137	15JAN69									810	137								
CASUAL		611		15JAN69									611									
HOSPITALIZED	7	1139		15JAN69									568		571							
HQ, V MEF																						
1ST CIVAFFGRP		63	7	28JAN69															63	7		
HQ, 5TH MARDIV																						
HQBN, 5TH MARDIV	4	1506	34	28JAN69															1461	34	45	
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF PAC																						
HQCO, FORTRPS	4	398	24	28JAN69																189	24	209
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																						
HQCO, 1ST MAR BRIG		230	8	28JAN69													230	8				
HQ, 9TH MAB																						
HQCO, 9TH MAB		482	20	28JAN69									482	20								
HQ, 111 MAF																						
H&S CO, 111 MAF	4	993	31	28JAN69	975	31																18
1ST CAG		436	19	28JAN69			436	19														
2D CAG	2	608	42	28JAN69	588	42																20
3D CAG		540	28	28JAN69					540	28												
4TH CAG		302	13	28JAN69							302	13										
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV																						
HQBN, 1ST MAR DIV	4	1930	42	28JAN69	1887	42																43
HQ, 3D MAR DIV																						
HQBN, 3D MAR DIV	4	2074	33	28JAN69							2053	33										21
INFANTRY																						
1ST MARINES																						
HQ CO		251	8	28JAN69	251	8																
1ST BATTALION		1054	59	28JAN69	1054	59																
2D BATTALION		1046	60	28JAN69	1046	60																
3D BATTALION		1105	59	28JAN69	1105	59																
3D MARINES																						
HQ CO		217	7	28JAN69	217	7																
1ST BATTALION		1156	56	28JAN69	1156	56																
2D BATTALION		1123	61	28JAN69							1123	61										
3D BATTALION		1154	56	28JAN69	1154	56																
4TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		218	6	28JAN69							218	6										
1ST BATTALION		1158	56	28JAN69							1158	56										
2D BATTALION		1113	61	28JAN69							1113	61										
3D BATTALION		1108	59	28JAN69							1108	59										
5TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		243	7	28JAN69	243	7																
1ST BATTALION		1033	61	28JAN69	1033	61																
2D BATTALION		981	54	28JAN69	981	54																
3D BATTALION		1119	61	28JAN69	1119	61																
7TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		242	7	28JAN69	242	7																
1ST BATTALION		995	56	28JAN69	995	56																
2D BATTALION		1059	59	28JAN69	1059	59																
3D BATTALION		1018	57	28JAN69	1018	57																
9TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		214	6	28JAN69							214	6										
1ST BATTALION		1106	56	28JAN69							1106	56										
2D BATTALION		1115	56	28JAN69							1115	56										
3D BATTALION		1118	56	28JAN69							1118	56										
26TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		500	12	28JAN69	261	6							239	6								
1ST BATTALION		1571	56	28JAN69	1571	56																
2D BATTALION	1	1621	96	28JAN69																	1621	96
3D BATTALION	1	1740	75	28JAN69																	1740	75
27TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		238	6	28JAN69															238	6		
1ST BATTALION		1095	86	28JAN69													1095	86				
2D BATTALION		1129	32	28JAN69															1129	32		
3D BATTALION		1144	32	28JAN69															1144	32		
28TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		244		28JAN69																244	7	
1ST BATTALION		1444	43	28JAN69																1444	43	
2D BATTALION		1182	36	28JAN69																1182	36	
3D BATTALION		1235	38	28JAN69																1235	38	

ARTILLERY					
11TH MARINES					
HQ BTRY	314	11	28JAN69	314	11
1ST BATTALION	665	18	28JAN69	665	18
2D BATTALION	671	15	28JAN69	671	15
3D BATTALION	650	16	28JAN69	650	16
4TH BATTALION	557	13	28JAN69	557	13
12TH MARINES					
HQ BTRY	296	16	28JAN69	296	16
1ST BATTALION	698	21	28JAN69	698	21
2D BATTALION	658	19	28JAN69	658	19
3D BATTALION	767	18	28JAN69	767	18
4TH BATTALION	514	14	28JAN69	514	14

[illegible]

SERVICE/SUPPORT

SERVICE/SUPPORT									
FLC, 111 MAF									
HQ, FLC/1ST FSR									
H&S BN	1642	58	28JAN69	1642	58				
SUPPLY BN	1958	37	28JAN69	1958	37				
7TH SEP HK FUEL CO									
MAINT BN	1148	9	28JAN69	1148	9				
FLSG-A/3D SERV BN	1336	26	28JAN69			1336	26		
FLSG-B/1ST SERV BN	1612	19	28JAN69	1612	19				
3D FSR									
H&S BN	1058	28	28JAN69			1058	28		
SUPPLY BN	1351	11	28JAN69			1351	11		
MAINT BN	1033		28JAN69			1033			
5TH FSR									
H&S BN	367	22	28JAN69					367	22
SUPPLY BN	432	18	28JAN69					432	18
MAINT BN	555		28JAN69					555	
5TH SERVICE BN	805	15	28JAN69			805	15		
PROV SERVICE BN, 9TH MAB	764	16	28JAN69			764	16		
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO	293		28JAN69					293	

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
MEDICAL		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
1ST MED BN		150	312	28JAN69	150	312																
3D MED BN		136	259	28JAN69					136	259												
5TH MED BN		96	157	28JAN69															96	157		
1ST HOSP CO		44	78	28JAN69	44	78																
5TH HOSP CO		30	48	28JAN69															30	48		
1ST DENTAL CO			83	28JAN69		83																
3D DENTAL CO			85	28JAN69			85															
5TH DENTAL CO			27	28JAN69																		
11TH DENTAL CO																		12		15		
13TH DENTAL CO		3	74	28JAN69	3	74																
15TH DENTAL CO			33	28JAN69																	33	
17TH DENTAL CO		3	39	28JAN69																3	39	
		4	57	28JAN69																4	57	
USMC		93,973			40,403		1,364		1,092		17,405		8,219		571		3,341		17,438			4,140
USN		4,445			1,921		129		296		675		244				163		829			188
GROUND TOTAL		98,418			42,324		1,493		1,388		18,080		8,463		571		3,504		18,267			4,328

AVIATION UNITS

[illegible]

[illegible]

Appendix G

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Reproduction of Status of Forces, 8 December 1969)

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		TO I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EAST PAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
HEADQUARTERS																						
HQ, FMF, PAC																						
FMF, PAC (FWD)	3	92	1	8MAY69													92	1				
H&S BN, FMF, PAC	3	1864	50	14MAY69													1864	50				
CAMP S. D. BUTLER		1456	124	25SEP69									1456	124								
CASUAL		423		25SEP69									423									
HOSPITALIZED	5	1168		25SEP69									1		570						27	
HQ, V MEB		1943	83	2DEC69															1943	83		
1ST CIVAFFGRP		61	3	2DEC69															61	3		
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF PAC																						
HQCO, FORTRPS		190	18	2DEC69															190	18		
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																						
HQCO, 1ST MAR BRIG		252	26	2DEC69													252	26				
HQ, I MEF																						
HQ 3D MARDIV																						
HQBN, 3D MARDIV		1830	79	2DEC69									1830	79								
HQ, III MAF																						
H&SCO, III MAF		1022	30	2DEC69	1022	30																
1ST CAG		509		2DEC69			509															
2D CAG		604		2DEC69	604																	
3D CAG		523		2DEC69					523													
4TH CAG		320		2DEC69							320											
HQ, 1ST MARDIV																						
HQBN, 1ST MARDIV	3	2138	47	2DEC69	2089	47																49
INFANTRY																						
1ST MARINES																						
HQ CO		273	10	2DEC69	273	10																
1ST BATTALION		1205	58	2DEC69	1205	58																
2D BATTALION		1191	57	2DEC69	1191	57																
3D BATTALION		1202	58	2DEC69	1202	58																
3D MARINES																						
HQ CO		288	9	2DEC69															288	9		
1ST BATTALION		1456	69	2DEC69											1456	69						
2D BATTALION		1356	74	2DEC69															1356	74		
3D BATTALION		1376	86	2DEC69															1376	86		
4TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		244	5	2DEC69									244	5								
1ST BATTALION		915	56	2DEC69									915	56								
2D BATTALION		927	55	2DEC69									927	55								
3D BATTALION		1163	54	2DEC69									1163	54								
5TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		342	7	2DEC69	342	7																
1ST BATTALION		1203	57	2DEC69	1203	57																
2D BATTALION		1218	51	2DEC69	1218	51																
3D BATTALION		1202	59	2DEC69	1202	59																
7TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		283	7	2DEC69	283	7																
1ST BATTALION		1184	57	2DEC69	1184	57																
2D BATTALION		1134	58	2DEC69	1134	58																
3D BATTALION		1203	43	2DEC69	1203	43																
9TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		389	54	2DEC69									389	54								
1ST BATTALION	1	1650	82	2DEC69																	1650	82
2D BATTALION	1	1552	57	2DEC69																	1552	57
3D BATTALION		1280	55	2DEC69									1280	55								
26TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		297	6	2DEC69	297	6																
1ST BATTALION		1317	60	2DEC69	1317	60																
2D BATTALION		1302	57	2DEC69	1302	57																
3D BATTALION		1318	56	2DEC69	1318	56																
ARTILLERY																						
11TH MARINES																						
HQ BTRY		448	10	2DEC69	448	10																
1ST BATTALION		647	16	2DEC69	647	16																
2D BATTALION		638	18	2DEC69	638	18																
3D BATTALION		621	16	2DEC69	621	16																
4TH BATTALION		588	13	2DEC69	588	13																

* UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH	STR RT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAT	PHU RAI	NO I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	PACIFIC	OTHER
		USMC USN		USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN
1ST BN, 13TH MAR		758 15	2DEC69	758 15								
HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG		20	2DEC69	20								
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY		179 3	2DEC69	179 3								
3D 175MM GUN BTRY		152 3	2DEC69	152 3								
5TH 175MM GUN BTRY		239 5	2DEC69				239 5					
1ST 8" HOW BTRY		220 5	2DEC69				220 5					
3D 8" HOW BTRY		228 4	2DEC69	228 4								
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY(CAME)												
RECONNAISSANCE												
1ST RECON BN		749 58	2DEC69	749 58								
3D RECON BN		501 37	2DEC69					337 28			164 9	
1ST FORCE RECON CO		145 7	2DEC69	145 7								
3D FORCE RECON CO		156 7	2DEC69				156 7					
ANTI-TANK												
1ST AT BN	4											
3D AT BN		154 7	2DEC69								154 7	
TANK												
1ST TANK BN		972 20	2DEC69	877 20								
3D TANK BN		910 23	2DEC69					478 13			432 10	
AMTRAC												
1ST AMTRAC BN		902 16	2DEC69									
3D AMTRAC BN		858 18	2DEC69	858 18				333 4			569 12	
ENGINEER												
1ST ENGR BN		923 15	2DEC69	923 15								
3D ENGR BN		767 22	2DEC69					371 18			336 4	
7TH ENGR BN		948 24	2DEC69	948 24								
9TH ENGR BN		1051 21	2DEC69		1051 21							
11TH ENGR BN		1112 19	2DEC69					516 15			596 4	
1ST BRIDGE CO		189	2DEC69		189							
3D BRIDGE CO (-)		85 1	2DEC69								85 1	
MOTOR TRANSPORT												
1ST MT BN		420 7	2DEC69	420 7								
3D MT BN (-)		232 12	2DEC69					144 10			88 2	
9TH MT BN		270 10	2DEC69					270 10				
11TH MT BN		517 10	2DEC69	517 10								
COMMUNICATION												
1ST RADIO BN		364	2DEC69	297						67		
5TH COMM BN (REIN)		1060 13	2DEC69	1060 13								
5TH COMM BN (-)		427 2	2DEC69					427 2				
9TH COMM BN		491 8	2DEC69					240 2			251 6	
1ST AMGLICO		110 4	2DEC69							110 4		
SHORE PARTY												
1ST SP BN		567 19	2DEC69	567 19								
3D SP BN		399 32	2DEC69					213 14			186 18	
MILITARY POLICE												
1ST MP BN		671 13	2DEC69	671 13								
3D MP BN		815 12	2DEC69	815 12								
SERVICE/SUPPORT												
PLC, III MAF												
HQ, FLC/1ST FSR												
HAS BN		1853 65	2DEC69	1853 65								
SUPPLY BN		1523 30	2DEC69	1523 30								
7TH SEP BK FUEL CO		150	2DEC69	160								

[illegible][illegible]

AVIATION UNITS

HQ SQDN FMFPAC	61	2DEC69	61
1ST MAW			
NWHG-1			
H&HS-1	835	36	2DEC69 835 36
NWFS-1	153		2DEC69 153
MWCS-1	304		2DEC69 304
MWSG-17			
H&MS-17	710	19	2DEC69 710 19
WERS-17	232		2DEC69 232
MAG-18			
H&HS-18	251	11	2DEC69 251 11
MASS-3	268	2	2DEC69 268 2
MACS-4	343	4	2DEC69 343 4
MAG-11			
H&MS-11	641		2DEC69 641
MABS-11	473	23	2DEC69 473 23
VMCJ-1	372		2DEC69 372
VMA(AW)-225	258	1	2DEC69 258 1
VMA(AW)-242	266	1	2DEC69 266 1
VMFA-542	286	1	2DEC69 286 1
MAG-12			
H&MS-12	447		2DEC69 447
MABS-12	553	24	2DEC69 553 24
MATCU-67	72		2DEC69 72
VMA-211	171	1	2DEC69 171 1
VMA-223	178	1	2DEC69 178 1
VMA-311	181	1	2DEC69 181 1
MAG-13			
H&MS-13	501		2DEC69 501
MABS-13	552	32	2DEC69 552 32
VMFA-115	278	1	2DEC69 278 1
VMFA-314	276	1	2DEC69 276 1
VMFA-122	358		2DEC69 358
MATCU-62	38		2DEC69 38
MAG-16			
H&MS-16	483		2DEC69 483
MABS-16	666	27	2DEC69 666 27
MATCU-68	52		2DEC69 52
VMO-2	276		2DEC69 276
HML-167	184		2DEC69 184
HMA-364	222	1	2DEC69 222 1
HMH-463	208	1	2DEC69 208 1
HMM-263	227	1	2DEC69 227 1
HMH-361	222	1	2DEC69 222 1

[illegible]

HMM-163	322	2DEC69									322		
HML-267	513	5 2DEC69									513	5	
HMM-265	174	2DEC69									174		
HMM-363	312	2DEC69									312		
MATCU-75	59	2DEC69									59		
USMC	29,213		7,932	4,174			1,903	2,391	1,559	10,741	513		
USN	344		129	63			27	34	21	64	6		
AVIATION TOTAL	29,557		8,061	4,237			1,930	2,425	1,580	10,805	519		

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DAI NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	No I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	82,282	39,456	1,560	523	4,727	15,417	570	3,841	12,246	3,942
	USN	3,668	1,762	21	0	74	999	0	150	509	153
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	29,213	7,932	4,174			1,903	2,391	1,559	10,741	513
	USN	344	129	63			27	34	21	64	6
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	111,495	47,388	5,734	523	4,727	17,320	2,961	5,400	22,987	4,455
	USN	4,012	1,891	84	0	74	1,026	34	171	573	159

- NOTES:
- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF'S.
 - FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN RVN.
 - PERSONNEL IN "OTHER" ARE ASSIGNED TO IT, ITT, SSC, CI TEAMS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE PLATOONS.
 - STRENGTH INCLUDED IN 1ST AND 3D TANK BATTALIONS.
 - THE 597 PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER" ARE HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA, BUT ARE CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, MCB, CAMP BUTLER.

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